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 2 
Overview 
 Over the last few decades, researchers have attempted to identify specific risk 
factors that influence the onset of various types of emotional distress in adolescence. One 
of the most extreme manifestations of emotional distress in adolescents is suicidality. To 
date, researchers have garnered evidence of the influence of emotional (i.e. depression 
and negative affect) (i.e. Negron, Piacentini, Graae, Davies, & Shaffer, 1997) and 
psychosocial (familial turmoil and social isolation) (i.e. Adams, Overholser, & Lehnert, 
1994; Groholt, Ekeberg, Wichstrom, & Haldorsen, 2000) processes that contribute to the 
onset of suicidality in adolescents. Cognitive factors (i.e. hopelessness and self-efficacy) 
have also been shown to contribute to the onset of suicidality in adolescents. However, no 
researchers to date have explored the relationship between thought-action fusion and 
suicide proneness. My purpose in this study was to investigate the relationship between 
thought-action fusion thinking styles and four measures of suicide proneness in a 
community sample of adolescents. In addition, I examined gender and age differences in 
regards to thought-action fusion thinking styles.  
Prelude in Cognitive Theory 
 In this section, I review the role of thought-action fusion within the parameters of 
cognitive theory. Over the last few decades a number of researchers have used the 
cognitive model to explain the onset of psychopathology in both adults and adolescents 
(Beck & Emery, 1985). Broadly, cognitive theorists assert that how one thinks largely 
impacts how one feels and/or behaves (Engler, 2006). Within cognitive theory Beck and 
Hollon (1993) contend that the role of schemas are vital in the maintenance of emotional 
stability within an individual. Specifically, a schema is a cognitive structure that acts as a 
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blueprint of an individual’s core beliefs and assumptions about how the world functions 
(Engler, 2006). According to Beck, schemas develop early in life, and are continually 
transformed by a person’s individual experiences or features of the environment in which 
an individual resides (Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003).   
 Beck and Hollon (1993) noted that cognitive schemas can either influence or 
inhibit the onset of emotional distress and/or psychopathology. Specifically, Beck (1967) 
theorized that negative schemas are often developed through the continued use of 
cognitive distortions and maladaptive automatic thoughts in daily functioning. Cognitive 
distortions refer to the processes where information gleaned from external events 
engender a significant amount of systematic bias that hinder one’s ability to effectively 
test reality (Leung & Wong, 1998). Furthermore, maladaptive automatic thoughts 
represent thinking patterns that reflect this systematic error, leaving one more vulnerable 
to the onset of psychological distress or deviant behavior (Leung & Wong, 1998).      
 Considering the developmental aspects of adolescents, it is not hard to surmise 
that teenagers may be more influenced by cognitive distortions then adults. An important 
aspect of Piaget’s formal operations stage that is useful in predicting emotional stability 
in adolescence is the ability to successfully test reality. Adolescents must shed 
dependence upon egocentric-approaches in appraising specific events (Lapsley, Milstead, 
Quintana, Flannery, & Buss, 1986), master an appropriate level of responsibility and 
control over their lives (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989), and develop a stable sense 
of self-concept (Erikson, 1968), in order to effectively establish accurate reality testing 
abilities. However, if adolescents continually face negative life stressors and/or their 
environment is not conducive to positive development, adolescents may depend more 
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upon cognitive distortions and maladaptive automatic thoughts to cope with their daily 
lives (Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003). Unfortunately, reliance upon cognitive 
distortions will likely inhibit the ability to effectively test reality, therefore, creating more 
distress for the adolescent.     
 Lastly, since adolescents appear more prone to cognitive distortions and 
vulnerabilities, Orbach, Mikulincer, Blumenson, Mester, and Stein (1999) noted that it is 
important for researchers to continue to identify cognitive variables that may be pervasive 
in an adolescent’s attempt to maintain emotional stability. One specific cognitive variable 
that appears to have a significant influence on an adolescent’s ability to maintain 
emotional stability is thought-action fusion (Muris, Meesters, Rassin, Merckelbach, & 
Campbell, 2001). 
The Presentation of the Thought-Action Fusion Construct 
 Thought-action fusion (TAF) was derived from Rachman’s (1993) desire to use 
the cognitive model to help explain the onset of obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Moreover, Rachman (1993) noticed his patients’ obsessions could be characterized by 
three features: an elevated sense of responsibility, the attachment of undue significance to 
obsessional activities, and the tendency to psychologically fuse thoughts and actions 
(Rachman, 1993).  
Specifically, Rachman (1993) noted that when a patient experienced an 
obsessional thought, it was generally accompanied by a strong sense of responsibility for 
the thought and its significance in the outcome of an event. Generally, Rachman 
contended that this procedure is similar to a self-defeating process. First, the patient feels 
morally and psychologically responsible for the intrusive thought. As a result, the patient 
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is likely to punish himself/herself by internalizing an irrational amount of blame for 
allowing the intrusive thought to exist. Lastly, the patient will experience extreme 
amounts of guilt for not being able to control the intrusive thought which he/she 
perceived led to a negative outcome. For instance, a person who has intrusive sexual or 
violent thoughts about another is likely to chastise himself/herself for having those 
thoughts and experience a strong sense of internal blame and guilt if anything negative 
happens to the person the intrusive thoughts were directed towards.  
The second feature of Rachman’s (1993) obsessional thinking is the assigning of 
significance to the intrusive thought. Rachman noted that most individuals confront 
intrusive thoughts on a daily basis, however only a handful of individuals are negatively 
affected by these thoughts. These individuals who are negatively affected by the intrusive 
thoughts are likely to attribute some special significance to the intrusive thought that 
helps maintain its position within human consciousness. Rachman observed that when the 
intrusive thought is attached to some kind of special meaning and withheld in human 
consciousness, it is likely to become more distressing and adhesive. Rachman asserted 
that distress most likely would take the form of debilitative anxiety and/or guilt. Rachman 
also noted that the adhesive quality of attributing a special meaning to intrusive thoughts 
likely influences the re-occurrence of attributing special meaning to other intrusive 
thoughts. Thus, the individual simulates a downward spiral affect whereby one is 
conditioned to continually recognize and attach special meanings to the most negative 
intrusive thoughts.  
The last feature of Rachman’s (1993) obsessional thought theory occurs when an 
individual fuses an intrusive thought with a forbidden action. Specifically, the fusion 
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aspect occurs when an individual appears to regard the intrusive thought and the 
forbidden action as morally equivalent to each other (TAF-Moral beliefs) (e.g. it is 
equally wrong to think about pushing someone out a window as to actually pushing 
someone out the window). These individuals are likely to feel they are unable to control 
the fusion between the intrusive thoughts and the forbidden action, which in turn will 
likely exacerbate the amount of distress or guilt experienced. Additionally, Rachman also 
noted that his patients often fused negative thoughts with the expectancy of certain 
outcome events. Specifically, he noticed that his patients were more likely to believe that 
thinking of a negative event will increase the odds the actual negative event will occur 
(TAF-Likelihood beliefs). Similarly, these individuals feel a strong sense of 
responsibility for the occurrence of a negative event, which makes them more vulnerable 
to bouts of anxiety, self-blame, and depression.  
Overall, it appears that an inability to control and shed intrusive thoughts 
precipitates a maladaptive process that leads to the experience of extreme guilt and self-
blame. Moreover, interference by intrusive thoughts may inhibit the ability of individuals 
to successfully test reality. If individuals continue to use this specific appraisal style in 
managing difficult situations, it is likely that the amount of distress experienced will 
develop into more psychopathological problems such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
depression, other types of anxiety disorders, and potentially suicidal ideation and/or 
attempts (Berle & Starcevic, 2005).  
Onset of Thought-Action Fusion 
 Although there has been no empirical evidence that explains the precipitation of 
TAF beliefs, some researchers (i.e. Berle & Starcevic, 2005; Rassin & Koster, 2003; 
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Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman, & Freeston, 1999) have theorized about a few constructs 
that may influence the onset of TAF beliefs. Salkovskis and colleagues (1999) asserted 
that TAF beliefs develop from numerous subtle interacting factors that an individual 
experiences over many years. Specifically, Salkovskis and colleagues (1999) noted that 
the inflated responsibility towards beliefs is oriented from two factors. The first factors 
that appear to be associated with the onset of TAF beliefs are strict belief systems and 
behavioral codes that are imbued upon a person by an authoritative figure (Berle & 
Starcevic, 2005). Specifically, religion and/or religiosity may be one vital source of these 
strict beliefs and/or behavioral codes (Rassin & Koster, 2003). However, Rassin and 
Koster (2003) clearly stated that their results do not indicate that being religious or 
actively participating in religious doctrine is likely to increase the chances of one fusing 
intrusive thoughts and forbidden actions. Rather that it is the common traits (i.e. a rigid 
interpretation of belief system, a person’s conviction, and/or an excessive fear of staunch 
religious people of being punished or criticized) that are usually found within staunch 
religious individuals, which may make them to more susceptible to TAF beliefs.   
 Another potentially contributing factor to the onset of TAF is the specific time 
when the intrusive thoughts occur. Specifically, Salkovskis and colleagues (1999) 
postulated that TAF beliefs develop following a specific event. Berle and Starcevic 
(2005) elaborated further by stating that a “coincidental co-occurrence of a thought and a 
significant event may lead to a person to form an erroneous causal link between the two 
(p. 278).” These coincidental co-occurrences may be important in the onset of TAF 
beliefs. This is especially true if these co-occurrences continue to occur through the 
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development of an individual or if they are combined with particular pre-existing 
attitudes or assumptions (i.e. other intrusive beliefs) (Berle & Starcevic, 2005).  
 Lastly, Berle and Starcevic (2005) noted that other personality characteristics 
such as neuroticism, narcissism, and/or harm avoidance may influence on the onset of 
TAF beliefs. Specifically, they noted that personality factors that feature faulty 
assumptions about the power or influence of one’s belief system may impact the onset of 
specific TAF beliefs. However, no researchers, to date, have examined if a relationship 
exists between TAF beliefs and personality traits, much less the role personality factors 
play in the onset and/or exacerbation of TAF beliefs.     
Assessment of Thought-Action Fusion  
TAF beliefs are assessed by using two distinct but highly correlated measures. 
The first and most globally used type of measurement of TAF beliefs is a self-report 
instrument (The Thought-Action Fusion Questionnaire; Shafran, Thordarson, & 
Rachman, 1996). Researchers have concluded that the self-report instrument is a valid 
and reliable measure of adult engagement in TAF thinking. Similarly, Muris and 
colleagues (2001) established a TAF self-report survey for adolescents. Again, 
researchers have deemed the adolescent version of the self-report TAF instrument as a 
reliable and valid measure. 
 A second type of assessment for measuring TAF beliefs is Rachman, Shafran, 
Mitchell, Trant, and Teachman’s (1996) “sentence paradigm” experiment. Rachman and 
colleagues developed an experiment to evoke TAF beliefs in participants. Specifically, 
Rachman and colleagues asked participants to think of a name of a close friend or 
relative. After the participant identifies a close friend or relative, the experimenters give 
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the participants a piece of paper with an incomplete sentence on it (e.g. I hope _____ is in 
a car accident). The participant is asked to write the name of the close friend or relative in 
the blank and then spend a few minutes reflecting on the situation that the sentence 
produces. The experiment has been found to elicit such distress as anxiety, discomfort, 
and the urge to neutralize (Rachman et al., 1996). Shafran and Rachman (2004) noted 
that such an experiment reflects the operation of TAF in individuals. Furthermore, 
Rachman and colleagues (1996) indicated that there was a strong association between 
TAF-Likelihood for others scores on the TAF self-survey and the estimates of the 
probability of the adverse events measured by the sentence paradigm experiment. This 
strong association indicates that the TAF-Likelihood for others has strong predictive 
validity.  
Correlates of Thought-Action Fusion 
 Researchers (Abramowitz, Whiteside, Lynam, & Kalsy, 2003; Amir, Freshman, 
Ramsey, Neary, & Brigidi, 2001; Coles, Mennin, & Heimberg, 2001; Hazlett-Stevens, 
Zucker, & Craske, 2002; Muris et al., 2001; Barrett & Healy, 2003; Rassin, Muris, 
Schmidt, & Merckelbach, 2000; Shafran et al., 1996) have identified that TAF beliefs are 
associated with various types of emotional distress in both clinical and non-clinical 
samples. Specifically, TAF beliefs have been associated with obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms, inflated responsibility, guilt, other types of anxiety symptoms, and depression. 
Obsessive-compulsive symptoms and TAF beliefs. As previously noted, TAF 
beliefs were originally observed by Rachman (1993) in order to help researchers and 
clinicians explain a viable model of how the onset of OCD occurs within specific 
individuals. As a result of Rachman’s (1993) observations, many researchers 
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(Abramowitz, et al., 2003; Amir, et al., 2001; Coles et al., 2001; Rassin, et al., 2000) have 
found a positive association between TAF beliefs and OCD symptoms. Moreover, 
Abramowitz and colleagues (2003) asserted that the association between TAF beliefs and 
OCD symptoms may indicate that TAF might be a significant factor in the onset of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) type symptoms. Furthermore, Abranmowitz and 
colleagues’ assertion gives credence to the possibility that cognitive factors play a major 
role in the treatment of OCD.  
Unfortunately, a positive association between TAF beliefs and OCD symptoms 
does not indicate that TAF beliefs play a powerful role in the onset or exacerbation of 
OCD symptoms. However, a handful of researchers have constructed structural equation 
models to help clarify the role of TAF beliefs in the onset of OCD symptoms. 
Specifically, Rassin and colleagues (2000) postulated that TAF beliefs’ interaction with 
thought suppression might explain a significant portion of variance in the onset of OCD 
symptoms. They theorized that an individual who over-evaluated the significance and 
consequences of intrusive thoughts (TAF) would attempt to use more thought 
suppression strategies to alleviate some of the distress. Paradoxically, researchers such as 
Wegner, Schneider, Carter, and White (1987) found that suppression of thoughts 
exacerbated the amount of intrusive thoughts experienced. As a result, Rassin and 
colleagues (2000) postulated that the combination of TAF beliefs and thought 
suppression would likely influence the onset of OCD symptoms.  
Additionally, Rassin and colleagues (2000) tested five models that they thought 
could account for a majority of variance in OCD symptomology. Their analysis revealed 
that only one of their models had an adequate fit. Specifically, that model suggested TAF 
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beliefs led to the use of more thought suppression, which in turn increased the likelihood 
of individuals experiencing OCD symptoms.  
 Similarly, Abramowitz and colleagues (2003) wanted to determine if TAF beliefs 
were directly associated with OCD symptoms or if other variables mediated the 
relationship between TAF beliefs and OCD symptoms. They noted that since TAF beliefs 
were associated with other types of emotional distress (i.e. symptoms of anxiety and 
depression) it might be plausible to assume that negative affect mediates the relationship 
between TAF beliefs and OCD symptoms. They ran a mediational model where they 
used TAF beliefs as the dependent variable, diagnostic groups as the independent 
variable, and negative affect (i.e. symptoms of anxiety and depression) as the mediating 
variable. Their data were taken from samples of patients with a diagnosis of OCD, panic 
attack disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, social phobia, depression, and a non-clinical 
control group. These six groups were regressed onto five dummy variables, so that the 
researchers could easily contrast each of the groups against the OCD group in regards to 
TAF beliefs. Before examining the mediational role of negative affect, the researchers 
indicated that patients with a primary diagnosis of OCD reported higher scores of TAF-
Likelihood beliefs than all of the other diagnostic groups. However, after controlling for 
the effect of anxiety and depressions scores (i.e. negative affect), they found that TAF 
belief scores for the OCD group were not different from the scores of any other 
diagnostic group. Thus, Abramowitz and colleagues suggested that negative affect, in the 
form of depression and anxiety, mediated the relationship between TAF beliefs 
(particularly TAF-Likelihood beliefs) and OCD symptomology. 
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 Perceived responsibility and TAF beliefs. Amir and colleagues (2001) found that 
TAF beliefs were positively related to inflated types of responsibility in the onset of 
obsessions. Specifically, Rachman (1997) proposed that an inflated sense of 
responsibility can both contribute to and engender a significant amount of TAF beliefs in 
an individual. As a result of Rachman’s theory, researchers have examined the 
relationship between TAF beliefs and responsibility. Specifically, a number of 
researchers (i.e. Gwilliam, Well, & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Rachman et al., 1996; 
Smari & Holmsteinsson, 2001; Yorulmaz, Yilmaz, & Gencoz, 2004) have concluded that 
there is a positive association between TAF beliefs and an inflated sense of responsibility.  
 Despite the positive relationship between inflated responsibility and TAF beliefs, 
Berle and Starcevic (2005) asserted there are other issues that need to be investigated in 
order for a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship. One such issue is the 
notion of a uni-dimensional idea of responsibility. Berle and Starcevic (2005) contended 
that there may be more then one type of inflated responsibility that TAF beliefs might be 
related to. In general terms, Rheaume, Freeston, Dugas, Letarte, and Ladouceur (1998) 
described perceived responsibility as a “belief that one possesses the pivotal power to 
provoke or prevent subjective crucial outcomes (p. 7).” According to Berle and Starcevic 
(2005) this type of perceived responsibility seems to be more closely related to TAF-
Likelihood beliefs, as opposed to TAF-Moral beliefs. Individuals who report high levels 
of TAF-Likelihood beliefs generally perceive that their thought processes have a magical 
power that influences certain realistic events. As a result, these individuals are likely to 
believe that it is their responsibility to prevent harm either to themselves or others for 
engaging in a specific thought processes.  
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However, this does not appear to be the case with those individuals who report 
high levels of TAF-Moral beliefs. TAF-Moral beliefs reflect the idea that thoughts are 
equivalent to specific actions. As a result, they would most likely not be concerned about 
whether or not they could inhibit or enhance the likelihood of a certain outcome because 
there is no longer any harm to prevent. In their perception, by thinking certain immoral 
thoughts they have already sinned, therefore, feeling more hopeless and helpless about 
the possibility of rectifying their sins.  
 Alternatively, Rachman (1993) described another type of perceived responsibility 
that may be associated with TAF beliefs. He noted that a second type of inflated 
responsibility involves the appraisal of the occurrence of intrusive thoughts. Rachman 
(1993) stated that when an individual attaches a significant meaning to intrusive thoughts, 
it is often associated with a sense that he/she is morally responsible for having such 
thoughts. Berle and Starcevic (2005) believe that this type of responsibility is more 
associated with TAF-Moral beliefs compared to TAF-Likelihood beliefs. However, no 
researchers, to my knowledge, have examined the relationship between both subscales of 
TAF beliefs with various types of responsibilities. 
Guilt and TAF beliefs. A number of researchers (Berle & Starcevic, 2005; 
Rachman et al., 1995; Rachman et al., 1996) have postulated that the logical outcome of 
attributing significant meanings to intrusive thoughts is guilt. This is especially true in 
regards to TAF beliefs. Berle and Starcevic (2005) asserted that guilt and responsibility 
are “closely aligned experiences (p. 273).” Therefore, a person experiencing irrational 
amounts of inflated responsibility for having immoral thoughts (TAF-Moral) or for not 
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being able to prevent harm that is associated with the intrusive thoughts (TAF-
Likelihood) may be more at risk to experience a significant amount of guilt.  
Rachman and colleagues (1995) did find support for the positive association 
between the subscales of TAF beliefs and state/trait guilt. Furthermore, Rachman and 
colleagues (1996) suggested that guilt appears to increase when TAF thinking is induced 
by the “sentence paradigm” experiment. Lastly, in a study that looked at the 
neutralization of TAF beliefs, Zucker, Craske, Barrios, and Holguin (2002) found that 
guilt was one of the motivating factors that drove individuals to attempt to neutralize the 
potential threat of harm from TAF-Likelihood beliefs.      
Anxiety symptoms and TAF beliefs. In addition to experiencing intense amounts of 
guilt, individuals who engage in TAF beliefs may also be subjected to bouts of anxiety. 
During clinical interviews with patients who had a diagnosis of generalized anxiety 
disorder, Borkovec and Roemer (1995) asked them what was the benefit of worrying 
about a specific event? The overwhelming response from the patients was that they felt 
excessive worry would diminish the likelihood that something bad would happen to 
them. As a result, Hazlett-Stevens and colleagues (2002) highlighted the possibility that 
TAF related beliefs may play an integral role in the onset of other anxiety related 
disorders besides OCD.  
In an undergraduate sample, Hazlett-Stevens and colleagues (2002) found that 
pathological worry was significantly associated with the TAF-Likelihood beliefs, 
however, they did not find an association between pathological worry and TAF-Moral 
beliefs. Furthermore, Hazlett-Stevens and colleagues also found that TAF-Likelihood 
beliefs were more prevalent in a group of undergraduates who met the criteria for full-
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blown or partial generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), then those undergraduates who did 
not meet any of the criteria for GAD.  
Moreover, some researchers (Rassin, Diepstraten, Merckelbach, & Muris, 2001a; 
Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, & Schmidt, 2001b) have found empirical evidence that TAF 
beliefs may be prevalent in other anxiety disorder, besides OCD and GAD. Specifically, 
Rassin, Diepstraten, and colleagues (2001a) found in an adult clinical sample that there 
were no significant differences in TAF beliefs among patients with OCD, panic attack 
disorder, social phobia, and GAD. Additionally, in a university student sample, Rassin, 
Merckelbach, and colleagues (2001b) found that students with mixed-anxiety diagnosis 
scored significantly higher on TAF beliefs then students with no anxiety diagnosis.   
Depression and TAF beliefs. As previously noted, Abramowitz and colleagues 
(2003) determined that depression was one of a few factors that mediated the relationship 
between TAF beliefs and OCD symptomology. Specifically, Berle and Starcevic (2005) 
noted that some elements of TAF beliefs may be associated with self-blame, 
personalization, and guilt tendencies that are apparent in depression. As a result, Berle 
and Starcevic suggested that TAF beliefs may play an integral role in the development 
and the maintenance of depression.  
A number of researchers (Abramowitz et al., 2003; Muris et al., 2001; Rachman 
et al., 1995; Rassin, Merckelbach, et al., 2001; Shafran et al., 1996) have found a positive 
association between depression and TAF beliefs. However, upon closer examination, it 
appears that only TAF-Moral beliefs account for the association with depression. 
Considering that anxiety and depression are highly associated with each other, 
Abramowitz and colleagues (2003) wanted to determine whether the TAF 
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belief/depression relationship existed after controlling for the variance accounted for by 
anxiety. As hypothesized, their results suggested that after controlling for the variance 
accounted for by anxiety, depression was moderately associated with TAF-Moral beliefs.  
Berle and Starcevic asserted that TAF-Moral beliefs play a more integral role in 
the development and maintenance of depression because of an embedded sense of 
ineffectiveness or powerlessness to change the moral wrong. Again, going back the 
features of TAF-Moral beliefs, Shafran and colleagues (1996) contended that once an 
individual has allowed an immoral negative thought to exist, it is equivalent to have 
committing the immoral act. Consequently, once the individual has acknowledged the 
immoral thought, the damage has already been done. Essentially, this process does not 
allow for the possibility of self-correction or intervention, therefore, leaving the 
individual in a state of powerlessness and/or helplessness to rectify the immoral response.   
Adolescence and TAF Beliefs  
 To date, only a few researchers have examined the cognitive processes of TAF 
beliefs in adolescents. In both studies, researchers attempted to replicate findings from an 
adult sample onto a sample of adolescents. Muris and colleagues (2001) wanted to 
determine if the correlations between TAF beliefs and a number of distress variables 
would be upheld in a sample of community adolescents. Muris and colleagues (2001) 
validated that both TAF-Likelihood beliefs and TAF-Moral beliefs were positively 
associated with state/trait anxiety, obsessions, agoraphobia, generalized anxiety disorder, 
separation anxiety, social phobias, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and depression in 
adolescents.  
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Barrett and Healy (2003) also found that children with a clinical diagnosis of 
OCD reported higher levels of TAF beliefs compared to a controlled sample of 
community children. As a result, both sets of researchers concluded that similar TAF 
thinking processes occur in both community and clinical samples of adolescents and 
adult. 
Adolescent Suicide and TAF Beliefs.   
 In light of the various correlates of TAF beliefs (i.e. inflated responsibility, guilt, 
anxiety, and depression), researchers have begun to ponder the question of whether TAF 
beliefs are specific only to the onset of OCD or are they a general process that can lead to 
the onset of a number of other disorders? Shafran and Rachman (2004) asserted that TAF 
research needs to be extended by demonstrating if the phenomenon contributes to the 
onset of other types of clinical disorders (i.e. affective or eating disorders). My main goal 
in this proposed study was to determine if TAF beliefs have a significant association with 
suicidal prone thoughts and behaviors in adolescents.  
 Although there has been no known researcher who has garnered empirical 
evidence that an association exists between TAF beliefs and suicidal thinking and 
behaviors in adolescents, there are several commonalities that exist between the two 
constructs. Firstly, TAF beliefs and suicidal behaviors share some common correlates. 
Much like TAF beliefs, suicidal prone thoughts and behaviors are positively associated 
with guilt (i.e. Hailborn, 2000), anxiety and/or pathological worry (i.e. Askenazy, Sorci, 
Benoit, Lestideau, Myquel, & Lecrubier, 2003), and depression (i.e. Rohde, Seeley, 
Langhinrichsen-Rohling, & Rohling, 2003). Furthermore, if TAF beliefs engender 
frequent bouts of guilt, anxiety/worry, and/or depression, an individual may become 
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increasingly more vulnerable to severe forms of emotional distress (i.e. suicide ideation 
and/or suicide attempts) (Rohde, Seeley, Langhinrichsen-Rohling, & Rohling, 2003).  
 Secondly, as previously noted, TAF can be described as an internalized cognitive 
response style (Berle & Starcevic, 2005). Moreover, TAF appraisals are likely to 
incorporate some type of obsessional impulse which Berle and Starcevic (2005) 
described as a severe form of rumination. Specifically, individuals who experience TAF 
beliefs are likely to ruminate about negative outcomes that could occur as a result of the 
immoral intrusive thought. As defined by Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, and Larsen (1997) 
rumination is “passively and repetitively focusing on one’s symptoms of distress and the 
circumstances surrounding those symptoms (p. 855).” People who tend ruminate more 
generally are prone to lengthen or worsen their negative emotions (Butler & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1994).  
Eshun (2000) hypothesized that rumination scores would predict a significant 
amount of variance in suicide ideation scores in a sample of American young adults. As 
expected, Eshun’s results indicated that rumination did predict a significant amount of 
variance in suicide ideation scores. Furthermore, Eshun (2000) concluded that cognitive 
appraisal styles that incorporated more rumination were likely to be associated with more 
severe forms of emotional distress such as suicidal attempts. Overall, since TAF appears 
to be an internalized cognitive appraisal style that places a heavy emphasis on 
rumination, it is reasonable to assume that TAF beliefs may be associated with some 
forms of suicidality in adolescence.  
 Lastly, Berle and Starcevic (2005) theorized that TAF beliefs may be related to a 
low sense of self-worth.  Specifically, Shafran and colleagues (1996) cited an example of 
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an OCD patient experiencing TAF beliefs. In this vignette, Shafran and colleagues 
highlighted that after experiencing the TAF belief the patient negatively evaluated herself 
as being a “bad” person. This negative evaluation may be the precipitant factor that spurs 
the onset of other more severe forms of emotional distress such as suicide ideation and/or 
suicide attempts. A number of researchers (i.e. Fergusson, Beautrais, & Horwood, 2003; 
Groholt, Ekeberg, Wichstrom, & Haldorsen, 2000; Lewinsohn, Rohde, & Seeley, 1994) 
have found strong evidence that suggests that self-esteem is an influential factor in the 
onset of both suicide ideation and suicide behaviors in adolescents and young adults. 
Additionally, Groholt, Ekeberg, Wichstrom, and Haldorsen (2005) theorized that 
individuals who suffer from low self-esteem have a difficult time giving themselves 
positive feedback; increasing the likelihood that an individual experiences some type of 
suicidal manifestation. In sum, it appears that TAF beliefs may act as an antecedent for 
low self-esteem, which places an individual at a higher level of risk for experiencing 
some type of suicidal thoughts and/or behaviors.  
Gender and TAF Beliefs 
 Another gap in the TAF literature that needs to be considered is the role of gender 
differences in the conceptualization of TAF beliefs. To date, there has been only one 
known researcher who has looked at the effects of gender on TAF beliefs. Muris and 
colleagues (2001) sampled a group of Dutch adolescents in secondary school, and 
reported that males and females did not differ significantly on measures of both TAF-
Moral beliefs and TAF-Likelihood beliefs. However, it is debatable whether this finding 
would generalize to another sample of adolescents (i.e. a sample of American community 
adolescents). 
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 Consequently, there is a wealth of empirical evidence and theory that suggests 
that gender differences in TAF beliefs could occur in a sample of American adolescents. 
Berle and Starcevic (2005) asserted that TAF beliefs are actually a type of an appraisal 
style. One quality of the TAF appraisal style is the specific emphasis on internalization. 
Essentially, an individual places irrational blame upon the self for not being able to 
control his/her intrusive thoughts or the outcome engendered by his/her intrusive 
thoughts. As a result, one could easily describe TAF as internalized cognitive appraisal 
style. Moreover, a large number of researchers (i.e. Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; 
Ingram, 1990; Ingram, Cruet, Johnson, & Winsnicks, 1988; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1993; Sethi & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1997) have found that female adolescents in the U.S. are 
more likely then U.S. adolescent males to engage in more internalized cognitive appraisal 
strategies. 
 In an attempt to clarify how gender differences in depression arise, Butler and 
Nolen-Hoeksema (1994) found that depressed women were more likely to use self-
reflection, ruminative coping strategies, whereas depressed men were likely to distract 
themselves more often by thinking about or doing other things. Experimentally, Ingram 
and colleagues (1988) found that regardless of their current mood men preferred to focus 
on more external tasks (i.e. watching television) while women preferred to focus on more 
internal tasks (i.e. looking at oneself in the mirror). Additionally, Klimes-Dougan and 
colleagues (1999) found that participants who were more suicidal used more internal 
cognitive appraisal styles (i.e. rumination) compared to adolescents who were not 
suicidal. However, both Butler and Nolen-Hoeksema (1994) and Ingram and colleagues 
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(1988) sampled adults for their investigation, and were concerned about whether these 
results could generalize to an adolescent sample.  
As a result, Sethi and Nolen-Hoeksema (1997) wanted to determine whether 
specific cognitive appraisal styles could be differentiated by gender in a sample of 
adolescents. As expected, Sethi and Nolen-Hoeksema (1997) experimentally found that 
males and females tended to think about very different things. Regardless of mood, Sethi 
and Nolen-Hoeksema reported that female thinking patterns reflected an internal and 
relational focus, whereas male thinking patterns reflected an external focus.  
Overall, since TAF has been theoretically classified as an internalized cognitive appraisal 
style, one might conclude that TAF beliefs may be more pervasive in female American 
adolescents compared to their male counterparts. Additionally, gender differences in TAF 
thinking might help researchers explain why gender differences occur in other clinical 
constructs (i.e. depression and suicidality). Therefore, a secondary purpose for me in this 
study was to determine whether gender differences exist in TAF thinking. 
 Chronological Age and TAF Beliefs 
 Despite the empirical results that suggest similar TAF processes occur in both 
adult and adolescent samples, there have been no known research that has taken into 
consideration developmental aspects of adolescents and how it impacts the onset of TAF 
beleifs. Specifically, developmental researchers (Elkind, 1967; Hudson & Gray, 1986; 
Looft & Charles, 1971; Low, 1999; Makros & McCabe, 2001; Wilson, Stelzer, Bergman, 
Kral, Inayatullah, & Elliot, 1995) theorized that during adolescence, normal individuals 
experience a lack of self-insight towards their thoughts and beliefs, a difficult time 
constructing their identity, and a heighten state of egocentric thinking. These 
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developmental factors may contribute a significant amount of variance in the onset of 
TAF beliefs.  
Piaget’s Theory. According to Piaget (as cited in Diessner & Tiegs, 2001), 
adolescence is marked by the ability to think abstractly (i.e. formal operations). More 
specifically, Piaget characterized formal operations as a type of hypothetico-deductive 
thinking that allows teenagers to draw conclusions about specific events from their 
perceptions and hypotheses. This type of thinking is quite discrepant from previous 
methods individuals used as a child going through the concrete operations stage of 
cognitive development. Specifically, concrete thinking requires individuals to observe 
events in order for them to reflect and form hypothesis, while in formal operations 
adolescents are now liberated from thinking that is built on concrete operations. This shift 
allows adolescents to draw conclusions about stimuli based on their self-reflections and 
theories. However, drawing conclusions from perceptions and hypotheses may be quite 
alarming for the teenager who just entered into adolescence. Specifically, Piaget asserted 
that young teenagers are “frequently occupied with disarmingly naïve and chimeric ideas 
concerning the future of the world (as cited in Diessner & Teigs, 2001, p. 242).” As a 
result, younger adolescents may be more susceptible to misuse their new thinking 
abilities. Younger adolescent may frequently misinterpret the cause of specific events, 
due to their naïve hypothesis and perceptions of themselves and the world in which they 
live. However, as young adolescents grow older, Piaget noted that they will become more 
accurate in interpreting the meaning of events. This process may explain why younger 
teenagers are more prone to irrational and inaccurate thinking then older teenagers. 
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Specifically, younger teenagers may frequently misinterpret their abilities in affecting 
certain outcomes.  
Erikson’s Theory. Additionally, according to Low (1999) identity development 
plays an integral role in the formation of cognitive processes. Specifically, Erikson 
(1968) noted that a developed sense of identity was more synonymous with positive and 
healthy cognitive beliefs. However, Erikson noted that in adolescents who were in a state 
of identity diffusion cognitive errors in information processing became more prevalent. 
Marcia (1966) defined identity diffusion as a state where individuals are not presently 
exploring alternative beliefs and in general have not committed to a set of beliefs that 
increase the quality of daily functioning.  
Moreover, Makros and McCabe (2001) postulated that adolescents who were in a 
state of identity diffusion would have a greater discrepancy between how one’s ideal self 
and one’s real self could function in the world. As expected, they did find evidence that 
adolescents who were in a state of identity diffusion were more likely to have larger 
discrepancies between how their ideal and actual self could function in the world. 
Alternatively, they found that adolescents who were able to commit to a set of beliefs and 
use alternative explanations effectively (Identity Achievement) had a smaller discrepancy 
between how one’s ideal self and real self could function in the world.  
Considering that older adolescents generally have more interpersonal experience 
in dealing with daily stress, it is plausible to conclude that they would be less prone to be 
in a state of identity diffusion compared to younger adolescents. Therefore, younger 
adolescents may be in more risk of making cognitive errors about their capabilities. 
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Essentially, in regards to TAF beliefs, younger adolescents may be more prone to view 
thoughts and action as inextricably linked.   
 Elkind’s Theory. Elkind (1967) postulated that during their teenage years 
adolescents will develop an egocentric attitude that accompanies them through the 
emergence of Piaget’s formal operations stage. The key feature of this egocentric attitude 
is the “embeddedness in one’s own point of view or the inability to ‘decenter’ to other 
perspectives (Looft & Charles, 1971, p. 21).” Essentially, the inability to “decenter” 
refers to a process where the adolescent is restricted by an overwhelming sense of 
interpersonal commitment where he/she is unable to engender alternative points of view 
to a situation. This inability to “decenter” may condition the adolescent to believe that 
he/she is indestructible and engender a high sense of personal power and uniqueness 
(Elkind, 1967).  
Consequently, adolescents who experience a sense of indestructibleness and high 
sense of personal power may attribute more magical tendencies to their beliefs (Ormont, 
1969). Specifically, adolescents may be more prone to believe that their thoughts are 
powerful enough to influence the outcome of certain occurrences. Another product of this 
high sense of power and indestructibleness is an inflated sense of responsibility. In a 
sample of community adolescents Wilson and colleagues (1995) noted that adolescents 
may tend to accept responsibility for situations in which they have no control.  
Hudson and Gray (1986) found that egocentrism was more prevalent in younger 
adolescents who were still moving through the concrete operations stage, while 
egocentrism was less prevalent in older adolescents who were firmly in the formal 
operations stage. Due to the products of having egocentric thoughts and the lack of 
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insight to produce more logical explanations, it is feasible to assume that younger 
adolescents may engage in more TAF thinking then older adolescents. 
 Overall, it appears that younger adolescents are more prone to types of cognitive 
errors like TAF beliefs. However, there is no empirical evidence to date that give any 
credence to this theory. As a result, a secondary purpose of my study was to examine 
whether younger adolescents report higher levels of TAF thinking compared to older 
adolescents.  
Purpose 
 My main purpose in this proposed research was to determine if adolescent 
development plays an influential role in the onset of TAF beliefs, if any gender 
differences existed in the development of TAF beliefs, and if TAF beliefs were predictive 
of other types of psychopathology such as suicidality in adolescents.  
Significance 
To date, no known researchers have investigated the possibility that 
developmental factors could contribute to the association between TAF beliefs and types 
of psychopathology in adolescents. Specifically, developmental factors seen in younger 
adolescents such as an inflated sense of responsibility, lack of insight, and the 
development of an individual’s identity may contribute to the onset of TAF beliefs. 
Another purpose in my study was to obtain preliminary evidence that developmental 
factors play an integral role in the onset of TAF beliefs.  
 Additionally, in regards to TAF beliefs, no known researchers have determined 
whether gender differences exist in a sample of American adolescents. According to 
Berle and Starcevic (2005), it appears that TAF beliefs reflect more of an internalized 
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appraisal style, therefore enhancing the possibility that females may be more prone to 
engage in TAF thinking. Therefore, I also proposed in this study to determine if any 
gender differences exist within a U.S. community adolescent sample.  
 One of the major topics discussed in the TAF literature is the question regarding 
specificity. Although Rachman (1993) developed the TAF construct in order to obtain a 
more comprehensive conceptualization of the onset of OCD, researchers today have 
found interesting evidence that TAF may be associated with other types of disorders (i.e. 
other types of anxiety disorders and affective disorders) in both adults and adolescents. 
Consequently, Shafran and Rachman (2004) suggested that future research should be 
directed in establishing a relationship between TAF beliefs and other types of 
psychopathology, in order to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the effects 
of TAF thinking. Therefore, in this research, I attempted to determine whether TAF 
beliefs predicted a significant amount of variance in adolescent suicide behaviors.     
 This research is important in expanding the TAF literature in regards to 
adolescent development as related to age, gender, and suicidal proneness. As previously 
noted, researchers have failed to acknowledge the potential role of development in the 
onset and/or exacerbation of TAF beliefs. If the results reveal that age plays a significant 
role in differentiating multiple TAF beliefs, then future researchers would be encouraged 
to take into account developmental considerations when theorizing about the specific role 
of TAF beliefs in such psychopathology as obsessive-compulsive symptoms, anxiety, and 
depression.  
 Similarly, there is a gap in the TAF literature concerning the role of gender 
development of TAF beliefs. Specifically, it is not known whether if females are more 
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prone to TAF thinking then their male counterparts or vise versa. Determining if gender 
differences exist in TAF thinking is important related to theoretically explaining gender 
differences in more clinically related constructs (i.e. depression). Moreover, having a 
testable model that explains gender differences in certain psychological disorders may 
affect the manner in which clinician’s diagnoses and treat their clients.  
 Lastly, excluding hopelessness and self-efficacy, cognitive variables have fallen 
short in terms of predicting adolescent suicidality. Orbach and colleagues (1999) charged 
future researchers to develop and investigate other cognitive constructs that may predict a 
significant amount of variance in adolescent suicidality. Considering that TAF beliefs are 
significantly associated with powerful adolescent suicidality predictors (i.e. depression, 
anxiety, guilt), one might reason that TAF beliefs may be able to predict a significant 
amount of variance in some forms of adolescent suicidality. If TAF does appear to be a 
powerful predictor of suicidality in adolescence, then it will provide future researchers 
with the building blocks to formulate more valid theories about the onset and/or 
exacerbation of suicidality in adolescence. Additionally, this research may assist 
clinicians in developing effective prevention and intervention programs to aid in the 
reduction of suicidal ideation, attempts, and completions in U.S. adolescents.   
Definition of Terms 
 Thought-action fusion. According to Rassin and colleagues (1999), thought-action 
fusion broadly “refers to the tendency to assume incorrect casual relationships between 
one’s own thoughts and external reality (p. 232).” Thought-action fusion will be 
measured by the Thought-Action Fusion Questionnaire for Adolescents (TAFQ-A), 
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which consists 15 items. The TAFQ-A consists of two distinct sub-scales: TAF-Moral 
beliefs and TAF-Likelihood beliefs (Muris et al., 2001).  
 TAF-moral beliefs. According to Muris and colleagues (2001), TAF-Moral is 
characterized by the belief that unacceptable thoughts are equivalent to the associated 
forbidden actions. Each item is represented in the form of a scenario section and a 
response section to the scenario. In the scenario section, the participant is asked to 
visualize himself/herself having a specific thought about a specific stimuli. In the 
response section, the participant is asked to rate on a scale from one to four (one being 
not true and four being very true) if having this thought is equal to actually committing 
the corresponding action. An example of a TAF-Moral belief is when a person equates 
thinking of swearing in church to actually swearing in church.  
 TAF-likelihood beliefs. According to Muris and colleagues (2001) TAF-
Likelihood is characterized by the belief that thinking of an unacceptable or disturbing 
event will increase the likelihood of that event actually occurring. Each item is 
represented in the form of a scenario section and a response section to the scenario. In the 
scenario section, the participant is asked to visualize himself/herself having a specific 
thought about a specific stimuli. In the response section, the participant is asked to rate on 
a scale from one to four (one being not true and four being very true) if having this 
thought increases the chance of the corresponding action actually occurring. An example 
of a TAF-Likelihood belief is when thinking about friend getting into a car accident 
actually increases the chances that friend will be in a car accident.  
 Suicide proneness. According to Lewinsohn, Langhinrichsen-Rohling, Langford, 
Rohde, Seeley, and Chapman (1995) suicidal proneness is defined as the engagement in 
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risk-taking thoughts and behaviors which reflect a person’s propensity at a given point to 
partake in suicidality. Suicidal proneness will be measured by the Life Attitude 
Schedules-Short Form (Lewinsohn, et al., 1995), which consists of 24 items that identify 
specific risk factors that contribute to the onset of suicidal thoughts and behaviors. The 
LAS consists of four relatively distinct content domains in which certain thoughts and 
behaviors fall. The LAS has four distinct subscales: health-related behaviors, death-
related behaviors, injury-related behaviors, and self-related behaviors.   
 Health-related proneness. The health-related content domain identifies general 
health questions that have been empirically and theoretically associated with the 
prediction of suicide. Specifically, the health-related content domains consists of 
questions that ask about one’s lack of self-care (“I don’t really care much about what I eat 
(e.g. fried foods, sugar, etc.).”) and one’s sense of overall wellness (“I feel good because 
my activities are meaningful and have purpose.”).  
 Death-related proneness. The death-related content domain identifies questions 
pertaining to one’s death that have been empirically and theoretically associated with the 
prediction of suicide. Specifically, the death-related content domain consists of questions 
that ask about one’s interest in dying (“Killing myself would solve many of my 
problems.”) and one’s perception of his/her longevity in life (“I expect to have a long an 
interesting life.”). 
 Injury-related proneness. The injury-related content domain identifies questions 
concerning one’s tendency to become injured that have been empirically and theoretically 
associated with the prediction of suicide. Specifically, the injury-related domain consists 
of questions that measure one’s propensity to engage in risky behaviors (“At least once a 
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month, I have driven or have been driven more than 20 miles per hour over the speed 
limit.”), self-injurious behaviors (“Sometimes I feel so frustrated that I would like to hit 
my fist against the wall (or something that could hurt me).”), and behaviors related to 
general safety (“I avoid unnecessary risks.”). 
 Self-related proneness. The self-related content domain acknowledges questions 
pertaining to one’s perception of self-concept that have been empirically and theoretically 
associated to the prediction of suicide. Specifically, the self-related content domain 
consists of questions that ask about one’s self-esteem (“I wish I was someone else.”), and 
self-image (“I believe I am a good person.”).  
Summary 
 Overall, there is a need for researchers to investigate the influence of cognitive 
constructs on the onset of psychopathology. One construct that potentially has the ability 
to predict a significant amount of variance in adolescent psychopathology is TAF 
thinking. To date, researchers have identified TAF thinking as influential factor in the 
onset and exacerbation of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. However, Berle and 
Starcevic (2005) noted that future research needs to investigate the possibility that TAF 
thinking may be prevalent in other types of psychopathology in both adults and 
adolescents. Therefore, in this study, I looked to extend that TAF literature by examining 
the relationship between TAF thinking styles and various types of suicide behaviors in 
adolescence. Additionally, I hoped to extend the TAF literature by determining the 
influence of age and gender on the prevalence of TAF thinking in adolescence.  
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Research Questions  
1) Is there a significant interaction between age and gender in measuring for 
TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood beliefs?  
2) Does the combination of the TAF subscale scores predict a significant amount 
of variance in four different types of suicide behaviors? 
 Null Hypotheses 
1) There is no significant interaction effect between age and gender when 
measuring for TAF thinking in a community sample of adolescents. 
2) The combination of TAF thinking score do not predict a significant amount of 
variance in four separate measure of suicide proneness. 
Expectations   
1) There will be a significant interaction effect between age and gender 
regarding the measurement of both TAF-Moral beliefs and TAF-Likelihood 
beliefs in a sample of community adolescents. 
2) Both TAF Moral thinking and TAF Likelihood thinking will predict a 
significant amount of variance in various types of suicidal proneness: death-
related, health-related, injury-related, and self-related.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
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Overview 
 I used this section to further my discussion on the topic of suicidality and TAF 
thinking. Specifically, I relayed the underpinnings of suicide in our society. First, I 
discussed the different types of suicidality that affect individuals in our society, with a 
specific focus on behaviors that are predictive of suicide completion. I then continued 
with a thorough review of the overarching conceptual issues in suicide theory. Next, I 
reviewed suicidality in adolescents with a specific focus on cognitive risk factors. Then I 
finished my discussion on suicide by conceptualizing, in a more detailed manner, why I 
believe TAF thinking is a significant risk factor of adolescent suicidal behaviors. Lastly, I 
discussed the effects of gender and age in both TAF beliefs and adolescent suicidality.  
Suicidality and Society. 
 Researchers from the World Health Organization approximated that suicide 
attempt rates will continue to increase between 40 to 100 times each year if no 
effective/reliable suicide intervention is found (Hall, O’Brien, Stark, Pelososi, & Smith, 
1998). As a result, completed suicide is the second leading cause of death in adolescents 
in a majority of the western hemisphere’s countries (Weissman, Bland, & Cannino, 
1999). In the United States, suicide is the third leading cause of death between the ages of 
15 and 19 and is the fourth leading cause of death of children between the ages of 10 and 
14 (Centers of Disease Control, 1995; Minino & Smith, 2001). Furthermore, researchers 
have concluded that 12.2 out of every 100,000 males will die by taking their own life, 
while only 2.4 out of every 100,000 females will die by taking their own life (National 
Center for Health Statistics, 2004).  
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 In addition to completed suicide, other forms of suicidality such as suicide 
attempts (parasuicide) and suicide ideation are prevalent among American adolescents. 
Approximately, 7% of high school adolescents attempt suicide in a one year period 
(Centers of Disease Control, 1991). One-third of adolescents who attempt suicide at least 
once in their life will eventually kill themselves (Lecomte & Fornes, 1998). Similarly, 
alarming statistics were reported by Grunbaum, Kann, and Kitchen (2002) where they 
approximated that 19% of American high school adolescents have seriously thought 
about committing suicide. Even more alarming are the reports of Myers, McCauley, 
Calderon, and Treder’s (1991) longitudinal analysis where they found that suicidal 
thoughts and gestures were present in 72% of an adolescent depressive sample at one 
time during the study.  
 Suicide researchers accentuate the need for future research to develop 
comprehensive and effective suicide prevention programs. Specifically, identification of 
cognitive risk and protective factors is an area in adolescent suicidality that needs further 
investigation.  
Suicide Completion 
 Due to its tragic and permanent nature, suicide has been one of the most 
researched areas in applied psychology. Despite the numerous empirical and theoretical 
articles written on suicide, suicide research has been plagued with difficult challenges in 
obtaining valid and reliable results regarding the conceptualization and the measurement 
of suicide. One of the more basic difficulties that have been troubling suicide researchers 
is the inability to clearly discern a well adopted definition of suicide (Berman, Jobes, & 
Silverman, 2005). Currently, suicide researchers use a wide range of suicidal thoughts, 
 35 
gestures, and behaviors to define suicide. According to Linehan’s (1986) overlapping 
model, the conglomeration of suicidal thoughts, gestures, and behaviors into one holistic 
construct of suicide is restrictive, in the sense that one is assuming that suicidal 
completers, attempters, and ideators experience statistically significant amounts of the 
same risk factors. If this notion of one holistic construct of suicide is true, then how do 
researchers explain the findings that only half of first time attempters actually kill 
themselves (Joiner, 2005) or why the majority of suicidal ideators never attempt suicide 
(Joiner, 2005)? Apparently, there are significant differences among individuals who 
commit suicide, those who attempt suicide, and those engage in suicidal ideation. 
Moreover, suicide prevention and intervention efforts are contingent on the ability of 
researchers to identify these significant differences. 
In attempting to discern suicide completers from other types of suicidal activity, 
one needs only to compare the methodologies used in accumulating data for suicide 
completers and other forms of suicidality. While researchers today have been relatively 
successful in measuring suicidal ideation and attempts through different types of self-
report measures, historically researchers, who strived to understand suicide completion, 
relied on restrictive and biased measures. Specifically, information regarding individuals 
who successfully committed suicide, in most cases, came from medical examiner’s 
reports, coroner’s reports, and/or, if available, suicide notes (Berman et al., 2005). Such 
data only provides researchers minimal insight into the instability that led a particular 
individual to kill himself/herself. Moreover, these records are only able to give us 
demographic data, frequency data, and data that describe specific themes of why a person 
would kill himself/herself, if an individual left a suicide note (Berman et al., 2005). 
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Again, these records are restrictive in a sense because they do not lend much information 
about the onset of suicidal thoughts and behaviors, and what particular risk factors might 
have played a prominent role in the eventual suicide completion.  
Furthermore, Phillips and Ruth (1993) are skeptical of the reliability and validity 
of medical examiner’s and coroner’s reports. Specifically, O’Carroll (1989) is 
particularly concerned about the variation in the way suicides are investigated, 
determined, and reported in these documents, potentially confounding the little 
information that we have received from these reports. To make matters worse, most 
researchers agree that individuals who would supply researchers and clinicians with the 
most valuable information regarding suicide prevention and intervention efforts are not 
available for study because they have successfully terminated their lives (Berman et al., 
2005). 
In order to collect less restrictive and more reliable data from suicide completers, 
researchers such as Jobes, Berman, and Josselson (1987) have aided in the development 
of a more psychometrically sound and widely accepted format to obtain data through a 
method called the psychological autopsy. Berman and colleagues have described the 
psychological autopsy as:  
“A technique that involves the systematic collection of psychological data through 
 structured interviews of the decedent’s family members, friends, coworkers, 
 fellow students, and other associates. Although the specific format may vary, 
 most investigators collect data relevant to the decedent’s behavior, personality, 
 style of coping, cognitive processes, psychiatric history, and general emotional 
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 life, so that a rich psychological mosaic of the decedent came be assembled.” 
 (p.85)         
The psychological autopsy also utilizes other relevant documents and corroborating 
evidence from hospitals and general practice case-notes, social work reports, and criminal 
records (Cavanagh, Carson, Sharpe, & Lawrie, 2003). There have been over 150 studies 
that have used the psychological autopsy to obtain valuable information about suicide 
completion (Cavanagh et al., 2003). In a systematic review of the psychological autopsy 
literature, Cavanagh and colleagues (2003) found significant commonalities that appear 
to be prevalent in a majority of suicide completions. Approximately 91% of suicide 
completers in 154 studies had a mental disorder; 59% had an affective disorder; 66% had 
made some type of communication of his/her intent to commit suicide; 39% made 
deliberate attempts of self-harm; and 50% had experienced some type of isolation. 
Unfortunately, the data gleaned from psychological autopsies cannot give us more 
specific information regarding the complex patterns and influences of these risk factors to 
help researchers and clinicians better understand suicide completion.  
Suicide Ideation and Attempts  
In order to obtain data that study the complex influence of risk factors on 
suicidality, most researchers conduct studies that replace suicide completion with 
measures of suicide attempts or suicide ideation. Measuring for suicidal attempts and 
ideation not only provides researchers with more statistical flexibility, it is also provides 
them with a means of obtaining more readily available data. In conducting a study using 
the psychological autopsy, researchers and IRB boards have to take into consideration 
more ethical obstacles than obtaining data using self-report measures for suicidal ideation 
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and attempt. By measuring for suicidal attempts and/or suicidal ideation researchers are 
more likely to get their studies through IRB and have less ethical complications with the 
implementation of specific elements in their methodology (Jobes et al., 1987).  
However, researchers need to understand that data obtained from suicidal ideators 
or attempters may not be generalizable to suicide completers. Furthermore, researchers 
have provided evidence that suggests that in general suicide completers experience more 
severe emotional and physical turmoil relative to ideators, attempters, and multiple 
attempters (Goldston, Daniel, Reboussin, Kelley, Ievers, & Brunstetter, 1996; Hawton, 
Kingsbury, Steinhardt, James, & Fagg, 1999). 
Joiner’s Comprehensive Theory of Suicide 
Despite the inability to glean complex patterns of risk factors from the data on 
suicide completers, the suicide researchers have engendered a significant amount of 
empirically based theories (Baumeister, 1990; Beck, 1996; Linehan, 1993; & Shneidman, 
1996) that have often aided clinicians and researchers in the assessment and treatment of 
suicidality. One specific theory that has generally been considered a viable account of 
suicide completion is Joiner’s (2005) comprehensive theory, which is based upon 
sociological and psychological elements. The central aspect of Joiner’s theory to suicide 
completion is based on the fear of suicide or death in general (Joiner, 2003). However, it 
is not fear of suicide that acts as a risk factor to eventual suicide completion, but it is the 
ability to “beat down the instinct to live” and to become indifferent about death via 
suicide that is prominent in Joiner’s theory (Joiner, 2003). Thus, Joiner (2003, 2005) 
asserted that in order to be able to commit suicide one has to fight one’s most rigid 
instinct, the desire to survive. However, Joiner stated that the ability to commit suicide is 
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necessary, but not sufficient for a person to complete suicide. Specifically, Joiner (2003, 
2005) asserted that an individual must also want to die.  
 Joiner (2003) postulated that the wish to die comes from two similar yet important 
sources: a person’s sense of ineffectiveness, therefore perceiving oneself more as a 
burden to others, and an individual’s perception that he/she is disconnected from others 
on an interpersonal level. Berman and colleagues (2005) highlighted the fact that a 
majority of suicide completions and attempts “arise from the overlapping and synergistic 
impact of the acquired ability (desire) for suicide, the perception of being relationally 
burdensome to others, and a sense of thwarted belongingness, the absence of closeness, to 
key relationships or groups (p.50).”  
Depletion of self-preservation defenses. Joiner (2005) noted that that the most 
effective protection against suicide completion lies not within psychological, 
psychosocial, or interpersonal resources but is ingrained within human 
psychophysiology. The nature of the human survival instinct protects humans against 
both internal and external threats on one’s life (Joiner, 2005). In regards to suicide, the 
basic survival instinct makes it increasingly difficult for suicidal individuals to engender 
a substantial painful experience that could lead to a fatal suicide attempt. Unfortunately, 
Joiner (2005) has noted that determined individuals can suppress this basic survival 
instinct, putting them in a vulnerable situation in which the individual is more prone to 
make lethal suicide attempts generally resulting in death. According to Joiner (2005), in 
order to suppress the survival instinct individuals have to become fearless regarding the 
act of suicide and have significantly reduced levels of pain tolerance. 
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Researchers have continuously asked how do individuals develop a sense of 
indifference towards killing themselves (Beck, 1996; Beck, Brown, Steer, Dahlsgaard, & 
Grisham, 1999; Cheng, Chen, Chen, & Jenkins, 2000; Joiner & Rudd, 2000; Joiner, 
Conwell, Fitzpatrick, Witte, Schmidt, Berlim, Fleck, Rudd, 2005; Lewinsohn, Rohde, & 
Seeley, 1996). Tragically, most researchers agree with Beck (1996) in that the answer lies 
within “practice.” Beck believes that in order to ward off our protecting factors against 
suicide, individuals need to stave off this “taboo” that makes us fearful of the negative 
consequences of a completed suicide. He conceded that habituation through frequent 
exposure to suicidal thoughts, gestures, and behaviors are the most effective means in 
warding off our biological defense of self-preservation. Moreover, suicide researchers in 
the last decade have found evidence that speaks to the validation of Beck’s theory on 
suicide completion. Specifically, in a study utilizing the psychological autopsy, Cheng 
and colleagues (2000) found that individuals who committed suicide had significantly 
more suicidal attempts compared to a matched controlled sample. 
Furthermore, Cheng and his colleagues (2000) concluded that previous suicide 
attempts appear to be a significant factor in eventual suicide completion. However, as 
previously noted the psychological autopsy offers restricted information and does not 
speak to interaction of psychological factors that may have an impact on the suicidal 
individual. As a result, Joiner and colleagues (2005) analyzed the relationship between 
current suicidality (i.e. ideation and behaviors) and number of suicide attempts while 
covarying for a number of powerful predictors of suicidal activity (i.e. sex, age, race, 
marital status, family history of suicide, depression, bipolar disorder, alcohol abuse, legal 
history, hopelessness, problem solving abilities, borderline personality disorder 
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symptoms, and negative life events) in a sample young adults with severe difficulties 
with suicidal symptoms. Their results indicated that the covariance of a great number of 
powerful suicide related variables had an insignificant effect on the relationship between 
current suicidality and number of suicide attempts. Furthermore, in a series of other 
studies with diverse samples, researchers found empirical evidence that suicide ideation 
is associated with previous suicide attempts (Joiner & Rudd, 2000), future suicide 
attempts (Lewinsohn, Rohde, and Seeley, 1996), and future suicide completion (Beck et 
al., 1999).   
  Although suicide ideation and attempts appear to be powerful predictors in 
depleting ones defenses in regards to self-preservation, two other destructive behaviors 
have been well researched in their association with suicidal completions. One particular 
destructive behavior that appears to predict suicide is substance abuse (Berman & 
Schwartz, 1990; Crumley, 1990; Hawton, Fagg, Platt, & Hawkins, 1993; Lester, 2000; 
Mehlenbeck, Spirito, Barnett, & Overholser, 2003; Runeson, 1990; Schaffer, Gould, 
Fisher, Trautman, Moreau, Klienman, & Flory, 1996). 
Crumley (1990) found, in a study of suicidal adolescents, that an increase of 
substance abuse was positively related to an increase in incidence, repetitiveness, 
seriousness of intent, and lethality of suicide attempts. Other studies using a sample of 
adolescents who completed suicide found that substance abuse is not only related to 
suicide completion but is a strong predictor as well (Schaffer et al., 1996). Moreover, 
researchers have concluded that 20-50% of adolescents who have completed suicide used 
some type of substance six hours before the final attempt (Hawton et al., 1993; Runeson, 
1990). Furthermore, Berman and Schwartz (1990) found that a high intent of hurting 
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oneself and a strong desire to commit suicide were significantly exacerbated by the onset 
of drug abuse, with 78% of suicide attempts occurring after drug use began in a sample of 
suicidal adolescents. 
Berman and Schwartz’s (1990) findings highlight key aspects of Lester’s (2000) 
theory which states that suicidal individuals use substances to obtain an alternative state 
of mind that is more conducive to a lethal suicide attempt. Mehlenbeck and colleagues 
(2003) elaborated on Lester’s theory by stating that individuals under the influence of 
alcohol or some other substance are likely to engender a less inhibited manner, therefore 
creating a state that optimizes more impulsive and irresponsible behavior. By creating a 
disinhibited state of mind due to the excessive use of drugs and/or alcohol one is 
diminishing the ability to think clearly about the consequences of his/her actions, 
therefore leaving one’s defenses for self-preservation weakened and vulnerable to a lethal 
suicidal attempt. 
Another sub-group who theoretically are more prone to deplete self-preservation 
defenses is self-mutilators (Guertin, Lloyd, Spirito, Donaldson, & Boergers, 2003; 
Pattison & Kahan, 1983; Suyemoto, 1998; Zlotnick, Donaldson, Spirito, & Pearlstein, 
1997). DiFilippo, Esposito, Overholser, and Spirito (2003) generally described methods 
of self-mutilation as “low lethality, with physical damage ranging from the superficial to 
moderate (p. 251).” Suicide research has only provided one study that has looked at self-
mutilation and suicide completion in a younger sample. In a systematic review of the 
psychological autopsy, Appleby, Cooper, Amos, and Faragher (1999) found that two-
thirds of their sample had a history of some form of mutilation. Similar results have been 
found in studies looking at suicide attempts and ideation (Guertin et al., 2003; Zlotnick et 
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al., 1997). In comparison with a non-clinical sample of adolescents, Guertin and 
colleagues (2003) found that 55% of a sample of clinical adolescent suicide attempters 
had a history of self-mutilation far superior then the non-clinical sample. Overall, it 
appears that most suicide attempters have difficulties with some form of self-mutilation 
(i.e. cutting themselves and/or picking at previous wounds) (Suyemoto, 1998). 
Researchers have also found that self-mutilation is a self-destructive behavior that 
is highly repetitive (Di Filippo et al., 2003). Consequently, adolescents who have had 
significant difficulties with suicidality often reported multiple self-mutilation experiences 
that range from two to a hundred times per month (Pattisan & Kahan, 1983). These 
findings are troubling especially when taking into consideration how self-mutilation 
affects pain tolerance in suicidal individuals. 
Considering that more lethal attempts of suicide (i.e. gun shot, hanging, jumping 
from tall heights) involve a significant amount of physical pain, researchers such as 
Orbach and colleagues (2001) have sought to determine if suicidal individuals have a 
higher tolerance for physical pain. As it turns out, Orbach and his colleagues found 
empirical evidence that suicidal individuals do have a higher tolerance for pain compared 
to a non-suicidal group. Moreover, Orbach and colleagues (2001) discerned two types of 
suicidal adolescents and found that adolescents who survived more lethal attempts, as 
compared to those who survived less lethal attempts, were able to endure more painful 
shocks, and in general perceived the stronger shocks as less painful. Researchers such as 
Orbach, Mikulincer, King, Cohen, and Stein (1997) asserted that self-destructive 
behavior such as self-mutilation may mediate the relationship between a high pain 
tolerance and suicidal attempts in adolescence. Furthermore, Furman (1984) asserted that 
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such physical violence towards the body extracts one’s sense of bodily self-love, which 
she proposes acts as a shield to ward off self-destruction. As such, it appears that the 
repetitious aspect of self-mutilation provides suicidal adolescents with an effective 
method of reducing their defenses of self-preservation. 
Although substance abuse and self-mutilation are conceptually different, when 
looking at suicidal adolescents, Baumeister (1990) argues they share some common 
components that help explain why suicidal individuals turn to such hazardous means of 
dealing with distress. Baumeister (1990) contended that suicidal adolescents choose to 
engage in substance abuse and self-manipulation to escape the self. Furthermore, this 
component of escaping is theoretically one of the major contributors to the repetitiveness 
aspect of substance abuse and self-mutilation (Baumeister, 1990). 
Suicidal individuals generally experience severe amounts of depression, 
hopelessness, and helplessness (Beck, Brown, & Steer, 1989). As a result, these 
individuals choose coping strategies that will alleviate the overwhelming amount of 
intrapsychic pain immediately (Baumeister, 1990). Generally, these individuals will try to 
suppress painful feelings, emotions, and thoughts by escaping into a state of cognitive 
deconstruction (Baumiester, 1990). This state of cognitive deconstruction is characterized 
by feelings of dissociation, numbness, and heightened sensation thresholds (Orbach, 
1994). Although escapement into cognitive deconstruction is ineffective in the long run, 
it provides minimal immediate alleviation of these painful emotional symptoms in the 
short run (Williams, 1996). Unfortunately, the suppression of the negative symptoms 
provided by escapement into cognitive deconstruction becomes habitual in suicidal 
individuals, therefore increasing more dissociation, numbness, and heightened thresholds 
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(Baumeister, 1990). As previously noted, higher thresholds for pain and continuation in 
altered mood states increases the risk for more impulsive behaviors and reduces the fear 
of physical pain, therefore leaving an individual more prone to make a fatal suicide 
attempt. Overall, having a history of suicidal thoughts and behaviors, along with 
engaging in substance abuse and self-mutilation appears to deplete individuals of their 
instinctual nature to preserve the self. 
Thwarted connectedness. Although it appears that the ability to commit suicide is 
necessary in actually completing an attempt, Joiner (2005) contends that the ability to 
suppress self-preservation defenses alone is not sufficient to complete an attempt. Joiner 
asserted, in his theory of completed suicide, that the individual who has the ability to die 
and the desire to die is the most vulnerable to complete a suicide attempt. Many 
researchers have undertaken the journey to understand human motivation, especially 
motivations that result in tragedy. In Joiner’s extensive research on suicidology, he 
contends that two basic needs play an integral role in one’s motivation to terminate 
his/her life. 
Joiner (2005) asserted that the motivation to die is perpetuated by one’s 
psychological deprivation of connecting or affiliating with other individuals in 
meaningful relationships. The need to belong is a well developed construct and, in some 
cases, a key component in many theories of psychology. For instance, Freud (1930) 
asserted that the need to belong was a critical variable in understanding the sex drive and 
the filial bond. Moreover, Maslow (1968), in his hierarchy of needs, theorized that the 
need to be loved and to belong was an essential step in the process to obtain self-
actualization. Although not obtained through the works of Freud and Maslow, the 
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construct of the need to belong has been empirically validated by a multitude of 
researchers (i.e. Epstein, 1992; Hogan, 1983; Ryan, 1991). 
In terms of clinical value, the need to belong appears to be a highly powerful 
construct that exerts significant influence over emotional patterns and cognitive processes 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1990). Consequently, if the need to be interpersonally connected is 
not satisfied, then it is likely to contribute to the onset or exacerbation of negative effects 
on health, adjustment, and well-being (Baumeister & Leary, 1990). Evidence of the later 
hypothesis can clearly been seen in research on completed suicide, suicidal attempts, and 
suicidal ideation. Regarding suicidal completion, Cavanagh and colleagues (2003), in a 
systematic review of psychological autopsies, found that approximately 50% (confidence 
intervals range from 22%-84%) of suicide completers had reported difficulties with social 
isolation. Additionally, in a review of the themes in adult suicidal notes, Foster (2003) 
found that a significant amount of the notes highlighted loneliness as an influencing 
factor in the completed suicide. Furthermore, in a study of adolescents and young adult 
suicide notes, Leenaars (1988) discovered that adolescent and younger adult suicide notes 
placed a heavier emphasis on dysfunctional interpersonal relationships than did the adult 
suicide notes. However, due to the inability of certain methodological instruments in 
obtaining information from suicide completers, researchers have been restricted in 
determining if social isolation is a significant predictor of completed suicide over and 
above a number of other powerful correlates of suicide completion. Therefore, 
researchers have tried to determine if social isolation is a significant predictor of other 
suicidal activities such as attempts and ideation. 
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There has been a vast amount of researchers that have concluded that social 
isolation (Groholt, Ekeberg, Wichstrom, & Haldorson, 2000; Negron, Piacentini, Graae, 
Davies, & Schaffer, 1997), loneliness (Roberts, Roberts, & Chen, 1998, Rossow & 
Wichstrom, 1994), and alienation (Kopper, Osman, Osman, & Hoffman, 1998) are 
significant risk factors of adolescent suicidal attempts and ideation. In a study of 
adolescent suicide attempters, Spirito, Stark, and Williams (1988) asserted that attempters 
used more social withdrawal compared to distressed and non-distressed controls when 
trying to cope with overwhelming stress. This finding was validated in Groholt and 
colleague’s (2000) study, where they found that community and inpatient samples of 
adolescents with a previous history of suicidal attempts rarely relied on support from 
others when attempting to manage neural and stressful situations. It appears that 
adolescents who engage in riskier suicidal behaviors (i.e. attempts) compared to moderate 
suicidal activity (i.e. ideation) experience greater feelings of withdrawal and alienation 
(Negron et al., 1997). Lastly, alienation, a general feeling of being misunderstood and 
unloved by others, appears to be highly powerful in predicting suicide probability scores 
(Kopper et al., 1998). Kopper and colleagues (1998) found that alienation scores 
(especially in male adolescents) predicted a significant amount of variance in suicide 
potential scores while controlling for highly powerful predictors of suicide such as 
depression, hypomania, and psychopathic deviate scores on the MMPI-A. 
Thwarted effectiveness. The second psychological state that Joiner (2005) 
emphasized in a strong desire to die is the perception that one is not effective in 
relationships. Joiner (2005) coined the term thwarted effectiveness to characterize the 
perception that one is a burden towards others. Moreover, for individuals who are having 
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difficulties with suicidal thoughts or behaviors, Joiner (2005) contended that the 
perception of seeing oneself as a burden who negatively affects others is highly 
associated with suicide. It is important to note that the thwarted effectiveness is based off 
an individuals perception that his/her roles in relationships are meaningless, causing 
others additional grief or frustration. Furthermore, these individuals with high levels of 
perceived ineffectiveness often describe their suicide attempts as altruistic (Durkhiem, 
1897). According to Durkhiem (1897), when individuals become so intertwined within a 
social group that their individuality begins to fade, they become more willing to sacrifice 
themselves for the benefit of the group. Joiner (2005) elaborates on the relationship 
between burdensomeness and altruistic suicide by asserting that some suicidal individuals 
believe that his/her self-sacrifice will bring about less distress for the group then his/her 
death. 
Unlike the vast amount of research on thwarted connectedness/belongingness, the 
research on burdensomeness or ineffectiveness is quite scant. However, there are a few 
studies that have reported empirical evidence that a sense of burdensomeness towards 
others is a significant influence in one’s decision to kill themselves (Brown, Dahlen, 
Mills, Rick, & Biblarz, 1999; Foster, 2003; Joiner, Petitt, Walker, Voelz, Cruz, Rudd, & 
Lester, 2002). To date, there have been only two studies that have associated perceived 
burdensomeness to actual completed suicide (Foster, 2003; Joiner et al., 2002). In a study 
examining themes of suicide notes, Foster (2003) discovered that a burdensome theme 
was explicitly present in about 7% of the suicide notes. However, perceived 
burdensomeness has been theoretically linked to feelings of shame for committing 
suicide (Joiner, 2005), which was in 74% of the suicide notes examined by Foster (2003). 
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As a result, it is conceivable that a majority of the variance in the suicide notes with a 
shame theme could be accounted for by feelings of ineffectiveness or burdensomeness 
towards others. 
Despite the unclear effect of burdensomeness or ineffectiveness has on completed 
suicide (as examined by Foster, 2003), Joiner and colleagues (2002) hypothesized that 
perceived burdensomeness would be a strong correlate of completed status by analyzing a 
different set of suicide notes. Joiner and colleagues (2002) allowed three raters to exam 
40 suicide notes (20 from completers and 20 from attempters). Each rater was asked to 
appraise the suicide notes on five specific influences (burdensomeness, emotional 
regulation, control of other people, emotional pain, and hopelessness) that could have 
contributed to the completed suicide. After controlling for the effects of age and gender, 
the results indicated that burdensomeness was the only significant correlate of completer 
status. Furthermore, Joiner and colleagues also found that burdensomeness was the only 
factor correlated with lethality of suicide attempts. Both Foster (2003) and Joiner and 
colleagues (2003) concluded that perceive burdensomeness appears to be a potential 
influence that affects what method one chooses to kill himself/herself and if one actually 
completes a suicide attempt. However, Joiner and colleagues (2002) note that replication 
of these results are necessary in determining the validation of his theory on the role of 
perceived burdensomeness of completed suicide. 
Overall, Joiner (2005) contended that completed suicides are characterized by 
one’s ability to go through with the act by suppressing one’s self preservation defenses 
and by a strong desire to die (i.e. high levels of isolation, alienation, ineffectiveness, and 
burdensomeness on others). Moreover, Joiner (2005) noted that in combination his 
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constructs engender a highly vulnerable situation, where individuals are likely to act on 
his/her suicidal tendencies. However, Joiner conceded that no matter how comprehensive 
his theory may be perceived, it cannot account for the complete variance in completed 
suicide. Therefore, other researchers should continue to test their own theories, in hopes 
that they can account for the variance in suicide completion that is not accountable by 
Joiner’s (2005) theory. 
Suicide Proneness 
In addition to suicide completion, attempts, and ideation; suicide researchers have 
uncovered other suicidal constructs such as suicidal proneness (Lewinsohn et al., 1995). 
Lewinsohn and colleagues (1995) found that there is a specific domain of behaviors that 
are life-threatening and that foster maladaptive thoughts that contribute to onset of 
suicidality in adolescence. Specifically, such behaviors as listening to music with a death 
related theme, not wearing one’s seat belt, and driving at excess speeds over the speed 
limit were highly correlated with intentionally hurting oneself and life time suicide 
attempts (Lewinsohn et al., 1995). Furthermore, Lewinsohn and colleagues (1995) 
believe that these specific life-threatening behaviors are most advantageous in predicting 
suicide completers, attempters, and ideators. Specifically, Lewinsohn and colleagues 
identified four domains (death-related, health-related, injury-related, and self-related) of 
thoughts and behavior that increase the likelihood of future suicidality. 
Death-related proneness. Of all the correlates of suicide, the most predictive of 
future suicide completion and attempts is having a previous history of suicidal behavior 
(Joiner et al., 2005). According to Lecomte and Fornes (1998) one-third of individuals 
who attempt suicide will eventually die from a completed suicide. Joiner (2005) asserted 
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that previous suicide behavior (especially suicide attempts) increases the likelihood that 
individuals will re-attempt and/or complete an attempt in the near future. Beck (1996) 
postulated that repeated exposure to suicidal thinking and behavior reduces the “taboo” or 
prohibited aspects regarding suicide attempts. Essentially, one begins to view suicide as a 
more viable option after exposing himself/herself to more suicidal thinking and/or 
behavior.  
Additionally, Joiner (2005) supplemented Beck’s theory by postulating that some 
types of suicidal behavior physically make individuals more vulnerable to re-attempts 
and completion. Specifically, Joiner asserted that painful (either physical or emotional) 
experiences that result in suicidality increases the likelihood of future suicide behavior by 
lowering an individual’s tolerance to pain. According to Orbach, Palgi, Stein, Har-Even, 
Lottem-Peleg, Asherov, and Eljzur (2001), individuals who reported higher suicidal 
scores also reported a lower pain tolerance. A lower pain tolerance is important in suicide 
attempts and completions because it reduces the body’s self-defenses against internal 
and/or external threats (Joiner, 2005). As a result, individuals with a previous history of 
suicidality may physically find it easier to inflict enough pain upon themselves to cause 
death.  
Health-related proneness. In addition to behaviors associated directly with suicide 
attempts, numerous other researchers (Brenner, Hassan, & Barrios, 1999; Burge, Felts, 
Chenier, & Parrillo, 1995; Garrison, McKeown, Valois, & Vincent, 1993; Husler, 
Blakeney, & Werlen, 2005; Kissinger, Fuller, Clark, & Abdalian, 1997; Massie, Gagnon, 
& Holland, 1994; Menninger, 1936; Narring, Miauton, & Michaud, 2003) provided 
evidence that adolescents who are prone to or engage in risky health behaviors are more 
 52 
likely to experience some type of suicidality in the future. Such health risk behaviors 
include drug and alcohol abuse, risky sexual behavior, physical fighting, smoking, 
contracting HIV, cancer, other chronic conditions, and having multiple surgeries. 
For instance, Brenner and colleagues (1999) found that adolescents who engaged 
in heavy alcohol abuse, drug abuse, and smoking were more prone to engage in suicidal 
ideation. According to Lester (2000), these risk health risk factors lower ones inhibitions, 
which is a very conducive state for suicide attempts to occur. Specifically, Lester noted 
that when adolescents are high or drunk they are more likely to engage in impulsive acts, 
which have been historically associated with suicide attempts (Kingsbury, Hawton, 
Steinhardt, & James, 1999). Additionally, Joiner (2005) also noted that while under the 
influence of drugs and/or alcohol, it is likely that one’s self-defenses against physical 
pain will be reduce, therefore, creating an optimal situation for some form of suicidal 
behavior to occur.  
Garrison and colleagues (1993) found that adolescents who engaged in more 
violent behavior were more prone to engage in suicidality. For instance, Garrison and 
colleagues found that adolescents who were involved in more physical fights were prone 
to engage in suicide ideation. Pfeffer, Newcorn, Kaplan, Mizruchi, and Plutchik (1988) 
hypothesized that such violent behavior in suicidal individuals is attributable to a 
psychiatric diagnosis. Similarly, Sternberg, Lamb, Guterman, and Abbot (2006) noted 
that aggressive behavior could be a reflection of negative affect or a dysfunctional family 
life that could increase the likelihood of suicide symptomology. Moreover, physical 
fighting is another means of lowering one’s tolerance for pain, which according to 
Orbach (2001) and colleagues may be indicative of future suicidal behavior.  
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Lastly, it appears that adolescents who are exposed to some physical illness or 
virus maybe more at risk to engage in suicide behaviors (Kissinger et al., 1997; Massie et 
al., 1994). Specifically, adolescents who suffer from a diagnosis of cancer or other 
chronic diagnoses (i.e. diabetes, asthma, heart disease) are likely to experience more 
suicidal symptoms (Narring, et al., 2003). According to Massie and colleagues (1994), 
adolescents who experience these chronic conditions may be more prone to severe bouts 
of depression and/or isolation which may result in a suicide attempt or completion. 
Furthermore, these individuals are exposed to multiple medical treatments that might 
include powerful side effects and frequent surgeries. According to Baumeister (1990) 
these individuals may view suicide as an escape from the physical pain and suffering 
brought on by their symptoms and/or medical treatment. Additionally, since these 
individuals experience serve amounts of emotional and physical pain, they may have 
already established the optimal pain tolerance to actually attempt and complete suicide 
(Joiner, 2005).  
Injury-related proneness. Over the last few decades, there has been a substantial 
debate about whether self-injurious behaviors should be considered serious attempts of 
taking one’s life (O’Carroll et al., 1996). However, Favazza (1996) has concluded that 
self-injurious behaviors are quite distinct from suicide attempts. Specifically, Favazza 
and Rosenthal (1993) and Favazza (1996) empirically determined that self-injurious 
behaviors were distinctly different from suicide attempts in terms of lethality, intent, 
cognition, and general behavior characteristics. However, other researchers (i.e. Guertin, 
Lloyd, Spirito, Donaldson, & Boergers, 2003; Pattison & Kahan, 1983; Suyemoto, 1998; 
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Zlotnick, Donaldson, Spirito, & Pearlstein, 1997) concluded that self-injurious behavior 
(or self-mutilation) is a powerful correlate and/or predictor of adolescent suicidality.  
According to DiFilippo, Esposito, Overholser, and Spirito (2003), self-injurious 
behaviors can describe a wide range of activities in adolescents. Most commonly, 
Favazza and Conterio (1989) noted that adolescents engage skin cutting, skin burning, 
and self-hitting. Moreover, Pattisian and Kahn (1983) asserted that once adolescents 
engage in self-injurious behavior there is a 63% that they will continue to injury 
themselves (anywhere from 2 to 100 times per month). Lastly, DiFilippo noted that 
escape from emotional pain was the main reason provided by adolescents for frequent 
self-injurious behavior. As a result, it appears that adolescents negatively rewarded 
(removal of emotional pain) themselves through self-injury. Such behavior is particularly 
concerning because it engenders frequent use self-injurious behavior as a viable coping 
strategy to relieve emotional distress and pain.  
Unfortunately, using self-injury as a coping response to distress is only a 
minimally and temporarily effective strategy in reducing emotional pain. Baumeister 
(1990) noted that such behaviors continually suppress emotional pain, until the individual 
reaches a state of deconstruction. Baumeister noted that a key characteristic of 
deconstruction is a heighten state of numbness. In this state of numbness, Baumeister 
postulated that individuals would become more susceptible to suicidal thinking and 
attempts.  Particularly, Baumeister noted that the state of numbness allowed individuals 
to inflict more pain upon themselves, therefore reducing the body’s self-defense 
mechanism to protect against internal threats.  
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Self-related proneness. Lastly, Lewinsohn and colleagues (1994) asserted that 
negative self-evaluation was another psychological construct that is highly predictive of 
future suicidal attempts and completions. Specifically, seeing the self as inferior to others 
(Neuringer, 1974), perceiving oneself as having no unique qualities (Joiner et al., 2002, 
and experiencing frequent feelings of worthless (Williams, Crane, Barnhofer, Van der 
Does, & Segal, 2006) have been found to be highly associated with suicidal intent, 
ideation, and attempts.  According to Joiner (2005), negative self-evaluations increase 
thwarted connectedness and effectiveness, which in turn exacerbates the desire to die. 
Joiner and colleagues (2002) postulated that after examining the content of 40 
suicide notes that feelings of ineffectiveness would appear to be a significant risk factor 
of suicidality. As expected, Joiner and colleagues (2002) found that thwarted 
ineffectiveness was the only significant predictor of completer status. As a result, Joiner 
and colleagues concluded that in order to successfully prevent future suicide behavior 
clinicians would have address feeling of ineffectiveness in significant relationships. 
Additionally, Joiner and colleagues recommend that instilling positive self-beliefs was 
the primary means of reducing thwarted ineffectiveness.  
Secondly, Joiner (2005) noted that negative self-evaluations or beliefs are highly 
associated with feelings of isolation and withdrawal. Moreover, feelings of social 
isolation and withdrawal have been consistently associated with suicidality (Groholt, 
Ekeberg, Wichstrom, & Haldorson, 2000; Negron, Piacentini, Graae, Davies, & Schaffer, 
1997). Joiner (2005) noted that emotional pain and suffering are likely products of not 
being able to connect with other individuals. Thus, if the emotional pain continues to 
intensify, individuals may turn to suicide as a means to escape (Baumeister, 1990).  
 56 
Adolescent Suicidality 
 Considering how much research has been conducted on the study of suicidology, 
researchers and clinicians know relatively little about specific suicide processes in 
adolescence (Wagner & Zimmerman, 2006). Cleary, this lack of knowledge about suicide 
processes in adolescence is due to developmental considerations. Specifically, 
researchers do not have a firm grasp on what types of developmental issues influence the 
onset of suicidal symptoms. However, Wagner and Zimmerman (2006) have compiled a 
significant amount of research in order to address developmental issues that appear 
prevalent within adolescent suicidality. 
 According to Cicchetti and Toth (1995), adolescent development can be 
understood as a series of reorganizations at increasingly higher levels of complexity and 
differentiation (Wagner & Zimmerman, 2006). Additionally, adolescence is marked by 
rapid reorganizations in biological, emotional, and cognitive domains. In the interest of 
this study, I focused on the cognitive aspects of development and its association with 
suicidality. 
 In early adolescence, teenagers begin to experiment with their new cognitive 
abilities (i.e. abstract thought) (Wagner & Zimmerman, 2006). Specifically, teenagers 
begin to analyze their thoughts processes. By examining their thought processes, 
adolescents are likely to become aware of contradictions in their self-conceptions. The 
process of identifying contradictions in their self-conceptualization can engender a 
significant amount of stress and emotional turmoil (Harter, 1999). Consequently, 
adolescents will attempt to cope with this stress and emotional turmoil by “projecting 
hypothetical scenarios into the future, they reanalyze the past, they compare their real 
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selves (and others’ selves) to ideal selves (Wagner & Zimmerman, 2006, p. 290).” Such 
reflection upon thoughts and perceptions eventually leads adolescents through the formal 
operations stage of development and into adulthood. 
 According to Damon and Hart (1982), these advanced levels of cognitive 
processing skills can also negatively affect the emotional stability of adolescents. 
Specifically, adolescents could catastrophize about future events (Leitenberg, Yost, & 
Carroll-Wilson, 1986), ruminate about past mistakes and wrong-doings (Klimes-Dougan, 
Free, Ronsaville, Stilwell, Welsh, & Radke-Yarrow, 1999), and experience a high level 
of self-discrepancy (continually comparing one’s real self to the standards of one’s ideal 
self) (Higgins, 1987). Consequently, such maladaptive responses (catastrophizing, 
rumination, and high levels of self-discrepancy) have been theoretically associated with 
suicidality in adolescents. 
Another type of developmental construct that appears to be prevalent in 
adolescent suicidality is cognitive self-regulation of emotion and behavior (Wagner & 
Zimmerman, 2006). According to Hathaway and Barkley (2003), behavioral inhibition or 
regulation is comprised of three distinct processes:  
“(1) the capacity to inhibit prepotent responses creating a delay in the response to 
 an event, (2) the capacity to interrupt ongoing response chains, (3) and the  
 protection of this delay in responding, the self-directed actions occurring within it, 
 and the goal directed behaviors they create from interference by competing events 
 and the prepotent responses they might trigger.” (p.102).  
Additionally, Barkley (1997) noted that behavioral regulation or inhibition also involves 
regulation of powerful emotions. Specifically, Barkley (1997) postulated that powerful 
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emotions, if held unchecked, can exert a significant amount of undue influence on 
behavioral responses. 
 According to Dahl (as cited in Wagner & Zimmerman, 2006), cognitive self-
regulation appears to be especially prevalent in the period between early and mid-
adolescence. Specifically, Dahl noted that “the timing of increases in risk taking behavior 
and emotional intensity are linked to the timing of puberty (Wagner & Zimmerman, 
2006, p. 291).” Moreover, within this period between early and mid-adolescence, Dahl 
believes that “adolescents are more prone to experiencing biologically driven, affect 
laden motivations before they have the cognitive wherewithal to cope with them and so 
are prone to making poor, risky choices (Wagner & Zimmerman, 2006, p. 291).” 
Consequently, if an adolescent continues to frequently make poor and risky choices, 
he/she is more prone to have lower levels or self-esteem and self-efficacy in decision 
making skills. In turn, lower levels of self-esteem and self-efficacy may contribute to the 
onset of suicidal thoughts and behaviors. Overall, it is important for adolescent suicide 
researchers to be competent in adolescent development, in order to establish valid and 
reliable prevention and intervention programs in treating suicide symptomology. 
Prevention and Intervention Efforts 
 Researchers have focused on developing therapeutic interventions and 
preventative measures in hopes of decreasing the suicide rates among children and 
adolescents. As reported by Donaldson, Spirito, and Overholser (2003), the literature on 
suicide interventions is considerably small relative to the numerous children and 
adolescents who engage in suicidal thoughts and behaviors. Donaldson and colleagues 
(2003) rationalized that this lack of research is due to the complex question of whether to 
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develop a program or technique that treats the underlying diagnostic condition or a 
program or technique that addresses the suicidal behavior directly. Although treatment of 
the underlying disorder appears to be essential to the reduction of suicidal behavior, it 
alone is insufficient and does not emerge as a viable option in the elimination of suicidal 
behavior in children and adolescents (Harrington, Kerfoot, Dyer, McNiven, Gill, 
Harrington, & Woodham, 1998). Therefore, as recommended by Donaldson and 
colleagues (2003), the primary focus of suicide researchers should revolve around testing 
the efficacy of the programs that have been designed to directly address suicidal 
behavior. 
In reviewing the outcome studies of suicide in adolescents, Donaldson and 
colleagues (2003) differentiated between the nonrandomized and randomized trials. 
Results of the nonrandomized trial initially appeared encouraging. Donaldson and 
colleagues found several studies that appeared to reduce not only suicidal behavior but 
specific risk factors as hopelessness (Phillay & Waasenaar, 1995), psychiatric symptoms 
(Phillay & Waasenaar, 1995), and negative affect (Ross & Motto, 1984), while also 
developing more cognitive skills such as impulse management (Ross & Motto, 1984), 
family and peer relationships (Ross & Motto, 1984) problem solving skills (McLeavey, 
Daly, Ludgate, & Murray, 1994), and coping skills (McLeavey, Daly, Ludgate, & 
Murray, 1994). Additionally, the effectiveness of each program did not appear to be 
affected by the type of theoretical approach (i.e. cognitive-behavioral, psychodynamic, 
and existentialistic) implemented. Such results suggest that treatment based on a wide 
variety of theories would be equally efficacious in treating suicidal behavior.  
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 Despite the initial success of the nonrandomized trials in reducing suicidal 
behavior, Donaldson and colleagues (2003) reported that the results of the three 
randomized trials appear less convincing. The randomized trials are a better indicator of 
treatment effects because they control for nuisance variables (i.e. spontaneous remission 
and placebo effects). Of the three trials (Controve, Zirinsky, Black, & Weston, 1995; 
Harrington, Kerfoot, Dyer, McNiven, Gill, Harrington, & Woodham, 1998; Rudd, Rajab, 
Orman, Stulman, Joiner, & Dixon, 1996) none produced significant results that speak to 
the efficacious nature of reducing suicidal behavior. Such results confound the findings in 
the nonrandomized trials and increase the need to search for new and innovative ways to 
empirically validate programs that withstand stringent statistical analyses. Moreover, a 
lack of an empirically validated treatment program for suicidal adolescents can 
exacerbate the anxiety experienced by the mental health professional working with the 
adolescent and impede the development of effective guidelines in this particular area 
(Donaldson et al., 2003). 
 Such difficulties with empirically validating a treatment program for suicidal 
adolescents have encouraged researchers to look at other means of reducing the 
prevalence rates of suicidal behavior in adolescents. One such mean is to focus on the 
risk factors that leave the adolescent vulnerable to engage in suicidal thoughts or 
behaviors, in hopes that the identification of these risk factors will help school teachers, 
parents, and mental health professional prevent suicidality. As a result, researchers have 
identified numerous amounts of demographic, social, behavioral, cognitive, mood, and 
personality variables that are highly associated with suicide behavior in adolescents. 
Specifically, researchers have identified sex (Adcock, Nagy, & Simpson, 1991), age 
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(Kessler, Borges, & Walters, 1999), geographic location (Centers of Disease Control, 
2002), ethnicity (Feldman & Wilson, 1997), quality of peer relationships (DiFilippo & 
Overholser, 2000), loneliness (Robert, Roberts, & Chen, 1998), isolation (Groholt, 
Ekberg, Wichstrom, & Ealdormen, 2000), substance abuse history (Wagner, Cole, & 
Schwartzman, 1996), a prior history of suicidal behavior (Wichstrom, 2000), 
hopelessness (Boergers, Spirito, & Donaldson, 1998), problem solving abilities (Spirito, 
Brown, Overholser, & Fritz, 1989), coping skills (Rhode, Seeley, & Mace, 1997), 
depression (Dori & Overholser, 1999), anger (Boergers, Spirito, & Donaldson, 1998), 
anxiety (Stein, Apter, Ratzoni, Har-Even, & Avidan, 1998), perfectionism (Enns, Cox, & 
Inayatulla, 2003), impulsivity (Beautrais, Joyce, & Mulder, 1999), and neuroticism 
(Enns, Cox, & Inayatulla, 2003) as risk factors of adolescent suicidality. 
Cognitive Risk Factors of Adolescent Suicide 
 Silverman and Maris (1995) noted that suicidal acts are multifactorial events that 
are composed of different types of expressions. For instance some expressions of suicidal 
acts may be behavioral (i.e. cutting oneself), affective (i.e. persistent crying and/or 
sadness) or cognitive (i.e. negative thoughts about oneself and one’s future). Of the three 
types of expressions, researchers know relatively very little of the cognitive components 
that influence the onset and/or exacerbation of suicidal symptoms, especially in 
adolescents. However, due to the continuous work of Beck and his followers, there has 
been an influx of researchers who are attempting to identify and conceptualize the role of 
specific cognitive vulnerability factors in depression and suicidality. 
 As of today, researchers have garnered a significant amount of empirical evidence 
that speaks to the positive relationship between cognitive risk factors and suicide. 
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Specifically, researchers have noted that self-efficacy (i.e. Dieserud, Roysamb, Ekeberg, 
& Kraft, 2001), hopelessness (i.e. Kazdin, French, Unis, Esveldt-Dawson, & Sherick, 
1983), coping strategies (i.e. Rhode, Seeley, & Mace, 1997), problem irresolvability (i.e. 
Orbach et al., 1999), and problem solving strategies (i.e. D’Zurilla, Chang, Nottingham, 
& Faccini, 1998) all have significant positive associations with a wide range of suicide 
thinking and behaviors.  However, some researchers have asserted that “so-called” 
cognitive constructs such as coping skills and problem solving strategies are actually 
composed of a number on non-cognitive elements. For instance, Connor-Smith, Compas, 
Wadsworth, Thomsen, & Saltzman (2000) noted that coping strategies can be cognitive, 
behavioral, and/or physiological, and therefore should not be identified as “true” 
cognitive constructs. As a result, it appears that self-efficacy and hopelessness are the 
only “pure” cognitive constructs that researchers have identified as risk factors to 
suicidality. 
 Hopelessness. According to Melges and Bowlby (1969) hopelessness is defined 
as a lowered expectation of achieving specific goals combined with negative beliefs 
about the likelihood of success (Dori & Overholser, 1999). Moreover, hopelessness is 
accompanied by feelings of personal futility about the future, loss of motivation, and 
future assumptions that one is destined to fail, continue to suffer, or encounter negative 
consequences (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974; Dori & Overholser, 1999; 
Melges & Bowlby, 1969; Spirito, Brown, Overholser, & Fritz, 1989). Consequently, 
Beck, Kovacs, and Weissman (1975) hypothesized that hopelessness would be a 
powerful correlate of suicidal behavior. 
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 As a result of Beck and colleagues hypothesis, there has been extensive 
investigations of the positive association between hopelessness and suicide (Asarnow & 
Guthrie, 1989; Asarnow, Carlson, & Guthrie, 1987; Beck, Brown, & Steer, 1990; Beck et 
al., 1975; Bedrosian & Beck, 1979; Carlson & Cantwell, 1982; Dori & Overholser, 1999; 
Fawcett, 1988; Hammond & Romney, 1995; Kashani, Reid, & Rosenberg, 1989; Kazdin 
et al., 1983; Kovacs, Beck & Weissman, 1975; McLaughlin, Miller, & Warwick, 1996; 
Steer, Kumar, & Beck, 1993; Minkoff, Bergman, Beck, & Beck, 1973; Pinto & 
Whisman, 1996). Additionally, numerous researchers (Beck, Brown, & Steer, 1990; Beck 
et al., 1975; Bedrosian & Beck, 1979; Beck & Weissman, 1975; Fawcett, 1988; Minkoff, 
Bergman, Beck, & Beck, 1973) have found support for Beck’s hypothesis. Specifically, 
Beck and colleagues (1990) found that hopelessness was even more useful in explaining 
suicidality then depression. Additionally, Asarnow and Guthrie (1989) found that when 
hopelessness was controlled for depression had only a weak association with suicide 
intent. Thus, hopelessness appears to be a powerful predictor of suicide ideation, intent, 
and behaviors. 
 However, the majority of the studies that found evidence for hopelessness as a 
powerful predictor of suicidality surveyed adult samples. As a result a number of 
researchers (Asarnow & Guthrie, 1989; Asarnow, Carlson, & Guthrie, 1987; Carlson & 
Cantwell, 1982; Dori & Overholser, 1999; Hammond & Romney, 1995; Kashani, Reid, 
& Rosenberg, 1989; Kazdin et al., 1983; McLaughlin, Miller, & Warwick, 1996; Steer, 
Kumar, & Beck, 1993; Pinto & Whisman, 1996) conducted studies to determine if these 
results were generalizable to other samples (i.e. adolescents). 
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 To date, there has been contradictory evidence that hopelessness is a predictor of 
suicidality in adolescents. Specifically, Carlson and Cantwell (1982) and Asarnow and 
colleagues (1987) found that hopelessness had a higher association with depression and 
had little influence in the onset of suicidal symptoms. Additionally, Carlson and Cantwell 
determined that hopelessness was ineffective in distinguishing between depressed-suicide 
attempters and non-attempters. As a result of the previous findings, Asarnow and 
colleagues (1987) concluded that hopelessness may not be a reliable indicator of suicidal 
risk because of some developmental issues that arise in adolescence. For example, 
Bemporad and Wilson (1978) found that adolescents were more focused on the present 
and had a difficult in conceptualizing the future. 
 Alternatively, there is another group of researchers (Dori & Overholser, 1999; 
Hammond & Romney, 1995; Kashani, Reid, & Rosenberg, 1989; Kazdin et al., 1983; 
McLaughlin, Miller, & Warwick, 1996; Steer, Kumar, & Beck, 1993; Pinto & Whisman, 
1996) who have found evidence for Beck and colleagues’ (1975) hypothesis that 
hopelessness is a powerful predictor of suicidality in adolescents. Additionally, some 
researchers (i.e. Kazdin et al., 1983) have found that hopelessness was more consistently 
correlated with suicide intent then was depression. Moreover, researchers such as Kazdin 
and colleagues (1983) used a hopelessness measure that was designed for adolescents, 
whereas some of the other studies (i.e. Carlson & Cantwell, 1982) used instruments that 
were more appropriate for adults. Thus, a lack of a hopelessness instrument designed for 
adolescents could have been a limitation that underscored the association between 
hopelessness and suicidality in adolescents in some research studies. 
 65 
 Self-efficacy. Another cognitive variable that has been consistently related to 
suicidality is self-efficacy. According to Bandura (1986) self-efficacy refers to one’s 
evaluation of his/her “capability to organize and execute courses of action required to 
attain designated types of performances (p. 391).” Bandura (1999) also noted that 
perceptions of efficacy affect the onset, intensity, and duration of coping strategies used 
to manage difficult interpersonal conflicts. As a result, a low evaluation of one’s ability to 
cope with negative stressors will likely exacerbate emotional distress, whereas a high 
evaluation of one’s ability to cope with negative stressors will likely hinder the onset of 
emotional distress. 
 A number of researchers (i.e. Bandura, Pastorelli, Barbaranelli, & Caprara, 1999; 
Muris, 2001; Oliver & Paull, 1995) found empirical evidence that suggests self-efficacy 
is a strong predictor of depression in a variety of samples. Moreover, considering the 
strong positive relationship between depression and suicidality, Bandura and colleagues 
(1999) hypothesized that self-efficacy may act as both a risk and protective factor to the 
onset of suicide symptomology. 
 As a result of Bandura and colleagues (1999) hypothesis, a moderate amount of 
researchers (Dieserud et al., 2001; Dieserud, Roysamb, Braverman, Dalgard, & Ekeberg, 
2003; Kaslow, Thompson, Okun, Price, Young, Bender, Wyckoff, Twomey, & Goldin, 
2002; Labelle & Lachance, 2003; Locke & Newcomb, 2005; O’Conner & Armitage, 
2003; Thompson, Kaslow, Short, & Wyckoff, 2002) examined the relationship between 
self-efficacy and suicidality. Kaslow and colleagues (2002) found that low self-efficacy 
was more prevalent in suicidal group of abused African American women compared to a 
non-suicidal group of African American women. Furthermore, Kaslow and colleagues 
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suggested that higher levels of self-efficacy engendered consistent sources of emotional 
support that inhibited the onset of suicide symptomology. Alternatively, low levels of 
self-efficacy were likely to be associated with less social support and more confusion 
about how to obtain social support within their environment. 
 Additionally, O’Conner and Armitage (2003) noted that more specific forms of 
self-efficacy had a significant impact on the onset of suicidality in a sample of adults with 
a previous suicide attempt. Specifically, O’Conner and Armitage hypothesized that 
individuals with a previous suicide attempt would have higher levels of self-efficacy 
regarding one’s ability to self-mutilate compared to a group of hospital controls and a 
group of community controls. As expected, O’Conner and Armitage found that 
individuals with a previous suicide attempt had higher levels of self-efficacy about self-
mutilating. As a result, O’Conner and Armitage posited that a high sense of efficacy 
regarding self-mutilation would explain why a significant amount of individuals who 
experienced a suicide attempt would reattempt. 
 Another type of focused self-efficacy that might have a negative association with 
suicidality is academic self-efficacy. Specifically, Labelle and Lachance (2003) 
hypothesized that low academic efficacy would contribute to the onset of suicide ideation 
in a sample of college students. As expected, Labelle and Lachance found that low 
academic efficacy predicted 11% of the variance in male suicide ideation and 19% of the 
variance in female suicide ideation. Furthermore, academic efficacy accounted 35% of 
the total variance in suicide ideation scores. According, to Labelle and Lachance, these 
results suggest that academic efficacy must be a key component to any treatment plan 
involving suicide ideation in college students. 
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 Lastly, there has been only one known study that has examined the self-efficacy-
suicidality relationship in a sample of adolescents. Specifically, Locke and Newcomb 
hypothesized that certain elements (i.e. assertiveness, problem solving confidence, and 
competence) of general self-efficacy would serve as protective factors in the onset of 
suicide ideation in a sample of adolescent Hispanic males. As expected, all three 
elements of general self-efficacy were found to have a negative relationship with suicide 
ideation in adolescent Hispanic males. Consequently, their conclusions provided 
preliminary evidence that self-efficacy may be a significant protective factor in 
adolescent suicidality. 
 Overall, it appears that both hopelessness and self-efficacy contribute to the onset 
of suicide symptomology. However it is imperative that researchers continue to examine 
other cognitive factors’ association with adolescent suicidality, in order to establish more 
effective prevention and intervention programs to treat suicide symptomology. As a 
result, I looked at the potential association between suicide proneness and another 
cognitive variable, TAF. 
TAF Beliefs and Various Types of Adolescent Suicidality 
 As previously noted, there have be no known studies that have examined the 
relationship between TAF thinking and suicidality in a sample of adolescents. However, 
there is a significant amount of empirical evidence that suggests a positive relationship 
might exist. Specifically, numerous researchers (i.e. Berle & Starcevic, 2005) have shown 
that both TAF thinking and adolescent suicidality share common correlates such as: self-
blame, guilt, pathological worry, irrational responsibility, anxiety symptoms, and 
depression. Additionally, according to Berle and Starcevic (2005) TAF thinking can be 
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described as an internalized cognitive appraisal style. This specifically may suggest there 
may be a significant relationship between TAF thinking and suicidality because 
internalized cognitive appraisal styles have been consistently found to have positive 
associations with suicidality (Eshun, 2000). However, considering that suicidality 
incorporates a number of thinking processes and behaviors, there are no concrete 
indications of what types of ideations or behaviors TAF thinking may be associated with. 
In the next section, I took an in depth look at the theoretical commonalities that may 
associate TAF thinking and various types of suicidal behaviors. 
 TAF and death related proneness. According to Berle and Starcevic (2005) 
adolescents who engage in TAF thinking are more prone to experience serve amounts of 
emotional distress. This emotional distress may take the form of guilt, self-blame, anxiety 
symptoms, or depressive symptoms. Specifically, Amir and colleagues (2001) noted that 
these distress symptoms could arise from the erroneous perception that one’s thought 
processes are responsible for harming oneself or others. To date, there has been no 
research that has examined the effects of irrational responsibility on relationship building 
and relationship maintenance. However, it is quite feasible to deduce that such irrational 
levels of responsibility may have a powerfully negative effect on the ability to create and 
maintain relationships. 
 Consequently, Joiner (2005) noted that a strong desire to die was heavily 
impacted by an individual’s perception that he/she is unable to create relationships or be 
effective in the maintenance of current relationships. Therefore, the possibility may exist 
that irrational levels of responsibility embedded within TAF thinking make one more 
vulnerable to a desire to die. Additionally, feelings of ineffectiveness and isolation may 
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exacerbate the emotional distress that an individual is already experiencing. As a result, 
the individual who engages in TAF thinking may view suicide as a means to escape the 
emotional pain that is associated with it (Baumeister, 1990).  Overall, it seems that TAF 
thinking may be associated with such death-related behaviors as suicide ideation and 
suicide attempts in adolescence. 
 TAF and health-related proneness. Health-related behaviors may be associated 
with TAF thinking especially indirectly through the effects of depression. According to 
Muris and colleagues (2001), TAF thinking was positively associated with depression in 
a sample of community adolescents. Moreover, Berardi (2001) surveyed 1896 primary 
care patients over the age of fourteen to determine how many patients presented 
depressive symptoms. They found that 8% of the participants presented with severe 
symptoms of depression. As a result, Berardi and colleagues (2001) concluded that 
depression was highly associated with physical illness. However, Berardi and colleagues 
did not offer any information regarding the direction of the physical illness-depression 
relationships. In essence, does physical illness precede depression or vise versa? 
 In order to shed more light upon the directional relationship between physical 
illness-depression relationship in adolescents, Husler and colleagues (2005) ran a series 
of structural equation models (depression led to more physical illness and physical illness 
led to more depression). Their results concluded that the model with the best fit was their 
primary model, where depression acted as a precedent to physical illness. These results 
suggest that adolescents who are depressed are more likely to become physically ill. 
Furthermore, according to Husler and colleagues (2005) depressed adolescents were also 
more prone to experience various types of medication, more surgeries, and more 
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exposure to needles. As a result, it appears that since depression appears to be associated 
with TAF thinking and physical illness, their might be a significant relationship between 
TAF thinking and physical illness in adolescents. 
 TAF and injury-related proneness. TAF thinking may also be associated with 
significant levels of injury-related behaviors. Specifically, there have been numerous 
researchers (Hazlett-Stevens et al., 2002, Rassin et al., 2001a; Rassin et al., 2001b) who 
have concluded that TAF thinking is associated with various symptoms of anxiety (most 
notably pathological worry). Moreover, Berle and Starcevic (2005) also hypothesized that 
TAF thinking may be a causal factor in the onset of these anxiety symptoms. Considering 
how anxiety symptoms appear to be a powerful predictor of self-mutilation in adolescents 
(Bennum, 1984), TAF thinking may be associated with self-injurious behaviors directly 
or indirectly through anxiety symptoms. 
 In a sample of adolescents and young adults Hazlett-Stevens and colleagues 
(2002) found that anxiety symptoms (especially pathological worry) was positively 
associated with certain types of TAF thinking (TAF Likelihood beliefs). Moreover, 
Bennum (1984) postulated that one of the main reasons why adolescents self-mutilated 
was to reduce the amount of negative affect that they were experiencing. Specifically, 
Favazza and Conterio (1989) found that 72% of females who self-mutilated did so in an 
attempt to stop their mind from racing, while 65% of the female self-mutilators justified 
self-harm because it was the only means to help them relax. Furthermore, Ross and Heath 
(2002) found that adolescents who self-mutilated had reported more difficulties with 
anxiety symptoms than those adolescents who did not engage in self-mutilations. As a 
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result, Ross and Heath (2002) concluded that anxiety is a precipitant factor to self-
mutilation in adolescents. 
 Additionally, Raine (1982) noted that adolescents may self-mutilate as a form of 
self-punishment. This is especially interesting when one considers the effects of TAF 
thinking of adolescents. Specifically, Berle and Starcevic (2005) postulated that 
personalization and self-blame were key factors in the positive relationship between TAF 
thinking and depression. Severe amounts of self-blame and personalization may promote 
the perception that the person who is engaging in TAF thinking is a bad person, who 
needs to be punished. As a result, the person may turn to self-injurious behaviors as a 
form a punishment. 
 TAF and self-related proneness. Shafran and colleagues (1996) rationalized how 
TAF thinking can lead to negative self-evaluations. Specifically, they noted that when a 
person engages in TAF thinking, he/she is likely to experience extreme amounts of guilt 
and/or shame for not being able to control the outcome of certain events. Moreover, if the 
person continues to blame himself/herself for uncontrollable thoughts or outcomes, then 
he/she is more likely to place negative value on his/her self-worth. Specifically, the 
individual will frequently label himself/herself as inherently bad because he or she feels 
powerless in preventing harm for themselves or others. 
 Furthermore, these negative self-evaluations may explain the association between 
TAF thinking and depression. According to Shrik, Gudmundsen, and Burwell (2005), 
negative cognitions about self-worth are a powerful risk factor in the onset and/or the 
exacerbation of depressive symptoms in adolescents. To test their hypothesis they 
correlated the reports of depression scores and negative self-evaluations scores in a 
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sample of 168 community adolescents. As expected, depression was highly associated 
with cognitive evaluations of self-worth. As a result, it appears that TAF thinking fosters 
frequent engagement in negative self-evaluating, which in turn could contribute to the 
onset of depression and suicidality in adolescents. 
Gender Differences, TAF, & Suicide 
 The nature of the relationship between gender and adolescent suicidal thoughts 
and behaviors can be described as paradoxical. Regarding suicide completion, research 
has reported that males complete more than females at a 4.7:1 ratio (National Center for 
Injury Prevention and Control, 2005). However, researchers have noted that females 
attempt more than males do at a 3:1 ratio (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2002). Additionally, female adolescents and young adults also tend to report more 
suicidal ideation compared male adolescents and young adults (Andrews & Lewinsohn, 
1992).  In response to these paradoxical conclusions, Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 
Lewinsohn, Rohde, Seeley, Monson, Meyer, and Langford (1998) asserted that gender 
differences in suicide are likely to be explained by the gender differences in constructs 
(i.e. depression, hopelessness, cognitive response styles) that have been empirically 
associated with suicidality. One construct that might help explain gender differences in 
suicidality is TAF thinking. 
Chronological Age, Development, and TAF Beliefs. 
To date, most TAF researchers commonly refer to TAF thinking as an antecedent 
to psychopathology in both adolescents and adults. However, there are some theorists 
(i.e. Piaget, Erikson, and Elkind) that imply aspects of TAF thinking may be a product of 
developmental aspects of adolescence. Specifically, Piaget (1954) noted that adolescence 
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is a time period where teenagers develop accurate reality testing abilities. Moreover, he 
suggested that since older adolescents have been privy to more life experiences, they 
were likely to use reality testing abilities more efficiently.   
 Similarly, Erikson (1968) noted that adolescence was a period where teenagers 
would strive to form a stable sense of identity. Erikson also noted that a developed sense 
of identity was more synonymous with positive and healthy cognitive beliefs.  
Alternatively, teenagers who have not been able to explore their identity for one reason or 
another were likely to experience more cognitive errors in information processing. Much 
like Piaget, he postulated that since older adolescents had more life experiences they were 
likely to have more developed identities then younger adolescents. 
 Lastly, Elkind (1967) postulated that during their teenage years adolescents will 
develop an egocentric attitude that accompanies them through the emergence of Piaget’s 
formal operations stage. From this egocentric attitude adolescents may believe that they 
are indestructible; engendering a high sense of personal power and uniqueness. 
Moreover, adolescents who experience a sense of indestructibleness and high sense of 
personal power may attribute more magical tendencies to their beliefs (Ormont, 1969). 
Specifically, adolescents may be more prone to believe that their thoughts are powerful 
enough to influence the outcome of certain occurrences. Again, much like Piaget and 
Erikson, Elkind noted that older adolescent were most likely more engaged within 
Piaget’s formal operations stage of development and therefore less likely to engage in 
egocentric thinking compared to younger adolescents. 
 Overall, it appears that younger adolescents seem to struggle more with their new 
cognitive abilities compared to older adolescents. Specifically, due to their lack of 
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experience, younger adolescents may attribute more value to their cognitive abilities, 
commit more errors in information processing, and attribute more magical tendencies to 
their beliefs. Such characteristics may be embedded within TAF thinking. As a result, I 
attempted to determine whether any age differences existed among adolescents on TAF 
thinking.  
Summary  
 Suicide thoughts and behaviors appear to be increasingly more prevalent in the 
development of adolescents. As a result, researchers have attempted to construct reliable 
prevention and intervention programs to reduce the rates of suicidality. Unfortunately, it 
appears that suicide researchers and clinicians have been unable to create effective 
prevention and interventions programs for adolescent suicidality. The lack of effective 
programs is most likely a reflection of an incomplete understanding of adolescent 
suicidality. One specific aspect of suicide research that may enhance the effectiveness of 
prevention and intervention programs is to learn more about the impact of cognitions. 
The research on cognitive influences on adolescent suicide is scant, and therefore future 
researchers may want to develop studies that investigate the impact of cognitive variables 
on suicidality in adolescence. My main purpose in this study was to investigate the 
relationship between TAF thinking and suicide proneness in a sample of community 
adolescents. In addition to investigating the relationship between TAF thinking and 
suicide proneness, I also looked to determine the effects of gender and age on adolescent 
TAF thinking. Such analyses may have a significant impact on other aspects of 
adolescent suicidality. Specifically, through this proposed study, I might be able to 
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engender significant insights in developmental and gender related considerations of 
adolescent suicidality.    
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
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Overview 
 In this section, I described the relevant parts of the procedural section of my 
study. I began this description with a thorough evaluation of the participants that were 
sampled for this study. I then described the procedures used in order to obtain permission 
to recruit the participants of this study. Specifically, I outlined the potential harmful 
effects of my study, how I dealt with these potential effects, data collecting procedure, 
incentives used to recruit participants, training of the researchers, and storage of data. I 
then followed this section with a brief description of the measures and their psychometric 
properties. Lastly, I concluded this section with a short summary on the research design 
and research questions I examined in this study.  
Participants 
 I collected data from 260 community adolescents. I recruited my participants at a 
Midwestern, urban public high school. Due to the arrangements with the high school, I 
collected data from Seniors, Juniors, and Sophomores only. Unfortunately, I was not able 
to collect data from the Freshman class. The school prohibited their participation due to 
the fact they had already taken a state wide survey the previous semester and did not want 
them to miss anymore class time. The sample included 145 females (56%) and 115 males 
(44%). Of the 260 participants, 139 were seniors (54%), 49 were Juniors (19%), and 72 
were Sophomores (28%). I collected data from 26 fifteen year-olds (10%), 55 sixteen 
year-olds (21%), 50 seventeen year-olds (19%), 122 eighteen year-olds (47%), and 7 
nineteen year-olds (3%). The mean age of the sample was 17.01 years. The sample was 
mostly Caucasian (55%), African-American (21%), Mixed-racial background (10%), 
Latino (7%), Native American (5%), and Asian American (2%). Lastly, while recruiting 
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participants and entering data provided by the participants, I noticed that a significant 
amount of participants appeared to be academically delayed. Specifically, 8% of the 
Seniors (Seniors who were nineteen years or older), 25% of the Juniors (Juniors who 
were eighteen years or older), and 9% of the Sophomores (Sophomores who were 
seventeen years or older) appeared to be academically delayed. 
Contacts. A meeting was held with the Coordinator of Trauma Prevention 
Services, the Director of Community Based Services, and Adolescent Health Coordinator 
to discuss the availability of specific Midwest high schools who would be interested in 
taking a survey. In the meeting, members from the state department and the researchers 
tried to identify schools who would be willing to cooperate and that were not schedule to 
participate in any state mental health surveys in the upcoming semester. Additionally, I 
was referred to advocate for the project through community mental health agencies. As a 
result, I made contact with Tulsa public high schools through Columbia Teen Screen, 
which is a mental health facility that assesses suicidality in adolescents who attend public 
high schools.   
Procedure 
 Before data were collected there was a series of steps that I took to ensure that the 
participants were ethically protected from any harm. First, I made an appointment to meet 
with the school principal, counselors, and district leader ship board to discuss the nature 
of the study and to ask permission to use their students as participants. Once permission 
was procured from the required school representatives, I submitted a draft of the purpose, 
procedures, inducements, potential risks and benefits, and significance of this study to 
Oklahoma State’s Institutional Review Board. After I obtained consent from the school 
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principals, school boards, and OSU’s IRB, I then addressed the specifics of conducting 
this study with the school principals and counselors.  
 Other requirements were also satisfied in order to ensure that the participants were 
protected from any kind of potential harmful effects that the study might evoke. 
Specifically, with the aid of the school principal, school counselors, and the English 
department faculty, I visited the high school approximately two weeks before the data 
collection date in order to inform students of the possible chance to be a participant in a 
research study. At this time participants were given two copies of informed consent. The 
first copy needed to be signed by a parent/guardian (giving their permission for their 
child to participate in the study) and returned to one of the faculty members. The first 
informed consent needed to have both the parents/guardians signature and the 
adolescent’s signature in order to partake in the data collection process. The second copy 
was given to the student’s parents/guardian to keep for his/her personal records. Each 
informed consent sent home addressed the nature of the study. The informed consent 
contained information about the content of the study, a brief disclosure to the purpose of 
the study, the potential risks and benefits of the study, clauses that remind both the 
student and the parental guardian that the study is both voluntary and anonymous, any 
incentives that will be offered for completion of the study, and a contingency clause that 
states if the participants are negatively affected by participating in the survey then there 
will be measures to aid the participant back into the emotional state he/she was in before 
taking the study.  
I also remained at the high school for the entire day of data collection to ensure 
that any participant who wished to discuss the affects of the study had ample time to do 
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so with me. Furthermore, I also negotiated with the school counselors to allow any 
student to come in and discuss with them any type of emotional disturbance they may 
have experienced from taking this survey. The school counselors made themselves 
available anytime during and after the data collection process. Additionally, I also made 
myself available at numerous publicized school-wide meetings, via telephone, and via 
email to address parental questions about the study or to receive parental non-consent 
notices. 
 On the days in which data collection occurred I went go to each participating 
English class before the beginning of school and collected all the informed consents. 
After I collected all of the informed consents, I entered each participating classroom (at 
the previously arranged time) and specifically reviewed with the participating students 
the assent form in which they signed before they took the survey. After the assent/consent 
form (depending on the age and legal status of the participant) had been read aloud, I 
passed out the survey to each student who has successfully obtained consent from his/her 
parent and/or given his/her consent/assent to participate in the study. All of the other 
students who either did not obtain consent or did not give assent worked a paper and 
pencil task pre-arranged class assignment that was handed out by the specific rooms’ 
faculty member.  
The survey took approximately thirty minutes for all of the students to complete. 
After I received all the completed surveys, I then passed out the small incentive (i.e. 
candy bar and/or a coke) that was promised the student in the informed consent and a 
debriefing sheet that details specific numbers the student can call if the student feels that 
he/she is in need of need of aid in resolving some of the emotional turmoil that might 
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have been precipitated by taking this survey. Additionally, I made myself available to any 
participant that was completely overwhelmed by the nature of the survey and needed 
immediate psychological attention. Lastly, I compensated the school in two ways. After 
the data from the school was analyzed the school received a report describing an 
aggregate picture of the schools students’ participation in risky behavior (i.e. suicide 
attempt, drug abuse, child abuse). This report did not include any names of specific 
students. It simply identified the amount of students who were having trouble with certain 
risky behaviors. All information was general and represented the sample as a whole. 
Secondly, for each class (i.e. Sophomore, Junior, and Senior), I gave one dollar to the 
student government for every student who completed my survey. The money was given 
directly to the class president of each class and was to be used for student activities such 
as prom and/or school field trips.    
Storage of data. All information the participants provided was anonymous. Their 
information was identified by code number only. Participants’ names were not placed 
anywhere on the survey. All information is stored in a lock file cabinet in my office. My 
committee and I are the only ones who have access to the data. The information the 
participants provided will be locked and kept safe for five years. After the five years are 
up, all information collected from this project will be destroyed. Individual responses to 
the survey will not be published in any manner. Only group information will be presented 
in any publications generated from this research, participants’ information will not be 
personally identified in any way. 
Research assistants. All researchers had completed a masters level degree in 
counseling psychology. All researchers had professional training in ethical issues 
 82 
regarding research with adolescents. Moreover, all researchers were trained for this 
specific project before collecting data from the students. Specifically, the researchers had 
extensive knowledge in data collection with children and adolescents, parental informed 
consents, confidentiality, and debriefing. Lastly, the researchers were available to talk to 
participants who become upset during the completion of the survey. Three students 
desired to talk with the primary researcher, and only one person discussed how the survey 
negatively affected their mood. The other two participants wanted to discuss personal 
issues not directly related to participating in the survey. When such an occurrence arose, 
the researcher privately talked to the participant to reduce any type of emotional 
disturbance and screen for severer emotional distress. Additionally, before the data 
collection all researchers met with the mental health professional at the school, in order to 
determine a course of action for transitioning upset participants from the researcher to the 
mental health practitioners.  
Measures 
Life Attitudes Schedule Short Form: LAS-SF. The LAS-SF (Rohde, Lewinsohn, 
Seeley, & Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 1996) is a 24-item measure that assesses the broad 
construct of suicide-prone behavior. The short form is similar to the original instrument, 
the Life Attitudes Schedule (Lewinohn et al., 1995), in that it also consists of the same 
four content areas: Death Related, Self Related, Health Related, and Injury Related. The 
Death Related subscale measures suicide and death related themes as well as themes 
regarding reasons to live. The Health Related domain consists of items that measure 
illness, lack of self-care, and wellness. The Self Related subscale measures self-worth, 
self-image, self-enhancement, and self-promotion. Lastly, the Injury Related sub-scale 
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measures injury-enhancing, risk-taking, and safety related thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors. The short form has been shown to be highly correlated (r = .93) with the 
original version of the LAS. Like the original form of the LAS, the short form also uses a 
4 (content areas) x 3 (behavior types) x 2 (valence) matrix. The highest score one can 
receive on the short form is 24 if the participant answers all of the negative items 
negatively and fails to endorse any of the positive items.  
Psychometrics. Internal consistencies for the short form are .92 for the total scale, 
.82 for the death-related items, .80 for the health-related items, .88 for the injury-related 
items, and .79 for the self-related items (Rohde et al., 1996). Test-retest reliability ranged 
from .67 to .80 for the content areas and .84 for the total LAS score in college samples 
(Rohde et al., 1996). For my study, the internal consistencies for the LAS short-form 
were .77 for the LAS total score, .52 for the death-related sub-scale, .52 for the health-
related sub-scale, .60 for the injury-related sub-scale, and .60 for the self-related sub-
scale. Considering the low reliabilities of the LAS-SF, I decided not to use them in my 
analysis. Instead, I decided to use the total LAS score which has an adequate reliability 
coefficient.  
 Thought-Action Fusion Questionnaire for Adolescents: TAFQ-A. The TAFQ-A 
(Shafran et al., 1996) is a 15-item measure that assesses TAF thinking in adolescents. 
Eight of the items measure TAF Morality thinking. Specifically, each item Of the 
Morality subscale consists of two components. The first component is a brief vignette 
that helps the adolescents to conceptualize TAF Morality thinking (e.g. “You are with a 
friend. Suddenly without any reason you think your friend is a stupid person.”). The 
second component of each item asks adolescents, how similar is having this thought to 
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actually doing the action (e.g. “Having this thought is almost as bad as really saying to 
your friend that he is stupid.”)? Seven of the items measure TAF Likelihood thinking. 
Again, each TAF Likelihood item is broken down into two components. The first 
component is a brief vignette that helps the adolescent conceptualize TAF Likelihood 
thinking (e.g. “Suddenly without a reason you have the thought that your father is laid off 
and that there are financial problems at home.”). The second component of each item 
asks adolescents, does having this particular thought increases the likelihood that the 
event will take place (e.g. “Having this thought increases the risk that your father really 
will be laid off.”)? The second component of both TAF Morality and Likelihood items 
uses a 4 point Likert scale as how true this statement is for the adolescent (1 = not true at 
all to 4 = very true).  
Psychometrics.  Muris and colleagues (2001) conducted a principle component 
analysis on a normal adolescent sample, which produced a two factor structure that 
accounted for 50% of the variance in TAF scores. The two factors obtained were TAF-
Moral and TAF-Likelihood. Moreover, internal consistency coefficients were adequate 
for both factors (Cronbach’s alpha .84 and .81 respectively). For my study, the internal 
consistencies for the TAFQ-A were .83 for the TAF-total score, .84 fore the TAF-Moral 
sub-scale, and .78 for the TAF-Likelihood sub-scale.  
Research Questions and Design 
 This investigation was designed to assess mean differences between younger and 
older adolescents and between female and male adolescents. Additionally, this 
investigation also looked at the ability of two TAF thinking styles to account for a 
significant amount of variance in four distinct suicide proneness measures. Overall, this 
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investigation was encouraged by a desire to extend both the TAF and adolescent suicide 
literature. 
 The following questions will be tested in the study. 
1) Is there a significant interaction between age and gender in measuring for TAF-
Moral and TAF-Likelihood beliefs? 
2) Does the combination of the TAF subscale scores predict a significant amount of 
variance in four different types of suicide behaviors? 
Mean scores for female and male adolescent at various ages were reported on a 
number of dependent variables (i.e. TAF-Moral, TAF-Likelihood, Death-Related 
behaviors, Health-Related behaviors, Injury-Related behaviors, and Self-Related 
behaviors). Question one was answered by using a 2 x 6 (gender by age) factorial 
analysis of variance. Specifically, gender (male vs. female) and chronological age (13-18 
year olds) were the independent variables, while both TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood 
were the dependent variables. Question three was answered by four distinct multiple 
regressions. For the four multiple regressions, each one of the suicide proneness measures 
was the criterion variable, while TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood were the predictor 
variables. Additional analyses included inter-correlations among all of the suicide 
proneness and TAF variables.  
Summary 
 In this study, I surveyed 260 community adolescents on both suicidal proneness 
and thought-action fusion. Participants were recruited through a public high school in the 
Midwest. I procured permission to collect data from a university IRB, the high school 
principle and school board, and the parents of legal guardians of the participants. All 
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information collected was confidential and participants were instructed not to place their 
name on any of the material before data collection. The survey approximately took only 
thirty minutes for each participant to complete the study. After completion of the study, 
every participant received a referral list in case the survey has negatively altered their 
mood. Additionally, a trained counselor was made available to the participants to manage 
any crisis situations that may arose from taking the survey. Participants were given small 
incentives (i.e. candy/soft drink and one dollar which goes towards the student 
government to set up school activities) for completing the survey. All data was stored in a 
secure cabinet with only the primary investigator and his committee having access to the 
cabinet. Furthermore, I used valid and reliable instruments to measures the desired 
constructs. Lastly, I analyzed the data by using well developed statistical procedures. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
FINDINGS 
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Introduction 
 I collected data from 260 community adolescents. The participants had a mean 
age of 17.01 (with a range from 15-19 year olds). Data were collected from Seniors, 
Juniors, and Sophomores only. The sample of adolescents were relatively diverse with 
the majority of participants being Caucasian, African-American, and bi-racial. 
Observationally, I found that a significant number of participants were academically 
delayed. As a result, I ran two MANOVAs (age vs. gender and academic class vs. 
gender) to examine my first research question. Additionally, I found that my subscales 
measures for the suicide proneness inventory had inadequate reliability coefficients 
(alphas below the .70 cutoff score). As a result, I used the suicide proneness total score to 
examine the relationship with the two TAF subscales scores. Also, I used the suicide 
proneness total scores as my criterion variable in my multiple regression.   
Overview 
 The findings of this study are presented according to the research questions. 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to explore potential age, gender, racial, and 
academic class group differences on the main study variables including suicide proneness 
and the two TAF subscales variables, TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood. MANOVA 
correlational, and regression analyses were conducted to answer the research questions 
for this study.  
Preliminary Analyses  
 The means and standard deviations for the TAFQ-A total score, TAF-Moral 
subscale score, TAF-Likelihood subscale score, and LAS-SF total score for the total 
sample are presented in Table 1. I also conducted a few preliminary analyses to obtain a 
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more robust picture of how various types of adolescents (gender, age, and race) reported 
thought-action fusion beliefs and suicide prone behaviors, feelings, and thoughts.  
 Suicide proneness demographics. I ran four ANOVAs to determine whether there 
were any demographic group (i.e. gender, ages, classes, and race) differences on suicide 
proneness total scores. The total suicide proneness score was used in these analyses 
because the total score was more reliable (alpha = .77) than the subscale scores.  In the 
first ANOVA, I found that there were significant gender differences in the reporting of 
suicide proneness total scores (F (1, 258) = 8.60, p = .004). Specifically, I found that 
adolescent males (n = 115) reported higher suicide proneness total scores compared to 
adolescent females (n = 145) (d = .36). Means and standard deviations of both male and 
female suicide proneness scores can be found in Table 2. In the second ANOVA, I found 
that there were no significant age differences in the reporting of suicide proneness total 
scores (F (3, 249) = 1.40, p = .24). It appears that fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen 
year old adolescents (nineteen year olds were excluded from the analysis due to their 
small number within the sample) do not significantly differ in their proneness to suicide. 
Means and standard deviations for fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen year old 
adolescents’ suicide proneness scores can be found in Table 3. In the third ANOVA, I 
found that there were no significant differences among class grades (Seniors, Juniors, and 
Sophomores) on suicide proneness total scores (F (2, 257) = .62, p = .54). It appears that 
Seniors, Juniors, and Sophomores report similar levels of suicide proneness during their 
high school years. Means and standard deviations for suicide proneness scores by 
academic class can be found in Table 4. Lastly, in the fourth ANOVA, I found no 
significant difference among students from different racial backgrounds on suicide 
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proneness total scores (F (2, 222) = 2.28, p = .105). It appears that African American 
students, Caucasian students, and students with multi-racial backgrounds (Latino, Asian 
American, and Native American students were excluded from the analysis due to low 
numbers within the sample) report similar levels of suicide proneness during their high 
school years. Means and standard deviations for suicide proneness scores by racial group 
(i.e., African-American students, Caucasian students, and students with a multi-racial 
backgrounds) can be found in Table 5. 
 Thought-action fusion demographics. Analyses comparing gender, age, and class 
mean differences on the TAF subscales are apart of my analysis for my first research 
question, and therefore will be presented later in the results section. However, I did 
conduct one MANOVA comparing racial differences (i.e., African American, Caucasian, 
and multiracial students) among the two TAF subscales (TAF-Moral and TAF-
Likelihood). I found that there was an overall significant main effect for race on the two 
TAF subscales (Wilks’ Lambda (2, 222) = 3.82, p = .005). Follow-up univariate analyses 
revealed that racial differences for the TAF-Likelihood subscale (F (2, 222) = 4.01, p = 
.019), but not for the TAF-moral scores (F (2, 222) = 1.66, p = .192). Results of the post-
hoc analyses indicated that African American students reported higher TAF-Likelihood 
scores compared to Caucasian students (d = .43). There were no significant differences 
between African American students and students with a multi-racial background or 
between Caucasian students and students with a multi-racial background. Means and 
standard deviations of African American students, Caucasian students, and students with 
a multi-racial background on TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood scores are presented in 
Table 5. 
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Research Question # 1 
Research Question # 1: “Is there a significant interaction between age and gender 
  in measuring for TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood beliefs?”  
Null Hypothesis # 1: “There is no significant interaction effect between age and 
gender when measuring for TAF thinking in a community sample of adolescents.” 
 Gender and age on TAF. To examine if an interaction existed between gender and 
age on the two TAF subscales (TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood), I ran a 2 x 4 (male vs. 
female, fifteen vs. sixteen vs. seventeen vs. eighteen) MANOVA. The nineteen year olds 
were excluded from the analysis due to a small amount of them within the sample. 
Overall, I found that there was no significant interaction between age and gender in 
regards on the two subscales of TAF (Wilks’ Lambda (3, 245) = 1.02, p = .411). See 
Table 6 for the means and standard deviation scores for this analysis. Cell means and 
main effects on TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood are presented in Table 6. I also found 
that there were no significant main effects for gender (Wilks’ Lambda (1, 245) = .85, p = 
.427) or age on the two TAF subscales (Wilks’ Lambda (3, 245) = .61, p = .725). Overall, 
it appears that boys and girls and adolescents from different age groups do not 
significantly differ in the morality of their thinking and the likelihood of engaging in 
thought-action-fusion. Therefore, the null hypotheses of my first research question was 
not rejected.    
 Gender and academic class on TAF. Considering that a significant amount of the 
participants in my sample appear to be academically delayed, I wanted to explore the 
impact of gender and academic class on the TAF subscale score. A 2 x 3 (male vs. 
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female, Senior vs. Junior vs. Sophomore) MANOVA was conducted on the two subscales 
of TAF (TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood) as my dependent variables. Similar to the first 
MANOVA, I found that there was no significant interaction effect on gender and 
academic class on the two subscales of TAF (Wilks’ Lambda (2, 254) = 1.26, p = .284). 
Cell means and main effects on TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood are presented in Table 
7. Again, I found that there were no significant main effects for gender (Wilks’ Lambda 
(1, 254) = 1.34, p = .265). There were also no significant main effects for academic class 
on the two TAF subscales (Wilks’ Lambda (2, 254) = .36, p = .834). Overall, it appears 
that boys and girls and adolescents from different academic classes do not significantly 
differ in the morality of their thinking and the likelihood of engaging in thought-action-
fusion. Again, despite substituting academic class for age, I failed to reject the null 
hypothesis for my first research question.  
Research Question #2 
 Research Question #2: “Does the combination of the TAF subscale scores predict 
 a significant amount of variance in four different types of suicide behaviors?” 
 Null Hypothesis #2: “The combination of TAF thinking score do not predict a 
 significant amount of variance in four separate measure of suicide proneness.” 
TAF and suicide proneness. To examine the question of the whether the two 
subscales of TAF could predict a significant amount of variance in suicide proneness 
scores, I ran Pearson product correlations among the three main variables: TAF-Moral, 
TAF-Likelihood, and suicide proneness (LAS total).  A multiple regression analysis was 
also conducted with the total suicide proneness score as my criterion variable and the two 
TAF subscales scores as my predictor variables.  
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 TAF-Moral was not significantly associated with the LAS total score (r = -.073, 
p > .05). However, I did find a small significant correlation between TAF-Likelihood and 
the LAS total score (r = .15, p < .05). In addition, TAF-Moral was moderately associated 
with TAF-Likelihood (r = .30, p < .001). Correlations among the variables are depicted 
on Table 8. Again, I also ran one multiple regression, using the enter method, where the 
LAS total score was my criterion variable and TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood were my 
predictor variables. I found that the combination of TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood 
predicted a statistically significantly, but non-substantial amount of variance (R2 = .04) in 
the LAS total scores (F (2, 257) = 4.82, p = .009). Both TAF-Moral (b = -.13, p = .048) 
and TAF-Likelihood (b = .19, p = .005) were significant predictors of the LAS total 
score. Coefficients and statistics for the multiple regression are presented in Table 9. 
Overall, it appears likely that adolescents who believe that thinking about certain events 
or outcomes influences the occurrence of that event outcome tend to report more suicide 
prone thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Thought-action-fusion predicted a small, (4%) 
but statistically significant proportion of the variance in suicide proneness scores.  
Therefore, the null hypothesis of my second research question was rejected.  
Summary 
 In the preliminary analyses, I found that there were gender differences in total 
suicide proneness scores in a sample of community adolescents. Specifically, male 
adolescents reported higher levels of total suicide proneness compared to female 
adolescents in high school. Furthermore, I also found that there were significant racial 
differences in Thought-Action-Fusion Likelihood beliefs in the sample of community 
 94 
adolescents. In particular, African-American adolescents reported higher likelihood belief 
scores than Caucasian adolescents in high school. 
 In the analysis of my first research question, I found that an age and gender 
interaction effect did not exist on TAF thinking in my sample of community adolescents. 
Moreover, I did not find any significant main effects for either age or gender on TAF 
thinking. I also found no significant interaction effect of academic class and gender on 
TAF thinking. Moreover, there were no significant main effects for either academic class 
or gender on TAF thinking in my sample of community adolescents. Overall, considering 
the lack of evidence I found, I failed to reject the null hypothesis for my first research 
question. 
 In examining the relationships between the TAF subscales and suicide proneness, 
I found only a small correlation between TAF-Likelihood and total suicide proneness. I 
examined this relationship further by using the two TAF subscales to predict the total 
suicide proneness scores. I found that the two TAF subscales predicted a significant 
amount of variance in the total suicide proneness score. Moreover, both subscales appear 
to be significant predictors of suicide proneness in adolescents. Overall, I did find 
evidence that the two TAF subscales predicted a significant amount of variance in the 
total suicide proneness score, therefore, I rejected the null hypothesis for my second 
research question. 
 95 
CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
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Impetus of Study 
 Thought-action fusion is a cognitive process that appears to be prevalent in the 
onset of such Axis-I disorders as OCD, GAD, and possibly Major Depression (Berle & 
Starcevic, 2005). Specifically, thought-action fusion is defined as fusing an 
irrational/intrusive thought with a forbidden action (Rachman, 1993). Rachman (1993) 
went on to describe the thought-action fusion construct in two distinct ways (Moral and 
Likelihood beliefs). Thought-action fusion moral beliefs occur when an individual 
regards an intrusive thought and the forbidden action as equal (i.e. “it is equally wrong to 
think about pushing someone out a window as to actually pushing someone out the 
window”). Thought-action fusion likelihood beliefs occur when an individual believes 
that thinking about an intrusive thought actually influences the outcome of the forbidden 
action (i.e. “my previous thoughts about my dad getting fired were an actual cause of him 
getting fired”).  
 To date, most of the thought-action fusion research has been conducted on adult 
samples. We know relatively little about whether the thought action-fusion processes are 
prevalent in adolescence. Furthermore, most of the thought-action fusion studies have 
been conducted on European samples, therefore it is unsure whether those results are 
generalizable to U.S. samples. As a result, I looked at the prevalence of thought-action 
fusion in a sample of U.S. community adolescents. 
 In addition, there are large gaps in the thought-action fusion literature in regards 
to gender, age, and race. Specifically, we know relatively little about how thought-action 
fusion affects adolescents from various genders, ages, and racial backgrounds. Therefore, 
the first purpose of my study was to determine if there were any demographic differences 
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(i.e. gender, age, and race) on thought-action fusion in a sample of U.S. community 
adolescents. Secondly, recent research has found that thought-action fusion may be 
prevalent in the onset of a wide range of psychopathological symptoms. To date, 
researchers have found solid evidence that thought-action fusion contributes to the onset 
of such Axis-I disorders as OCD (Rachman, 1993), GAD (Hazlett-Stevens et. al., 2002), 
and specific types of phobias (Rassin et. al., 2001a). However, researchers such as Berle 
and Starcevic (2005) have noted that thought-action fusion may be associated with 
depressive and suicidal symptoms. Therefore, the second purpose of this study was to 
determine whether thought-action fusion was associated with suicide prone thoughts (i.e. 
“I am worthless.”), feelings (“When I am mad, I feel like hitting or striking an inanimate 
object.”), and actions (“I often go on drinking sprees.”).  
Overview  
 In this section, I discussed my findings for each research question. Specifically, I 
compared my findings to the previously cited thought-action fusion and suicide 
proneness literature. In this discussion of my findings, I also reviewed different areas in 
the thought-action fusion and suicide proneness literatures that need to be addressed 
through future research studies. I then commented on the social and clinical implications 
of my findings. Lastly, I briefly discussed the limitations regarding my research design, 
participant sample, and measures.  
Summary of Research Findings  
In the present study, I examined thought-action fusion beliefs and suicide 
proneness in a community sample of U.S. adolescents (N = 260). First of all, the TAFQ-
A was deemed to be a reliable instrument. The total thought-action fusion score had an 
 98 
internal consistency coefficient of .83, the TAF-Moral subscale had an internal 
consistency coefficient of .84, and the TAF-Likelihood subscale had an internal 
consistency coefficient of .78. Second, I found that male and female adolescents from 
varying ages reported similar amount of thought-action fusion thinking. Third, I found 
that African-American adolescents use more thought-action fusion likelihood beliefs 
(thinking about an intrusive thought actually influences the outcome of the forbidden 
action) compared to Caucasian adolescents. Fourth, it appears that male adolescents 
engage in more suicide prone behaviors and thoughts compared to female adolescents. 
Fifth, I found that adolescents who engage in more thought-action fusion likelihood 
thinking were more likely to engage in more suicide prone thoughts and actions. 
Furthermore, I found that thought-action fusion moral (when an individual regards an 
intrusive thought and the forbidden action as equal) and likelihood (thinking about an 
intrusive thought actually influences the outcome of the forbidden action) beliefs 
predicated a statistically significant amount of variance in the total suicide prone thoughts 
(i.e. “I am worthless”) and behaviors (i.e. “When I get mad a usually smash my fist 
against the wall.”) .    
Thought-Action Fusion and Demographics 
 Assessment. The TAFQ-A was established by using data from normal Dutch 
adolescents. In this study, I wanted to determine if the TAFQ-A was a reliable measure in 
a sample of community U.S. adolescents. I found that the TAFQ-A was a reliable 
measure of thought-action fusion in my sample. As previously noted, each of the three 
TAF scores had an adequate internal consistency (the TAF total score had an alpha of 
.83, the TAF-Moral score had an alpha of .84, and the TAF-Likelihood had an alpha of 
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.78). These results confirm Muris and colleagues (2001) findings that the TAFQ-A is a 
reliable instrument of thought-action fusion that can be used with a variety of adolescent 
samples. As a result, researchers should be comfortable using the TAFQ-A in future work 
with U.S. community adolescents. However, researchers should try to obtain evidence for 
the reliability of TAFQ-A in other adolescent samples (i.e. clinical samples).   
Demographics. One of the major purposes of this study was to obtain a clearer 
understanding of how gender, age, academic class, and race affect thought-action fusion 
beliefs in a sample of community U.S. adolescents. As a result, I conducted several 
analyses that engendered a more robust picture of the prevalence of thought-action fusion 
thinking in a diverse group of adolescents. 
 Age and TAF. According to my results, I did not find any significant differences 
in thought-action fusion beliefs among 15 through 18 year old high school students. I 
believe that this finding is important when considering how adolescents develop their 
cognitive abilities and establish their identities. Specifically, thought-action fusion beliefs 
are built upon faulty thinking that fosters an adolescents’ propensity to use more magical 
tendencies to interpret the causes of events (Berle & Starcevic, 2005). Essentially, these 
magical tendencies may be indicative of adolescents’ inability to accurately manage their 
abstract thinking skills (Bolton, et. al, 2002). As a result, it appears that the magical 
thinking element of thought-action fusion beliefs can be characterized by individuals who 
are transitioning out of Piaget’s concrete operational stage of cognitive development into 
the formal operations stage of cognitive development. According to Diessner and Teigs 
(2001), individuals who are in this transitional period often rely on naïve or chimeric 
ideas (possibly magical) about how the world functions in order to get a firmer handle on 
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their new found abstract thinking abilities. As a result, thought-action fusion beliefs may 
be developmentally appropriate for individuals who are transitioning between Piaget’s 
concrete operational stage of cognitive development and Piaget’s formal operational 
stage of cognitive development. Considering, that I found no differences between 15 and 
18 years old high school students, I am inclined to believe that middle aged adolescents 
and older adolescents have similar difficulties in interpreting their thoughts accurately. 
On a broader scale, this finding may also suggest that middle aged adolescents and older 
adolescents may be still be in state of transitioning between Piaget’s concrete operations 
stage and Piaget’s formal operation stage of cognitive development. This idea is 
congruent with De Lisi and Staudt (1980) hypothesis that adolescents do not master their 
abstract thinking abilities until they reach their early twenties.   
Furthermore, these results also suggest that 15 and 18 year olds may be at the 
same stage of identity development. As previously cited, Eirkson (1968) noted that 
healthy and rational thinking was synonymous with a stronger sense of identity. Thought-
action fusion beliefs are a form of irrational thinking that highlights an individuals’ 
inability to engender rational explanations of how events occur (Rachman, 1993). 
According to Rachman (1993) individuals who use thought-action fusion processes often 
believe that by thinking about a certain event they have inevitably affected the occurrence 
or outcome of that event. Essentially, they believe that their thoughts can predict or 
influence outcomes of events in which they have no control. Furthermore, Rachman 
(1993) also noted that thought-action fusion beliefs are rigid and adhesive. This illustrates 
that individuals who use thought-action fusion thinking are characterized by an 
inflexibility of using other thinking styles. This irrationality (Makros & McCabe, 2001) 
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and rigidity (Marcia, 1966) is also reflected in individuals who are stuck in a state of 
identity diffusion or identity foreclosure. Both identity diffusion and foreclosure are 
states where the adolescent has not experimented with alternative ideals and roles 
(Marcia, 1966). Thus, this lack of experimentation with ideals and roles may be highly 
associated with inflexibility that is found within thought-action fusion thinking. 
Furthermore, Makros and McCabe (2001) found that irrational cognitive processes were 
found to be highly correlated with identity diffusion. Again, considering that I found no 
age differences between 15 and 18 year old in thought-action fusion thinking, I am 
inclined to believe that middle aged and older adolescents have similar difficulties with 
experimenting with alternative ways of thinking. On the broader scale, this finding may 
also suggest that middle aged and older adolescents may be having similar difficulties in 
exploring their identity and forming a stable sense of self. 
Lastly, as result of my findings, I suggest that 15 and 18 year olds may be equally 
dependent upon egocentric thinking as they enter into formal operations. Elkind (1967) 
postulated that adolescents who were moving into the formal operations stage of 
cognitive development were likely to present more egocentric style of thinking to protect 
them against the hardships of managing their new cognitive abilities. This egocentric 
thinking is marked by thoughts of indestructibleness, a high sense of personal power over 
others and the world (Elkind, 1967), and frequent use of magical tendencies to interpret 
events (Ormont, 1969). Considering that these magical tendencies and a high sense of 
personal power are hallmarks of development and maintenance of thought-action fusion 
beliefs, it can be feasibly assumed that thought-action fusion thinking is related to higher 
levels of egocentric thinking (Berle & Starcevic, 2005). Furthermore, Hudson and Gray 
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(1986) postulated that older adolescents had the ability to shed this egocentric attitude 
because they had more experience developing their reality testing and abstract thinking 
abilities. They also noted that older adolescents were more likely to have the ability to to 
obtain insights from their actions and draw more logical explanations of how events 
occur. However, considering that I found no age differences between 15 and 18 year old 
in thought-action fusion thinking, I am inclined to believe that middle aged and older 
adolescents have similar difficulties with shedding their egocentric thoughts. 
Furthermore, I believe my findings present preliminary evidence that Hudson and Gray’s 
(1986) hypothesis is inaccurate, and that middle-aged and older adolescents use similar 
amounts of egocentric thinking.  
Overall, from my results, I suggest that 15 through 18 year olds are less 
distinguishable in their abilities to accurately interpret their thoughts, experiment with 
alternative ways of thinking, and shed their egocentric ideas. In general terms, I also 
believe that middle-aged adolescents may be experiencing similar difficulties compared 
to older adolescents with managing their new cognitive abilities, developing their sense 
of identity, and shedding their reliance upon egocentric thinking. However, it must be 
noted that I used chronological age as a measure of adolescent development. This is 
troublesome because researchers such as De Lisi and Staudt (1980) have noted that 
adolescent development does not occur within a vacuum and may fluctuate from 
individual to individual on when he/she masters his/her cognitive abilities and/or 
establishes a strong sense of self. Considering the problems with using age as a measure 
of adolescent development, I recommend that future researchers use more reliable 
measures of cognitive and identity development in determining whether middle-aged and 
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older adolescents differ on measures of irrational thinking (i.e. thought-action fusion 
beliefs).  
Gender and TAF.  Much like age, I found no gender differences in thought-action 
fusion thinking among my sample of U.S. community adolescents. These results are 
congruent with the findings in the Muris and colleagues (2001) study. They found no 
gender differences in a sample of Dutch adolescents. As a result, it appears that his 
results are generalizable to a sample of U.S. adolescents.  
Furthermore, considering that there were no gender differences in thought-action 
fusion beliefs, my findings possibly negate whether male and adolescent females think 
differently. According to Sethi and Nolen-Hoeksema (1997), adolescent males and 
females think about entirely different things. They postulated that male thinking patterns 
emphasized more of an external focus, while female thinking patterns emphasized more 
of an internal focus. However, Berle and Starceiv (2005) characterized thought-action 
fusion thinking by a number internalized appraisal style elements such as self-reflection 
and rumination. Specifically, individuals who engage in thought-action fusion thinking 
often experience a significant amount of guilt and responsibility for having damaging 
thoughts that negatively affect the outcome of an event (Berle & Starcevic, 2005). As a 
result of this guilt and perceived responsibility, these individuals often ruminate about 
their perceived influence on the negative event (Berle & Starcevic, 2005). Rumination, in 
this sense, is a process whereby an individual continually thinks about how he or she is to 
blame for the occurrence of the negative events.  
In addition, Berle and Starcevic (2005) also noted that thought-action fusion 
thinking affects an individuals’ opinion of his or her self-worth. They noted that if 
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individuals continue to use thought-action fusion thinking as the primary thinking style 
that they were likely to obtain a sense of hopelessness regarding their ability to maintain 
healthy relationships with people. Specifically, Berle and Starcevic (2005) noted that 
these individuals will accumulate a significant amount of blame for the occurrence of 
negative outcomes within a relationship. These people often feel that they are the cause 
of the dysfunction within the relationship and claim that they only hurt the people that 
they love. Through these self-reflective thoughts these individuals consider themselves as 
“bad people” who cannot be productive within relationships (Shafran, et. al., 1996). 
Considering that both males and females engage in similar amounts of thought-action 
fusion thinking, I believe that researchers have to take into consideration that adolescent 
males do engage in some forms of internalized thinking (i.e. rumination and self-
reflection). As a result, I believe that male and female adolescents are not as discrepant in 
their thinking styles as Sethi and Nolen-Hoeksema (1997) findings lead us to believe.    
However, my results also suggest that thought-action fusion thinking may be 
more complex then a simple appraisal style. Specifically, there appears to be a strong 
element of faulty information processing, whereby an individual fuses coincidental co-
occurrences of a thought and an event develops an erroneous causal link between the two 
(Berle & Starcevic, 2005). This line of thinking characterizes thought-action fusion 
beliefs as more of a function of a cognitive distortion. According to Leung and Wong 
(1998), cognitive distortions refer to the processes where information gleaned from 
external events engender a significant amount of systematic bias that hinder one’s ability 
to effectively test reality. In regards to thought-action fusion, the fusion of the intrusive 
thought and the forbidden action disrupts the ability of the individual to accurately 
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interpret the cause of certain events or outcomes. In addition, Rachman (1993) noted that 
there is an adhesive quality about thought-action fusion thinking, whereby individuals 
who use thought-action fusion to interpret the outcome of one event are likely to use 
thought-action fusion thinking for future interpretations of events. Furthermore, 
according to Wilde (1994), gender differences do appear to exist in other cognitive 
distortion constructs (i.e. automatic beliefs and irrational thoughts). As a result, I believe 
that thought-action fusion beliefs should be considered a type of cognitive distortion that 
hinders an adolescent’s ability to accurately test reality. 
Race and TAF. An interesting result of this study was the discovery of racial 
differences in a particular type of thought-action fusion belief. Specifically, African-
American adolescents appear to engage in more thought-action fusion likelihood thinking 
compared to their Caucasian counterparts. Again, thought-action fusion likelihood beliefs 
are characterized by the idea that thinking of an unacceptable or disturbing event will 
increase the likelihood of that event actually occurring. One reason why African-
American may be predisposed to the thought-action fusion likelihood beliefs is their ties 
with their local church or religious community (Stack & Wasserman, 1995). Stack and 
Wasserman (1995) found that African-American adolescents and young adults are more 
likely to spend a significant time developing the spiritual self at church or church related 
events. This is important because Berle and Starcevic (2005) noted that adherence to 
religious doctrine may be associated with the onset of certain thought-action fusion 
beliefs. They hypothesized that the onset of thought-action fusion is heavily influenced 
by strict belief systems and behavioral codes that are perceived to be imbued upon that 
person by an authoritative figure. Berle and Starcevic (2005) noted that religion may act 
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as the authoritative figure that presents it congregation with a clear and strict set of 
behavioral codes. This is not to say the religion is the cause of thought-action fusion 
thinking, however, it appears that people with personality traits congruent with the strict 
behavioral codes of religious doctrine may be more likely to engage in thought-action 
fusion thinking. Such characteristics that appear to be congruent with both thought-action 
fusion thinking and adherence to a specific religious doctrine are a rigid interpretation of 
their beliefs, a person’s conviction, and/or an excessive fear of being punished or 
criticized. Consequently, Rassin and Koster (2003) found that individuals who attend 
more religious services and events are likely to have a cognitive style that is congruent 
with thought-action fusion thinking. Overall, it appears that African-American 
adolescents may be more prone to engage in more thought-action fusion likelihood 
thinking because of the characteristics (i.e. a rigid interpretation of their beliefs, a 
person’s conviction, and/or an excessive fear of being punished or criticized) that are 
fostered with in a religious community.  
Additionally, this finding is especially interesting considering that we know 
relatively little about what cognitive risk factors contribute to the onset and/or 
exacerbation of emotional distress in African-American adolescents. Considering that 
African-American adolescents appear to have higher levels of sensitivity to anxious 
(Rabian, Embry, & MacIntyre, 1999) and depressive symptoms (Emslie, Weinberg, 
Rush, Adams, & Rintelmann, 1990) thought-action fusion beliefs may be able to predict a 
significant amount of emotional distress in African-American adolescents. Future 
researchers need to examine the potential of thought-action fusion beliefs to act as 
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antecedents to anxious and depressive symptoms in both clinical and non-clinical 
samples of African-American youth.       
Clinical Implications  
 I believe my findings highlight the importance for mental health professionals to 
take into consideration adolescent development and ethnic background when identifying 
cognitive risk factors that are contributing to the onset and/or exacerbation of adolescent 
emotional distress. My results show that middle age adolescents and older adolescents 
may be having similar difficulties with thought-action fusion thinking. Essentially, 
middle-aged adolescents may have similarly difficult times in interpreting their thoughts, 
experimenting with alternative ways of thinking, and shedding their egocentric attitudes. 
Interestingly, these difficulties may also underlie individuals who are transitioning from 
one developmental stage to the next (i.e. concrete operation to formal operations or 
identity diffusion/foreclosure to identity achievement). As a result, thought-action fusion 
thinking may be a result of developmental struggles to obtain mastery over one’s new 
abstract thinking abilities and/or a stable sense of self.    
In light of the previous findings, therapists need to foster a strong self-efficacy 
within adolescents who engage in thought-action fusion thinking so that they may 
effectively manage their new cognitive abilities and develop a strong sense of self. One 
of the more prevalent tasks a therapist might need to take is to constructively challenge 
and restructure the adolescent’s thought-action fusion beliefs. By challenging and 
restructuring these beliefs, the therapist will be effectively helping the adolescent 
construct a more rational and practical style of thinking. This will help adolescents 
accurately interpret their perceptions about the causes of events, which in turn may 
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reduce the amount of emotional distress they are experiencing. Also by challenging and 
restructuring their faulty beliefs, the therapist is helping the adolescent build a stable 
foundation where they will be able to construct their identity and shed their dependence 
upon egocentric thinking. Overall, therapists have the ability to help their adolescent 
clients move through their developmental stages and reduce the amount of emotional 
distress they experience through fostering a high sense of self-efficacy and constructively 
challenging and restructuring their irrational and impractical thought-action fusion 
beliefs.  
 Furthermore, my results highlight the need for therapists to recognize the 
influence of ethnic and cultural differences in cognitive variables on the onset and/or 
exacerbation of emotional distress. It appears African-American adolescents engage in 
more thought-action fusion thinking compared to Caucasian adolescents. The prevalence 
of thought-action fusion thinking in African-American adolescents may be related to a 
rigid interpretation of their beliefs, a person’s conviction, and/or an excessive fear of 
being punished or criticized that they have fostered through their involvement within 
their religious community (Rassin & Koster, 2003). Furthermore, while engaging in 
religious activities and beliefs may act as a barrier to suicidal activity (Stack & 
Wasserman, 1995) for African-American adolescents, it may also increase the likelihood 
of them experiencing mild to severe anxious and depressive symptoms through thought-
action fusion beliefs (Berle & Starcevic, 2005). However, the major barrier for therapists 
in treating clients from a different cultural or ethnic background is to be able to challenge 
the irrational beliefs (thought-action fusion beliefs) system of the client, while still 
appreciating the clients’ cultural background. Therapists cannot simply charge into 
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therapy and challenge beliefs that are the cornerstones of the client’s culture. The 
therapist must successfully reconstruct maladaptive aspects of the irrational beliefs, while 
still accepting the client’s culture and desire to adhere to his/her cultural norms. If 
therapists can treat clients within the framework of their culture, then the bond between 
the client and therapist remains strong and the client may still be able to obtain a 
significant amount of insight regarding the irrationality and the negative affects of his or 
her beliefs. Overall, it is important for the therapist to identify and treat irrational beliefs 
(thought-action fusion beliefs) within the cultural context of the client. The therapist must 
takes step to provide the client with symptom relief and a chance for a higher quality of 
life without removing the client from his/her desired cultural community.    
Suicide Proneness 
 Assessment. In this study, I used the LAS-SF to measure suicidal prone behavior, 
thoughts, and feelings. Overall, I found the LAS-SF to be a valid and reliable measure of 
the total suicide prone behaviors, thoughts, and feelings. However, I did not find the 
LAS-SF subscales scores (death-related, health-related, injury-related, and self-related) to 
be reliable measures. Each subscale measure had a reliability coefficient lower then the 
.70 cutoff score. As a result, future researchers may need to be a little hesitant in using 
the LAS-SF sub-scale scores in assessing specific types (i.e. death-related, health-related, 
injury-related, and self-related) of suicidal prone behaviors, thoughts, and feelings in a 
community sample of adolescents.  However, future researchers should feel comfortable 
in using the LAS-SF total score in assessing a wide range of suicide prone behaviors, 
thoughts, and feelings.  
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 Demographics. Another interesting result of this study was the discovery of 
gender differences in the total suicide proneness score. It appears that adolescent males 
engage in more suicide prone behaviors, thoughts, and feelings compared to adolescent 
females. This finding is consistent with Langhinrichsen-Rohling and colleagues (1998) 
results. Specifically, Langhinrichsen-Rohling and colleagues (1998) found that 
community adolescent males reported higher suicide proneness scores compared to their 
female counterparts.  In essence, both sets of results support the notion that males may 
have more impulsive/sensation seeking tendencies compared to their female counterparts. 
Furthermore, these results are consistent with adolescent males’ higher rates of lethal 
suicide attempts and higher completion percentage (National Center for Injury Prevention 
and Control, 2005).  
In theory, one can explain these findings by looking at the tenets of the gender-
role socialization hypothesis. Specifically, the gender-role socialization hypothesis states 
that male adolescents are more likely to assert their independence and “superior prowess” 
by engaging in risky, self-destructive, and sensation seeking behavior, whereas female 
adolescents tend be more introspective engaging in more self-care and healthy behaviors 
(Langhinrichsen-Rohling et. al., 1998). Overall, it appears that the difference between 
males and females on suicide prone behavior, thoughts, and feelings may be a function of 
culture specific norms of gender-roles (Langhinrichsen-Rohling et. al., 1998).  
Clinical Implications 
 One implication of this research is the need for therapists to establish gender 
specific interventions for clients who suffer from suicidal thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors. Specifically, adolescent male interventions should focus on reducing 
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engagement in risky behavior, exploring and possibly re-shaping decision making 
processes, and identifying more socially appropriate means for them to explore their 
identity as a man. Alternatively, interventions for adolescent female should focus more 
reconstructing self-defeating processes that cause more depressive and hopeless feelings 
(Langhinrichsen-Rohling et. al., 1998). 
Thought-Action Fusion and Suicide Proneness 
 In this study, I also examined the relationship between the two subscales of 
thought-action fusion (TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood) and suicide proneness. The only 
statistically significant association was the positive one between thought-action fusion 
likelihood and suicide proneness. Furthermore, I entered the two thought-action fusion 
subscales into a multiple regression equation to determine how much variance they 
predicted in the criterion variable suicide proneness. I found that the combination of the 
two thought-action fusion subscales predicted a statistically significant amount of 
variance (4%) in suicide proneness. Post-hoc analysis revealed that both thought-action 
fusion moral and thought-action fusion likelihood beliefs were significant predictors of 
suicide proneness.   
Although there was a statistically significant positive association between 
thought-action fusion likelihood beliefs (the belief that thinking of an unacceptable or 
disturbing event will increase the likelihood of that event actually occurring) and suicide 
proneness (highly predictive behaviors, thoughts, and feelings of suicide completion), the 
association was so small that there does not seem to be much practical significance tied to 
the relationship. Additionally, the finding that the combination of thought-action fusion 
beliefs predicted only 4% of the variances in suicide proneness scores confirms that there 
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is little practical significance between the thought-action fusion beliefs and suicide 
proneness in adolescents. Therefore, although previous research has discovered that the 
thought-action fusion subscales have been moderate predictors of such emotional distress 
as anxiety (Barrett & Healy, 2003) and depression (Muris et. al., 2001), thought-action 
fusion beliefs do not appear to have much of an influence upon the onset and/or 
exacerbation of suicide prone behaviors, thoughts, and feelings. Specifically, I believe 
that the proclivity of adolescents to fuse thoughts and actions together is a weak indicator 
of individuals who engage suicidal prone behaviors (i.e. drinking and self-mutilating), 
thoughts (i.e. “I am worthless” and “I am not a good person”), and feelings (i.e. anger and 
indifference).   
However, due the small reliability coefficients for the subscales measures of the 
LAS-SF (i.e. death-related, health-related, injury-related, and self-related), I was not able 
to report any associations between the two subscales of thought-action fusion (TAF-
Moral and TAF-Likelihood beliefs) and the subscales measures of the LAS-SF. Instead, I 
had to substitute the four subscales measures of the LAS-SF with the LAS-SF total score 
which is an all encompassing measure of suicidal thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. It 
might be possible that by lumping suicide proneness into one encompassing total 
construct, I might have missed an important association between a type thought-action 
fusion belief (Moral and/or Likelihood) and a narrower measure (i.e. death-related, 
health-related, injury-related, and/or self-related) of suicide proneness. For example, 
Berle and Starcevic (2005) noted that thought-action fusion beliefs may actually cause a 
decrease in one’s self-esteem, therefore there could have been a practically significant 
association between thought-action fusion beliefs and self-related suicide prone 
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behaviors, thoughts, and feelings (i.e. “I feel worthless” and “I feel as if I am a good 
person”). Unfortunately, the self-related suicide prone construct had only six-items, 
which negatively affected its reliability coefficient. As a result, future researchers need to 
use a more reliable instrument of specific types of suicide proneness subscales when 
measuring the association between suicide proneness and thought-action fusion beliefs.        
Furthermore, although there were no practically significant results that spoke to 
the direct influence of thought-action fusion beliefs on suicide proneness, thought-action 
fusion beliefs might be indirectly associated to suicide proneness through constructs such 
as depression and anxiety. Thought-action fusion beliefs have been firmly established as 
a strong correlates of anxiety (Hazlett-Stevens, et al., 2003, Rassin, et. al., 2001a; Rassin, 
et. al., 2001b). Furthermore, recent researchers have found preliminary evidence that 
thought-action fusion beliefs may be an antecedent of depressive symptoms (Abramowitz 
et al., 2003; Muris et al., 2001; Rachman et al., 1995; Rassin, Merckelbach, et al., 2001; 
Shafran et al., 1996). Considering that both depression (Boergers, et. al., 1998; Trautman, 
Rotheram-Borus, Dopkins, & Lewin, 1991) and anxiety (Kosky, Silburn, & Zubrick, 
1990; Trautman, et. al., 1991) are highly predictive of suicidality in adolescents, it is 
plausible to assume that thought-action fusion beliefs may act through anxiety and 
depression in contributing to the onset and/or exacerbation of suicidality. In the future, it 
is important for researchers to establish more concrete evidence of the role of thought-
action fusion beliefs in the onset of depressive and anxious symptoms with clinical and 
non-clinical samples of adolescents. If researchers find that thought-action fusion beliefs 
are antecedents to depressive and anxious symptoms, then they can conduct more 
complex research designs (i.e. structural equation modeling) to determine if thought-
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action fusion beliefs have an indirect influence on suicidality through depressive and 
anxious symptoms.    
Clinical Implications 
 Considering that thought-action fusion beliefs have only a small association with 
suicidal proneness, mental health practitioners should probably treat suicidal symptoms 
by focusing on more predictive symptoms of suicide (i.e. depression and anxiety). By 
treating depression and anxiety related symptoms, therapists should be able to see a 
dramatic reduction in the suicidal behaviors and thoughts in their adolescent client. 
However, Donaldson and colleagues (2003) noted that treating the symptoms directly 
related to adolescent suicidality might be necessary but not sufficient in order to prevent 
future relapse.  As a result, therapist may need to address underlying processes that may 
be preventing the therapeutic change in their clients. For instance, if a therapist feels that 
his/her client’s depressive and anxious symptoms are deeply rooted in the client’s faulty 
cognitive processes, then the therapist may need to identify and then addresses these 
maladaptive cognitive process in order to reduce the depressive or anxious symptoms. 
One type of cognitive process that might act as an antecedent for depressive and anxious 
symptoms is thought-action fusion beliefs. As a result, if therapists are having a difficult 
time treating the most predictive symptoms (i.e. anxiety and depression) of suicidality in 
adolescents, they may need to identify and address more deeply rooted cognitive 
processes (i.e. thought-action fusion beliefs) that may be hindering the reduction of these 
symptoms. In such a case, the reconstruction of thought-action fusion beliefs (or other 
similar cognitive processes) may indirectly pave the way for reduction of suicidal 
symptoms.  
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Limitations 
 Through the course of this study, I noticed some significant limitations that 
hindered the usefulness and generalizability of my results. Specifically, there were 
limitations regarding the research design, participant sample, and the measures used to 
survey the participants that need to be considered in interpreting my results.  
 Research design. The most glaring limitation of my study was the method in 
which the data was collected. Specifically, results were based solely on self-report 
responses. Self-response surveys are subjective in nature and often can be influenced by 
social desirability demands and response biases. As a result, it is possible that these 
confounds (i.e. social desirability and response biases) may hinder the generalizability of 
these results to similar samples across the U.S. Another limitation in my design is the 
cross sectional approach to data collection. By using a cross-sectional design, I am not 
able to speak to how these variables will interact across time. Therefore, time might be 
another confounding variable that hinders the generalizability of my results. Lastly, the 
analyses in which I used do not speak of the causal relationship among thought-action 
fusion beliefs and suicide proneness. My results only produced the association between 
thought-action fusion beliefs and suicide proneness. They do not address the possibility 
that thought-action fusion beliefs cause suicide proneness actions, feelings, or behaviors 
in community adolescents. More complex research designs need to be constructed in 
order to test the causal relationship between thought-action fusion beliefs and suicide 
proneness in a sample of community adolescents.  
 Participant sample.  Some variables within my participant sample may also 
negatively affect my ability to generalize my results. Specifically, I only collected data 
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from high school Seniors, Juniors, and Sophomores. I was not able to collect data from 
high school Freshmen. It is possible that high school Freshmen may experience thought-
action fusion and suicide proneness differently compared to more academically advanced 
students. Therefore, a lack of Freshmen participants may hinder my ability to generalize 
my findings to another sample of high school students. Additionally, I noticed, through 
recruiting participants and entering data, that my sample had a significant number of 
students who were academically delayed. This may also hinder my ability to generalize 
these findings to another sample of high school students. Furthermore, while the 
participant sample was relatively diverse (in regards to Caucasian, Africa-American, and 
bi-racial students), I was not able to garner any information on Latino, Asian-American, 
and Native American adolescents. Specifically, I was not able to determine whether 
thought-action fusion beliefs are significant risk factors to Latino, Asian-American, and 
Native-American high school students. Furthermore, I was not able to analyze any data 
regarding the prevalence of suicide prone actions, feelings, and thoughts in Latino, 
Asian-American, and Native American students compared to Caucasian and African-
American students.     
Measures. Lastly, there were some limitations regarding the measures I used to 
survey my sample. First, I used age and academic class as measures of adolescent 
development. Previous research has shown that there is a significant amount of variability 
in adolescent development in regards to age and academic class (De Lisi & Staudt, 1980). 
Therefore, while age and academic class may be associated with adolescent development, 
it should not be considered synonymous with adolescent development. Therefore, age 
and academic class may not be valid measures of adolescent development, which could 
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affect the implications of my results. Future researchers need to examine thought-action 
fusion beliefs in regards more reliable measures of adolescent development. Secondly, I 
found that LAS-SF is not a reliable instrument in measuring the four-subscale measures 
of suicide proneness (death-related, health-related, injury-related, and self-related actions, 
feelings, and thoughts). I found that the reliabilities of these sub-scales were poor. As a 
result, I was not able to draw any specific conclusions regarding which type of suicide 
prone actions, feelings, and thoughts were associated with thought-action fusion beliefs. 
Future researchers should be wary of using the four subscale measures of the LAS-SF 
when sampling community adolescents.    
Recap of Future Directions for Research 
 As I noted throughout this chapter, my research has opened up a large number of 
opportunities for future researchers to expand on my research. Specifically, I believe that 
there are four major areas in which researchers can expand upon my research findings.  
 In response to my results, I implied that thought-action fusion thinking may be a 
product of development. Unfortunately, I used chronological age as my measure of 
adolescent development. According to De Lisi and Staudt (1980), age is not a sound 
measure of adolescent development because it does not account for the variability in how 
adolescents mature cognitively, behaviorally, and interpersonally. As a result, I 
recommend that future researchers attempt to determine the influence of development 
(i.e. cognitive and identity) on the onset and/or the exacerbation for thought-action fusion 
beliefs. Specifically, I would like to see the association between a sound measure of 
cognitive development (particularly concrete operations and formal operations) and 
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thought-action fusion beliefs and the association among Marcia’s stage of identity 
development and thought-action fusion beliefs.  
 Second, my results indicated that thought-action fusion may be a prevalent risk 
factor in the onset of emotional distress for African-American adolescents. This is a 
fascinating finding because we have a scant amount of literature that speaks to cognitive 
vulnerability factors that are prevalent in adolescent African-American mental health. I 
recommend that future researchers take an in depth look at the role of thought-action 
fusion beliefs in the onset such emotional distress symptoms as depression and anxiety in 
African-American youth. 
 Third, I was not able to obtain associations among specific types (i.e. death-
related, health-related, injury-related, and self-related) of suicide prone thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors and types of thought-action fusion beliefs (moral and likelihood) due to the 
small coefficients of the LAS-SF subscales. I recommend that future researchers use the 
LAS long form in order to obtain content specific associations between types of suicide 
prone thoughts, feelings, and behaviors and thought-action fusion beliefs. 
 Lastly, although I did not find any practically significant, direct associations 
between thought-action fusion beliefs and total suicide prone thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors that does not mean that thought-action fusion beliefs do not influence the onset 
and/or exacerbation of suicide prone thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in community 
adolescents. I recommend that future researchers look at the indirect relationship between 
thought-action fusion beliefs and suicidality through potential mediating variables as 
obsessions and compulsions, anxiety related symptoms (i.e. pathological worry), and 
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depressive symptoms. This type of research study calls for a more complex research 
design such as structural equation modeling.     
Summary 
 Overall, it appears that thought-action fusion beliefs are prevalent type of 
cognitive process in community adolescents. Moreover, the TAFQ-A appears to be a 
reliable measure of both thought-action fusion moral and thought-action fusion likelihood 
beliefs in U.S. community adolescent. There appears to be no age, academic class, and 
gender differences in thought-action fusion beliefs. However, I did find that African-
American adolescents report engaging in more thought-action fusion likelihood beliefs 
compared to Caucasian adolescents. This finding may be important in understanding the 
maladaptive cognitive processes that contribute to emotional distress in African-
American adolescents. Consistent with previous research, I found that there are gender 
differences in suicide proneness. Specifically, adolescent males engage in more risky 
behavior that leads to suicide completion compared to adolescent females. This finding is 
important in that males might need treatment plans that focus on a combination of 
impulsive/sensation seeking behavior and ruminative and self-reflective processes, while 
females may require treatment plans that focus more on self-defeating thought patterns. 
Lastly, although there was a small statistically significant relationship between thought-
action fusion likelihood and suicide proneness, I feel that this relationship should be 
viewed cautiously as any substantive significance was assessed as low. However, I feel 
that with further research, thought-action fusion beliefs may be found to have an indirect 
relationship with suicide proneness through anxiety and depression. Overall, further 
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research needs to be conducted to confirm my results and address the limitations of my 
study.  
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Four Main Psychological Measures  
Scales Means Standard Deviations 
TAFQ-A Total 
TAFQ-A Moral 
TAFQ-A Likelihood 
LAS-SF Total 
26.19 
16.74 
9.50 
6.00 
7.15 
5.67 
3.00 
3.69 
Note: TAFQ-A = total scores on the Thought-Action Fusion Questionnaire Adolescent 
Version, TAFQ-A Moral = total Moral Beliefs score on the Thought-Action Fusion 
Questionnaire Adolescent Version, TAFQ-A Likelihood = total Likelihood Beliefs score 
on the Thought-Action Fusion Questionnaire Adolescent Version, and LAS-SF Total = 
total score on the Life Attitudes Schedule-Short Form. 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for Adolescent Males and Females on TAF-Moral, TAF-
Likelihood, and LAS-SF Total Score. 
Scale Males (N = 115) 
Means (SD) 
Females (N = 145) 
Means (SD) 
TAF-Moral 
 
TAF-Like 
 
LAS-SF Total 
16.25 (5.80) 
 
9.71 (3.13) 
 
6.74 (3.98)** 
17.12 (5.55) 
 
9.34 (2.84) 
 
5.41 (3.35)** 
Note: TAF-Moral = Thought-Action Fusion Moral Beliefs, TAF-Like = Thought-Action 
Fusion Likelihood Beliefs, and LAS-SF Total = Total Suicide Proneness. 
** = Gender differences significant at the .01 level 
* = Gender differences significant at the .05 level 
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Table 3 
 
Mean and Standard Deviations for 15 through 18 year olds on the TAF-Moral, TAF- 
 
Likelihood, LAS-SF Total Score 
 
Scales 15 y/o (N = 26) 
Means (SD) 
16 y/o (N = 55) 
Means (SD) 
17 y/o (N = 50) 
Means (SD) 
18 y/o (N = 122) 
Means (SD) 
TAF-Moral 
 
TAF-Like 
 
LAS-SF 
Total 
18.69 (5.36) 
 
9.85 (4.01) 
 
6.12 (3.20) 
16.31 (5.46) 
 
9.44 (2.56) 
 
5.82 (4.55) 
16.88 (5.55) 
 
9.36 (2.88) 
 
5.16 (3.18) 
16.48 (5.88) 
 
9.48 (2.98) 
 
6.42 (3.64) 
Note: TAF-Moral = Thought-Action Fusion Moral Beliefs, TAF-Like = Thought-Action 
Fusion Likelihood Beliefs, and LAS-SF Total = Total Suicide Proneness. A superscript A 
indicates that the mean differs significantly from 15 year olds. A superscript B indicates 
that the mean differs significantly from 16 year olds. A superscript C indicates that the 
mean differs significantly from 17 year olds. A superscript D indicates that the mean 
differs significantly from 18 year olds.  
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Table 4  
 
Mean and Standard Deviations for Seniors, Juniors, and Sophomores on the TAF-Moral,  
 
TAF-Likelihood, LAS-SF Total Score 
 
Scales Seniors (N =  139) 
Means (SD) 
Juniors (N = 49) 
Means (SD) 
Sophomores (N =72) 
Means (SD) 
TAF-Moral 
 
TAF-Like 
 
LAS-SF Total 
16.53 (5.62) 
 
9.58 (3.12) 
 
6.22 (3.49) 
16.94 (6.00) 
 
9.04 (2.21) 
 
5.59 (3.65) 
16.96 (5.59) 
 
9.68 (3.14) 
 
5.83 (4.10) 
Note: TAF-Moral = Thought-Action Fusion Moral Beliefs, TAF-Like = Thought-Action 
Fusion Likelihood Beliefs, and LAS-SF Total = Total Suicide Proneness. A superscript A 
indicates that the mean differs significantly from Seniors. A superscript B indicates that 
the mean differs significantly from Juniors. A superscript C indicates that the mean 
differs significantly from Sophomores. 
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Table 5 
 
Mean and Standard Deviations for Caucasian, African-American, and Bi-racial  
 
Adolescents on the TAF-Moral, TAF-Likelihood, LAS-SF Total Score 
 
Scales Caucasian (N = 143) 
Means (SD) 
African-American (N = 54) 
Means (SD) 
Bi-Racial (N = 28) 
TAF-Moral 
 
TAF-Like 
 
TAF-SF 
Total 
17.41 (5.60) 
 
9.00 (2.47)B 
 
6.36 (3.98) 
16.14 (5.89) 
 
10.24 (2.83)A 
 
5.09 (2.80) 
15.71 (5.52) 
 
9.86 (4.46) 
 
6.21 (4.01) 
 
Note: TAF-Moral = Thought-Action Fusion Moral Beliefs, TAF-Like = Thought-Action 
Fusion Likelihood Beliefs, and LAS-SF Total = Total Suicide Proneness. A superscript A 
indicates that the mean differs significantly from Caucasian Adolescents. A superscript B 
indicates that the mean differs significantly from African-American Adolescents. A 
superscript C indicates that the mean differs significantly from Bi-Racial Adolescents. 
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Table 6 
 
Cell Means and Main Effects for Age and Gender on TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood 
 
 Males Means  
 
TAF-M          TAF-L 
Females Means  
 
TAF- M         TAF-L 
Main Effects 
 
TAF-M        TAF-L 
 
15 y/o 
 
 18.40               9.70  18.87              9.94 
 18.69            9.84 
16 y/o 
 
 16.30               8.88  16.31              9.72 
 16.30            9.43 
17 y/o 
 
 15.38               10.23  17.40              9.05 
 16.88            9.36 
18 y/o 
 
 16.03               9.86  16.93              9.00 
 16.48            9.48 
 
Main Effects 
 
 16.23               9.66 
 
 17.16              9.33  
Grand TAF-M 
Mean = 16.73 
 
Grand TAF-L  
Mean = 9.50 
Note: TAF-M = Thought-Action Fusion Moral Beliefs and TAF-L = Thought-Action 
Fusion Likelihood Beliefs. Results indicated that there was no significant interaction 
effect between age and gender. There were also no significant main effects for either age 
or gender.  
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Table 7 
 
Cell Means and Main Effects for Academic Class and Gender on TAF-Moral and TAF- 
 
Likelihood 
 
 Males Means  
 
TAF-M          TAF-L 
Females Means  
 
TAF- M         TAF-L 
Main Effects 
 
TAF-M        TAF-L 
 
Sophomores 
 
 16.51               9.18  17.38              9.94 
 16.98            9.59 
Juniors 
 
 17.00               9.95  16.89              8.37 
 16.93            9.02 
Seniors 
 
 15.87               9.83  17.06              9.30 
 16.53            9.53 
 
Main Effects 
 
 16.23                9.66 
 
 17.16              9.33  
Grand TAF-M 
Mean = 16.73 
 
Grand TAF-L  
Mean = 9.50 
Note: TAF-M = Thought-Action Fusion Moral Beliefs and TAF-L = Thought-Action 
Fusion Likelihood Beliefs. Results indicated that there was no significant interaction 
effect between academic class and gender. There were also no significant main effects for 
either academic class or gender.  
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Table 8 
 
Correlations among TAF-Moral, TAF-Likelihood, and LAS-SF Total 
 
Scales 
 
 
         TAF-Moral                TAF-Likelihood               LAS-SF Total 
TAF-Moral  
 
TAF-Likelihood 
 
LAS-SF Total  
              1.00                                  .30**                              -.07    
                                                      
1.00                                    .15*  
 
                                                                                              1.00    
Note: TAF-Moral = Thought-Action Fusion Moral Beliefs, TAF-Like = Thought-Action 
Fusion Likelihood Beliefs, and LAS-SF Total = Total Suicide Proneness. 
** = Gender differences significant at the .01 level 
* = Gender differences significant at the .05 level 
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Table 9 
 
Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis of TAF-Moral and TAF-Likelihood on LAS- 
 
SF Total 
 
 
                                                    B             Beta         Std. Error           F             R2                
LAS-SF Total                                                                                      4.82          .04**  
 
             TAF-Moral                  -.08            .13*              .04    
     
            TAF-Likelihood             .23            .19**            .08 
Note: TAF-Moral = Thought-Action Fusion Moral Beliefs, TAF-Like = Thought-Action 
Fusion Likelihood Beliefs, and LAS-SF Total = Total Suicide Proneness. 
** = Gender differences significant at the .01 level 
* = Gender differences significant at the .05 level 
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PARENTAL/GUARDIAN PERMISSION FORM: THOUGHT ACTION FUSION 
AND RISKY BEHAVIORS 
Dear Parents/Legal Guardians, 
We would like to invite your child to participate in a study that looks at risk 
and/or protective factors that influence adolescents’ potential to engage in risky behaviors 
and self-defeating thought patterns. This study will take place at your son/daughter’s high 
school. Your child will be asked to fill out a survey that is made up of a series of self-
surveys about specific behaviors and thinking patterns that adolescents engage in 
everyday life. Specifically, your adolescent will be asked about how his/her thoughts 
about a situation affect the actual occurrence of the situation (For example: Pretend that 
you believe that you are going to have trouble passing an upcoming English test. In your 
opinion, does your thought of failing the test increase the chance that you will actually 
fail the test?). Your son/daughter will also be asked about some of his/her engagement in 
risky behaviors and self-defeating thought patterns (i.e. not wearing one’s seatbelt, eating 
unhealthy foods, listening to music with a violent/death theme, thinking frequently of 
death/suicide, and do you believe yourself to be a good person). This project in not an 
intervention, we are simply collecting your sons and daughter’s responses to a few self-
survey questions.  
Although answering some questions may make some people feel uncomfortable, 
we do not feel that your son/daughter is in any great harm by participating in this 
research. However, your child will be free to skip any question(s) that makes him/her feel 
uncomfortable. Additionally, your child will also have the right to cease participation of 
the study at any point during the survey. Lastly, if your son/daughter feels upset after 
taking the survey, we will provide them with the opportunity to speak with a 
professionally trained counselor and provide them with a list of resources where they can 
receive more aid outside of the school setting. While your child may not directly benefit 
from participating in this research, this information to which he/she provides will help 
mental health officials and school counselors better understand which behaviors and 
thoughts are more likely protect or contribute to adolescents engaging in risky behaviors 
and self-defeating thought patterns. In turn, this should help prevent more accidents and 
violence within the school and familial environment.  
If your child brings back this formed signed by you (no matter if you say no or 
yes to their participation in the study) they will receive a small incentive (generally a 
candy bar or something similar that complies with your son/daughter’s school 
regulations). Moreover, for every child that participates and completes the survey, the 
researcher will give one dollar to the student government to help pay for student activities 
(i.e. proms or field trips).  
 All information your child provides will be anonymous. His or her information 
will be identified by code number only. His or her name will not be placed anywhere on 
the survey, except possibly on the last page. The last page of the survey offers your child 
the opportunity to speak to mental health professional if they feel any type of distress 
from taking the survey. We will ask you child to sign his/her name on the last page if 
they would like to speak with a mental health professional. Although we do not expect 
that many adolescents will need to speck with a mental health professional, we want to 
make sure that every adolescent who completes the survey has a chance to reduce any 
stress caused from participating in the study. The researcher will tear the last page of the 
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survey off of the packet so it will not be identified with any of your child’s responses. If 
by chance your child tells one of the research members that he/she is going to hurt 
himself/herself, another, or is being abused at home, we must take steps to ensure that 
your child is safe. All information will be stored in a lock file cabinet in the primary 
researcher’s office. Only the primary researchers will have access to the data. The 
information your child provides will be lock and kept safe for five years. After the five 
years are up, all information collected from this project will be destroyed. Individual 
responses to the survey will not be published in any manner. Only group information will 
be presented in any publications generated from this research, your child will not be 
personally identified in any way. 
 If you wish to have a more thorough assessment of you child’s emotional health 
or if you are concerned about some of your child’s current behavior, I have negotiated for 
the services of Teen Screen to be available to assess your child free of cost. Teen Screen 
is Mental Health Association of Tulsa sponsored program that provides high school 
students the chance to talk about their difficulties with a trained professional. The trained 
professional will come into the high school and take your son/daughter out of class and 
have them take an assessment on a lap top computer. The assessment should only take 
about twenty to forty minutes depending how long the interview lasts. The computer 
assesses your child for drug/alcohol risk, depressive and anxious symptoms, and physical 
health needs. Once the student has completed the survey, the trained professional will 
discuss some of their responses with them. If the trained professional is concerned about 
some of their behavior, they will make contact with you and discuss with you some of 
your child physical and emotional needs. This program is not associated directly to the 
study, it is just a service that will be offered in case you (the parents/legal guardians) 
want a through assessment of you child’s emotional health and/or concerned about some 
of your child’s current behavior. If you are interested in this program please notify us by 
checking the appropriate space below and we will send you more specific information 
regarding Teen Screen including a permission form for your son/daughter to be assessed. 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding the study, you can contact Jeff Klibert 
M.S. or Dr. Jan Bartlett, Ph. D. at (405) 744-2104. If you have questions about your 
child’s rights as a volunteer, you may contact Dr. Sue C. Jacobs, IRB Chair, 219 Cordell 
North, Stillwater, OK 74078, 405-744-1676 or irb@okstate.edu. 
 
I have read and fully understand the consent form.  
As parent or guardian I would like ____________________________(print child’s name)  
 
_____to participate in the described research. 
_____not to participate in the research above 
_____to participate in the research above and send me information on Teen Screen. 
_____ not to participate in the research above, but send me information on Teen Screen.    
 
___________________________  ________________ 
Parent/Guardian Name (printed)   Date  
 
___________________________  ________________ 
Signature of Parent/Guardian   Date 
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CONSENT FORM FOR STUDENTS OLDER THEN 18 OR WHO HAVE BEEN 
EMANCIAPTED FOR THOUGHT ACTION FUSION AND RISKY BEHAVIORS 
 
Currently, at your high school, we are conducting research on risk and/or 
protective factors that influence adolescents’ potential to engage in risky behaviors and 
self-defeating thought patterns. If you agree to participate in the study, you will be asked 
to fill out a survey that is made up of a few questionnaires about specific behaviors and 
thinking patterns that you do in everyday life. Specifically, you will be asked about how 
your thoughts about a situation affect the actual occurrence of the situation (For example: 
Pretend that you believe that you are going to have trouble passing an upcoming English 
test. In your opinion, does your thought of failing the test increase the chance that you 
will actually fail the test?). You will also be asked about some risky behaviors you might 
do and self-defeating thought patterns (i.e. not wearing one’s seatbelt, eating unhealthy 
foods, listening to music with a violent/death theme, and do you believe yourself to be a 
good person). 
Although answering some questions may make some people feel uncomfortable, 
we do not feel that you are in any great harm by participating in this research. However, 
you will be free to skip any question(s) that makes you feel uncomfortable. Additionally, 
you also have the right to stop participation of the study at any point during the survey 
without penalty. If you feel upset after taking the survey, we will provide you with the 
opportunity to speak with a professionally trained counselor. At the end of the survey you 
will be asked if you would like to talk with a mental health professional. If you decide 
you would like to talk with a mental health professional we will ask you to indicate so by 
printing your name on the last page in the appropriate section. The last page will be torn 
off from the rest of the data and will not be used to identify your responses in any way. 
At the end of the survey everyone will get a list of resources that may help individuals 
who want to talk to someone outside of school. While you may not directly benefit from 
participating in this research, the information you give will help mental health officials 
and school counselors better understand which behaviors and thoughts are more likely 
protect or contribute to adolescents engaging in risky behaviors and self-defeating 
thought patterns. In turn, this should help prevent more accidents and violence at school 
and in the family or with friends.  
If you bring back the consent form (no matter if you say no or yes to their 
participation in the study) you will receive a small incentive (generally a candy bar or 
something similar that complies with your son/daughter’s school regulations). Moreover, 
if you choose to participate and complete the surveys, the researcher will give one dollar 
to the student government to help pay for student activities (i.e. proms or field trips).  
 All information you provide us with will be anonymous. This means that we do 
not want to know which survey packet is yours; your answers will not be identified with 
you. Please do not put your name anywhere on the survey except on the separate last 
page if you wish to speak to me, a school counselor, or other mental health professional. 
Your information will be identified by code number only. All information will be stored 
in a locked file cabinet in my office. My supervisor and I will be the only people who 
will see your responses, however we will not able to tell which response goes with which 
person. The information you provide will be locked and kept safe for five years. After the 
five years are up, all information collected from this project will be destroyed. Individual 
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responses to the survey will not be published in any manner. Only group information will 
be presented in any publications generated from this research, you will not be personally 
identified in any way. 
If you would like a more thorough assessment of your emotional health, I have 
negotiated for the services of Teen Screen to be available to assess you free of cost. Teen 
Screen is Mental Health Association of Tulsa sponsored program that provides high 
school students the chance to talk about their difficulties with a trained professional. The 
trained professional will come into the high school and take you out of class and have 
you take an assessment on a lap top computer. The assessment should only take about 
twenty to forty minutes depending how long the interview lasts. The computer assesses 
you for drug/alcohol risk, depressive and anxious symptoms, and physical health needs. 
Once you have completed the survey, the trained professional will discuss some of your 
responses with you. If the trained professional is concerned about some of their behavior, 
he/she will help you get in contact with people/agencies who can meet your 
emotional/physical needs. This program is not associated directly to the study; it is just a 
service that will be offered in case you want a thorough assessment of your emotional 
health. If you are interested in this program please notify us by checking the appropriate 
space below and we will send you more specific information regarding Teen Screen 
including a permission form for you to be assessed. If you have any questions or concerns 
regarding the study, you can contact Jeff Klibert M.S. or Dr. Jan Bartlett, Ph. D. at (405) 
744-2104. If you have questions about the research and your rights as a research 
volunteer, you may contact Dr. Sue C. Jacobs, IRB Chair, 219 Cordell North, Stillwater, 
OK 74078, 405-744-1676 or irb@okstate.edu. 
 
Signature of student over the age of 18 or who has been emancipated. 
 
I have read and fully understand the consent form and have been given a copy to keep. 
 
 
I would like ____________________________(print your name)  
 
_____to participate in the described research. 
 
_____ not to participate in the research above 
 
_____ to participate in the research above and send me information on Teen Screen. 
 
_____ not to participate in the research above, but send me information on Teen Screen.    
 
___________________________  ________________ 
Participant’s Name (printed)   Date  
 
___________________________  ________________ 
Signature of Participant   Date 
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ASSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH: THOUGHT ACTION 
FUSION AND RISKY BEHAVIORS 
 
Currently, at your high school, we are conducting research on risk and/or 
protective factors that influence adolescents’ potential to engage in risky behaviors and 
self-defeating thought patterns. You will be asked to fill out a survey that is made up of a 
few self-surveys about specific behaviors and thinking patterns that you engage in 
everyday life. Specifically, you will be asked about how your thoughts about a situation 
affect the actual occurrence of the situation (For example: Pretend that you believe that 
you are going to have trouble passing an upcoming English test. In your opinion, does 
your thought of failing the test increase the chance that you will actually fail the test?). 
You will also be asked about some of your engagement in risky behaviors and self-
defeating thought patterns (i.e. not wearing one’s seatbelt, eating unhealthy foods, 
listening to music with a violent/death theme, and do you believe yourself to be a good 
person). 
 
Although answering some questions may make some people feel uncomfortable, 
we do not feel that you are in any great harm by participating in this research. However, 
you will be free to skip any question(s) that makes you feel uncomfortable. Additionally, 
you also have the right to stop participation of the study at any point during the survey 
without penalty. If you feel upset after taking the survey, we will provide you with the 
opportunity to speak with a professionally trained counselor. At the end of the survey you 
will be asked if you would like to talk with a mental health professional. If you decide 
you would like to talk with a mental health professional we will ask you to indicate so by 
printing your name on the last page in the appropriate section. The last page will be torn 
off from the rest of the data and will not be used to identify your responses in any way. 
At the end of the survey everyone will get a list of resources that may help individuals 
who want to talk to someone outside of school. While you may not directly benefit from 
participating in this research, this information to which you provide will help mental 
health officials and school counselors better understand which behaviors and thoughts are 
more likely protect or contribute to adolescents engaging in risky behaviors and self-
defeating thought patterns. In turn, this should help prevent more accidents and violence 
within the school and familial environment.  
 
If you have brought back your parental consent formed signed by your 
parents/legal guardians (no matter if you say no or yes to their participation in the study) 
you will receive a small incentive (generally a candy bar or something similar that 
complies with your son/daughter’s school regulations). Moreover, if you choose to 
participate and complete the surveys, the researcher will give one dollar to the student 
government to help pay for student activities (i.e. proms or field trips). 
 
All information you provide us with will be anonymous. This means that we do 
not want to know which survey packet is yours. Please do not put your name anywhere 
on the survey. The only place you should put your name is at the end of the survey if you 
want to talk to a mental health professional. If you by chance you tell us that you are 
going to hurt yourself, another, or are being hurt at home I must take steps to make sure 
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that you are safe. All information will be stored in a lock file cabinet in my office. My 
supervisor and I will be the only people who will see your responses.  
 
Signature for Participant Assent  
 
I have read and fully understand the consent form.  I sign it freely and voluntarily.  
A copy of this form has been given to me. 
 
________________________                  _______________ 
Signature of Participant   Date 
 
I certify that I have personally explained this document before requesting that the 
participant sign it.  
 
________________________       _______________ 
Signature of Researcher   Date 
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Script for Youth Cognitive Risk Factors Project 
 
Read the Following to the Class: 
 
“Good morning everyone, my name is (NAME). I would like  to tell you about an 
exciting project that you can participate in. This project asks you to respond to questions 
about your behaviors, emotions, and your thoughts. This is also an opportunity for you to 
miss a little class, fill out a questionnaire, and possibly learn new things about yourself. 
 
The reason we’re asking you guys all these questions is because we think that’s the best 
way to understand what teenagers are thinking and going through so we can provide help 
to those who need it. Specifically, we are also interested in seeing how thoughts and 
emotions are related to adaptive and risky behaviors teenagers. 
 
If you and your parents/legal guardians have given assent/consent you may participate in 
the study. If you did not bring back your consent form in or if you and/or your parents do 
not want you to take part in the study, you will take part in an exercise provided by your 
teacher. For those who are taking the survey, it should only take you about a half of an 
hour to complete. The questions are about how you feel in different situations, and how 
your thoughts affect your actions. We also ask you some questions about your 
experiences as a teenager. We want to remind you that participating in this project is 
voluntary. This means that you can stop at any time, or skip any questions that may 
bother you. However, it would benefit us if you answer each question as honestly as you 
can. Please do not put your name on any of the materials. This is important because we 
want to keep your information confidential, this means that we will not be able to tell 
your answers from anyone elses. However if you write or tell us that you are going to 
hurt yourself, hurt someone else, or if someone is hurting you at home we are legally 
responsible to take steps to make sure you are safe. After you have completed the survey, 
one of our project team members will pick it up from you. They will also give you a sheet 
that provides you with some resources in case you feel bad after taking the survey. Also 
our team members and some of your school counselors will be available to you if you 
want to talk about some emotions that may arise from taking the survey. After the the 
researcher picks up the survey, he/she will hand out an small incenitve to those students 
who brought back there parental consent/informed consent form (no matter if your 
parents/guardians gave you premission to take the survey or not).   
 
Does anyone have any questions?” 
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TEACHER INSTRUCTIONS FOR COLLECTING AND HANDLING STUDENT 
INFORMDED CONSENT: THOUGHT ACTION FUSION AND RISKY 
BEHAVIORS 
 
To all Teachers, 
 
Thank you for your participation in my study “Thought action fusion and risky behaviors 
in community adolescent.” Here are some instructions that should help both you and I 
with the process of collecting data in your classroom. Following these instructions are 
important for ethical and practical reasons. Firstly, it is my duty to protect any 
confidential information that either the student or the student’s parents provide me with, 
therefore I must take steps to ensure that all information is as safe as possible. Secondly, I 
know you are giving up some of your precious class time and I would like to make data 
collection as quick and easy for everyone involved.  
 
I will come into your classroom two weeks prior to collecting data to introduce the study 
to the students and hand them parental/guardian permission forms for them to take home 
to get signed by their legal parent/guardian. This process should only take five minutes of 
your class time. Upon giving the students the parental/guardian permission forms, I will 
ask them to have one of their parents sign the form and bring it back to you, so that you 
can store them for me until the date of data collection comes. It is important that you try 
to keep all the returning forms as secure as possible. This means storing all the 
permission forms in a secure location where it will near impossible for prying eyes to get 
a hold of who is and who is not participating in the study. It is my guess that students will 
be continually bringing these permission forms to you during the two weeks until I return 
to collect the data.  
 
The day of data collection will come approximately two weeks after I introduced the 
study. It is my guess that the data collection will take 30-40 minutes of your class time. 
Unfortunately, not all of the students will have received permission to take the survey, 
and therefore will not be participating in the survey on the data collection day. For those 
students, it would be great if you could have a pencil and paper assignment ready for 
them to complete while the students with permission to participate are completing the 
survey. I believe that a pencil and paper task would be best for two reasons 1) hopefully 
they will allow for enough silence so that those taking the survey can focus solely on 
completing the survey in a timely manner & 2) so it would be hard for someone to 
identify who is taking the survey and who is completing the class task.  
 
Overall, I truly appreciate your sacrifice of your class time. I hope this study provides a 
great amount of understanding and knowledge of adolescent problem behaviors and how 
to intervene and prevent them. If you have any questions about the study or how it will 
affect you and your students feel free to call me at (251) 689-0161. 
 
Thank you for your time and effort, 
 
Jeff Klibert 
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Demographic Sheet 
 
 
 
Directions: Please answer each question by filling in the blank, checking the blank, or circling the 
number that best describes you. 
1) How old are you? Age _______   
 
2) Are you   _____ Female or    _____ Male 
 
3) Race (Check all that apply): 
  ____ a) African American/Black 
____ b) American Indian/Native American 
____ c) Asian/Asian American 
____ d) Hispanic/Latino(a) 
____ e) White, non-Hispanic 
____ f) Other: _______________________ 
 
 
4) Who do you live with in your home?  ____________________________________________________ 
                                                                 
 
5)  What year are you in high school? 
      ____ a) Freshman  
    ____ b) Sophomore 
    ____ c)  Junior 
    ____ d)  Senior 
   
Right now we would like to ask you how are you feeling today. Please circle the answer 
the best describes how you are feeling RIGHT NOW. 
 
1) Happy 
  
 Not at all A little     Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
2) Bored 
 
 Not at all A little      Somewhat       A Lot     Very Much  
3) Anxious 
 
 Not at all A little       Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
4) Angry 
 
 Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
5) Curious  
 
Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
6) Sad 
 
Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
7) Tired 
 
Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
8) Offended 
 
Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
9) Embarrassed 
 
Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
10) Excited 
 
Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
11) Distracted 
 
Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
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TAFQ-A 
 
In the next section, there are two parts to each question. Please read each section 
carefully and answer each response as truthfully as you can. The first section gives you a 
situation where you have a certain thought about your self, a family member, a friend, or 
a stranger. In the second section (the response section) we want to know if this specific 
thought is as bad as actually committing the associated act or if a particular thought 
increases the risk of the actual associated act occurring. There is no right or wrong 
answer we just want to understand how specific thoughts affect you and your actions.  
Please answer the responses to each question by circling the appropriate number: circle 1 
is you believe that the response is not at all true, circle 2 is you believe the response is 
somewhat true, circle 3 if you believe that the response is pretty true, circle 4 is you feel 
that the response is very true.  
1 = Not at all True 
2 = Somewhat True 
3 = Pretty True 
4 = Very True 
 
 
01. You are with a friend. Suddenly without any 
reason you think that your friend is a stupid 
person. 
 
Response: Having this thought is almost as bad as really 
saying your friend is stupid. 
1…...2…...3…..4 
02. Suddenly without any reason you have the 
though that you are dying. 
 
Response Having this thought increases the risk that 
you really are going to die. 
1…...2…...3…..4 
03. You are alone in church standing in front of 
a large statue of Jesus. Suddenly you have a 
thought of spitting on the statue. 
 
Response Having this thought is almost as bad as really 
spitting on the statue. 
1…...2…...3…..4 
04. Suddenly without any reason you have the 
thought that your father is fired from his job 
and that there are money problems at home. 
 
Response Having this thought increases the risk that 
your father will be fired from his job. 
1…...2…...3…..4 
05. You meet a classmate. Suddenly without any 
reason you think of an abusing word for this 
person. 
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Response Having this thought is almost as bad as 
abusing this person. 
1…...2…...3…..4 
06. Suddenly without any reason you have the 
thought that you are hit by a car. 
 
Response Having this thought increases the risk that 
you really will be hit by a car. 
1…...2…...3…..4 
07. You are sitting in the classroom. All your 
classmates are quietly working. Suddenly 
you have the thought of shouting at the top 
of your voice. 
 
Response Having this thought is almost as bad as really 
shouting at the top of your voice in a silent 
class. 
1…...2…...3…..4 
08. Suddenly without any reason you have the 
thought that you fall seriously ill.  
 
Response Having this thought increases the risk that 
you really will fall seriously ill. 
1…...2…...3…..4 
09. In a silent street, you meet a younger child. 
Suddenly without any reason you think of 
pushing the child down. 
 
Response Having this thought is almost as bad as really 
pushing the child down. 
1…...2…...3…..4 
10. Suddenly without any reason you have the 
thought of your father or mother being in a 
car accident.  
 
Response Having this thought increases the risk of 
your father or mother really being in a car 
accident. 
1…...2…...3…..4 
11. You walk on the street and you meet an 
unfamiliar person. Suddenly you have the 
thought of making an obscene gesture to this 
person. 
 
Response Having this thought is almost as bad as really 
making an obscene gesture to this person. 
1…...2…...3…..4 
12. Suddenly without any reason you have the 
thought that your mother is dying. 
 
Response Having this thought increases the risk that 
your mother really is going to die sometime 
soon.  
1…...2…...3…..4 
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13. You have heard that the parents of one of 
your classmates are getting a divorce. 
Suddenly you have the thought of teasing 
your classmate with this information. 
 
Response Having this thought is almost as bad as really 
teasing your classmate with this information. 
1…...2…...3…..4 
14. Suddenly without any reason you have 
thought that you will not be able to graduate 
and move unto the next grade with your 
classmates. 
 
Response Having this thought increases the risk that 
you really will not graduate and not move 
unto the next class with your classmates. 
1…...2…...3…..4 
15. You come across your mother’s purse. 
Suddenly you have the thought of stealing 
some money from the purse. 
 
Response Having this thought is almost as bas as really 
stealing money from the purse.  
1…...2…...3…..4 
 
LAS.  
 
For each of the statements below, think back over the past week and decide if the 
statement describes you. If the statement is true or mostly true for you, circle the T which 
stands for True. If the statement is false circle the F which stands for false. 
  
01. I take care of my possessions so they last will last as 
long as possible. 
01.     T           F 
02. I choose to listen to music that has a death related 
theme. 
 
02.     T           F 
03. I try to eat foods that are good for me. 
 
03.     T           F 
04. I have gone on an occasional drinking spree. 
 
04.     T           F 
05. I avoid unnecessary risks. 05.     T           F 
06. At least once a month, I have driven or have been 
driven more than 20 miles per hour over the speed 
limit. 
06.     T           F 
07. I rarely do things that violate my standards. 
 
07.     T           F 
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08. I spend a lot of time things that are unproductive or 
unfulfilling. 
08.     T           F 
09. I look forward to life. 
 
09.     T           F 
10. I enjoy thinking about death. 
 
10.     T           F 
11. I enjoy eating “right.” 
  
11.     T           F 
12. I don’t really care much about what I eat (e.g. fried 
foods, sugar, etc.). 
12.     T           F 
13. I enjoy spending time with people who are cautious 
and avoid unnecessary risks.  
13.     T           F 
14. Sometimes I feel so frustrated that I would like to 
hit my fist against the wall (or something that could 
hurt me). 
14.     T           F 
15. I feel good because my activities are meaningful 
and have purpose. 
15.     T           F 
16. I wish I was someone else. 
 
16.     T           F 
17. I expect to have along an interesting life. 
 
17.     T           F 
18. Killing myself would solve many of my problems. 
 
18.     T           F 
19. It is important to brush one’s teeth after every meal. 
 
19.     T           F 
20. The danger of smoking cigarettes has been 
exaggerated. 
 
20.     T           F 
21. The chance of my being injured in an accident in the 
next year is very low (less than 10%). 
21.     T           F 
22. Sometimes I think about injuring myself (i.e. 
smashing my fist into a window). 
22.     T           F 
23. I believe I am a good person. 
 
23.     T           F 
24. I think I am worthless. 
 
24.     T           F 
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Right now we would like to ask you how are you feeling today. Please circle the answer 
the best describes how you are feeling RIGHT NOW. 
 
1) Happy 
  
 Not at all A little     Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
2) Bored 
 
 Not at all A little      Somewhat       A Lot     Very Much  
3) Anxious 
 
 Not at all A little       Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
4) Angry 
 
 Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
5) Curious  
 
Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
6) Sad 
 
Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
7) Tired 
 
Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
8) Offended 
 
Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
9) Embarrassed 
 
Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
10) Excited 
 
Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
11) Distracted 
 
Not at all A little      Somewhat        A Lot     Very Much 
 
 
Were you upset by any of the questions in the survey?  Yes___ No___ 
 
If so, how much were you upset by the questions in this survey? 
    
A. Not at all         B. A Little       C. Somewhat         D. A Lot           E. Very Much   
      
Which specific items bothered you? 
 
 
What suggestions do you have for future researchers to help students be comfortable 
participating in research studies? 
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               Some of these questions can be very personal and sometimes people can feel 
bad or upset by being asked such personal questions. This is your chance to 
speak with a mental health professional if you are feeling really upset or sad. If 
you would like to speak to a mental health professional please print you name in 
the following blank. If you do not want to speak to a mental health professional 
please do not print your name in the blank. This sheet will not be apart of your 
responses it will be torn out by the researcher once you hand in your survey. 
 
 
PRINT YOUR NAME HERE IF YOU WANT TO SPEAK WITH A MENTAL  
 
HEALTH  PROFESSIONAL:_______________________________________ 
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WHEN YOU ARE BEING REFERRED FOR COUNSELING 
  
If you have insurance, look on the back of the insurance card for a Customer 
Service phone number.  Call your insurance carrier and ask about your mental 
health benefits.  You will want to ask about your benefits, the cost to you, and 
how to choose a mental health service provider. 
You will want to get answers to these specific questions:  
 BENEFITS - What are my outpatient mental health benefits? 
 COST - How much will it cost to me to receive mental health 
services?  
 SERVICE PROVIDERS - Who can provide mental health services 
under this plan? 
 
Most insurance plans require that mental health services be provided by a 
licensed mental health professional. In Oklahoma, there are several different 
kinds of licensed mental health professionals. They are:  
   
 
LMFT  Licensed Marital & Family Therapist  
LPC  Licensed Professional Counselor 
LSW/LCSW Licensed Social Worker with Clinical  
    Specialty   
 LMHP Licensed Mental Health Professional  
    (new specialty-verify on network) 
 
 
 
IF YOU DO NOT HAVE INSURANCE: 
If you are seeking mental health services and do not have health insurance or if 
you have a policy which does not include mental health care, then you will 
probably want to seek mental health services from one of the community 
agencies that provide services with fees charged on a sliding scale based on 
one’s income.  Attached is a list of area agencies. 
If you have any questions or need further help 
please contact the Mental Health Association in Tulsa  
at 585-1213 
or  
The Tulsa HelpLine  
at 211 or www.211Tulsa.com 
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MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES (CHILD/ADOL) 
Associated Centers for Therapy 
 7010 S. Yale, Suite 215 
 Contact: Teresa Mashburn  492-2554 
Broken Arrow Family Resource Center 
 802 N. Sycamore, Broken Arrow 
 Contact: Phil Lowe   258-6545 
Britney Parks    747-1600 5512 S Lewis Ave.  
 (Neuropsychological and psychological testing) 
Center for Counseling  and Education 747-6800 
CREOKS    
 6126 East 32nd Place 
 Contact: Jennifer Givens   592-1622 
DaySpring Services of Oklahoma 712-0859 
 2761 E. Skelly Drive, Suite 700 
 Contact: Alica Longnecker  388-6449 
Family & Children’s Service   587-9471 
  650 S. Peoria    
 4 intake staff/return call within 2 hrs.   
 Multiple office locations but ALL initial appointments  
 are scheduled at this number.) 
Parent/Child Center 
 1421 S. Boston (has services for family also) 
 Contact: Marcia Crutcher   599-7999 
Positive Behavioral Strategies 
 1629 S. Peoria 
 Contact: Pat Baxter   585-9888 
Youth Services of Tulsa   582-0061 
 311 S. Madison  
 Contact: David Grewe   382-4491 Owasso office, Kim  
 272-5146 
 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES (YOUTH)  
Palmer Drug Abuse Program   832-7763 711 S. Sheridan  
 Contact: Tania Stewart 
 
RESTRICTED SERVICES (INDIAN YOUTH)  
Indian Health Care Resource Center   588-1900 550 S. Peoria 
 Contact: Dr. Janet Willis, Norman Summers, LCSW  {Must have CDIB 
(Indian Certification) card}    
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS 
Family Medical Care Counseling Services 
 7600 S. Lewis    493-7852 
 Contact: Jenny Rettig 
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COUPLES, PARENTS, & FAMILIES  
Domestic Violence Intervention Services  585-3163 
 4300 S Harvard, Suite 100 
YWCA Resource/Resonance Center  587-3888 
 1608 South Elwood Avenue 
OU Psychiatric Clinic    660-3130 
 4502 East 41st Street   522-3211 
 Medication management-Adults only 
HOSPITALS (Out Patient & Inpatient services) 
Laureate Psychiatric Clinic   481-4000 
 6655 S. Yale 
 Rotating intake staff 
Parkside Psychiatric Hospital and Clinic  588-8888 
 1619 East 13th Street 
 Contact:  Darren Sanchez 
Shadow Mountain Behavioral Health 492-8200 
 6262 S. Sheridan Rd.    
 Contact: Elizabeth James    
St. John’s Medical Center    748-9868 
 4720 S. Harvard  
 Contact: JoAnn Flournoy, RN 
Tulsa Regional Medical Center   599-5880 
 744 W 9th Street 
 Ask for admissions 
Local Resources 
Tulsa HelpLine     211 
Mental Health Association in Tulsa   585-1213 
 Contact:  Mark Davis  627-2224 
Al-Anon/Alateen     747-0017 
Call Rape Crisis Line    744-RAPE 
      744-7273 
State Resources 
Teen Hotline      1-800-522-TEEN  (12:00 noon-12:00 midnight)     
(8336) 
Reach-Out Hotline     24/7 1-800-522-9054 
Safeline (domestic violence)  24/7  1-800-522-7233 
Child Abuse Hotline   24/7  1--522800-3511 
Sexually Transmitted Diseases Hotline 1-800-227-8922 
Oklahoma AIDS Hotline   1-800-535-AIDS Spanish AIDS Hotline  
 1-800-344-SIDA   
National Resources 
National Mental Health Association 1-800-969-NMHA     
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill  1-800-950-6264 
National Crisis Helpline   1-800-999-9999 
American Foundation for Suicide Prevention 1-888-333-2377 
American Association of Suicidology 1-202-237-2280 
National Suicide Prevention Lifeline 1-800-273-TALK 
Spanish   1-888-628-9454  
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YOUTH SERVICES AGENCIES (METRO AREA): 
The youth services agencies operate on contracts with the state.  They focus on counseling services for teenagers and 
their families and also operate emergency youth shelters for teenagers who need to leave the family setting for a 
short period. 
 
Claremore Rogers County Youth Services   24 HOURS + shelter (918) 341-7580 
  (Rogers County)    Contact: Linda Wilton 
Pawhuska Youth Services of Osage County  24 HOURS + shelter (918) 287-2881 
  (Osage County) 
Sapulpa  Youth Services of Creek County  24 HOURS + shelter (918) 227-2622 
  (Creek County) 
Tulsa  Youth Services of Tulsa   24 HOURS + shelter (918) 582-0061 
  (Tulsa / Wagoner Counties)  Contact:  David Grewe 
 
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS (METRO AREA): 
Community mental health centers operate on contracts with the state, and tend to serve primarily adults, but they 
also have evaluation, case management, and some medication and treatment services for teenagers in most counties. 
 
Grand Lake Mental Health Center, Inc.   (M-F, 8:00am-5:00pm) (918) 430-0335 
Crisis (after hours)        (800) 722-3611 
Claremore Office        (M-F, 8:00am-5:00pm) (918) 342-0770 
 
CREOKS Mental Health Services, Inc.   (M-F, 8:30am-5:00pm) (918) 756-9411 
Crisis (after hours)        (800) 756-9246 
Tulsa Satellite Office     (M-F, 8:30am-5:00pm)  (918) 382-7300 
Sapulpa Satellite Office     (M-F, 8:30am-5:00pm) (918) 227-2016 
Okemah Satellite Office     (M-F, 8:30am-5:00pm) (918) 623-2922 
 
Edwin Fair Community Mental Hlth. Ctr.   (M-F, 8:00am-5:00pm) (580) 762-5761 
 Crisis (after hours)        (800) 566-1343  
Pawhuska Satellite Office     (M-F, 8:00am-5:00pm) (918) 287-1175 
      
Bill Willis Community  Mental Health Ctr.   (M-F, 8:00am-5:00pm) (918) 456-8272 
 
Wagoner Satellite Office:     (M-F, 8:00am-5:00pm) (918) 485-4040 
 
COPES AND COPES for kids    24 hours a day  (918) 744-4800 
 
RESOURCE CENTERS: 
OSU-COM Tulsa Area Prevention Resource Center (Public Clearinghouse)  
1560 E. 21st St., Suite, 210, Tulsa, OK 74114     (918) 749-8800 
 
Youth Resource Library, Oklahoma Cooperative Extension Service Tulsa County  
4116 E. 15th St., Tulsa, OK 74112       (918) 746-3706 
 
University of Oklahoma National Resource Center for Youth Services 
202 West 8th St, Tulsa, OK  74119       (918) 585-2986
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